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Abstract
There has been a resurgence of interest in prosocial behaviour in recent years, but many
authors avoid the topic of altruism due to the difficulty of discerning the motives behind
the behaviour. The present thesis takes a behavioural definition of altruism (Le. that the
point of interest is the altruistic action rather than the underlying motives) and employs a
paradigm from experimental economics that minimises the impact of motivating factors
aside from altruism: the dictator game. Preschool children's emerging altruistic behaviour is
assessed and the norms governing this behaviour are hypothesised. Chapter 1 gives an
introduction to prosocial behaviour in general, before focussing on altruism and the
dictator game. It demonstrates that while behaviour in older children and adults is
influenced by numerous intrinsic and extrinsic factors, little is known about influences on
the altruistic and dictator game behaviour of preschool children. Chapter 2 conducts a
standard DG with 4-5 year-old children with particular focus on the influence of siblings. It
also examines the impact of endowment size, providing a reduced endowment in order to
ascertain whether children's understanding of the numerosities involved influences dictator
game behaviour. There was no effect of endowment size upon DG behaviour, but sibling
status was found to influence donations, with children with older siblings being more likely
to donate than those without older siblings. These results are discussed in terms of models
of sibling influence. Chapter 3 extends these findings by examining whether adults behave
similarly to children and whether the influence of older siblings remains in adulthood. A
shift in the influence of siblings was observed, with adults with siblings being more
generous than those without siblings, rather than older siblings in particular being
beneficial. How these findings further inform models of sibling influence is discussed.
Chapter 4 examines how the source of the endowment influences preschoolers' altruistic
behaviour in the dictator game by asking children to earn their endowments rather than
provide them as a windfall. While previous work has shown that adults are less generous
ii
when they have earned their endowment than when it is a windfall, children showed little
difference in behaviour according to the source of their endowment, although there is
evidence to suggest that children with older siblings are beginning to internalise the
relevant norms (otherwise there was no effect of sibling status). Chapter 5 examines the
effect of framing upon children's altruistic behaviour by providing different information
about the recipient (rather than no information as is standard in the DG). Children gave
more to a recipient with positive characteristics than one with negative characteristics and
were also influenced by the mere possession of information. Chapter 6 sums up by
demonstrating how these findings interact to inform our understanding of preschoolers'
altruistic behaviour and outlines areas for future research. Altogether, this thesis
demonstrates that there are numerous influences on preschoolers' altruistic behaviour but
children are nonetheless similarly altruistic to adults rather than more selfish, as is often
assumed.
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Chapter 1: General introduction
Anyone who pays attention to the news would find it easy to believe that humans have a
huge capacity for antisocial behaviour but are much less inclined towards prosocial
behaviour. This imbalance in reporting is also found in the psychology literature, with much
greater emphasis being placed on antisocial than prosocial behaviours. Indeed, a recent
search of Web of Knowledge for papers produced in the last ten years including the term
'prosocial' returned 2558 results; the same search including the term 'antisocial' returned
9116 articles, more than three times as many ("Web of Knowledge," 2010). Nonetheless,
prosocial acts occur with a potentially surprising frequency - in anyone day the majority of
those of us lucky enough to live in a peaceful country will experience much more in the way
of prosocial behaviours than in the way of antisocial acts. This thesis aims to explore the
prosocial behaviour of altruism in a group that is often assumed to behave selfishly:
preschool children.
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 1.1 will begin by describing prosocial
behaviour and its development, before outlining some of the influences on prosocial
behaviour. Section 1.2 will focus on one form of prosocial behaviour: altruism. Definitions
and theories of altruism will be considered and methodologies employed to examine
altruistic behaviour will be discussed.Section 1.3 will explore one paradigm in particular in
detail, the dictator game, which is the experimental measure that will be used throughout
the thesis. Influences on dictator game behaviour will be outlined, criticisms of the dictator
game will be considered, and explanations for dictator game behaviour will be explored.
Finally, section 1.4 will round up by outlining some of the outstanding questions that this
thesis aims to addresswith useof the dictator game.
1
1.1 Prosocial behaviour
The term 'prosocial' was introduced as an antonym of 'antisocial' (Wispe, 1972) and can be
defined as a behaviour voluntarily undertaken in order to benefit another (Eisenberget al.,
1999). There are a number of behaviours that fall under the umbrella term of prosodality,
including altruism, helping, sharing and cooperation (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989), although
there are doubtless numerous additional behaviours that fall into each of these categories
(e.g. comforting, volunteering, etc.). Prosocial actions involve an individual providing a
resource to benefit another individual or group. The resource in question is not necessarily
a concrete item such as sharing food or donating money: it could be provision of support or
volunteering time, to name just two examples. Cooperation differs slightly from other
prosocial behaviours in that it is not unidirectional and thus involves less asymmetry,
entailing two or more people working together to achieve a mutually beneficial goal
(Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). Altruism, on the other hand, can be viewed
as prosocial behaviour in its strictest sense, given that it is often argued that altruistic
behaviour benefits another in the absenceof benefit to the self; this is discussed in greater
detail in section 1.2.
1.1.1 Prosodal development
A great number of studies in the developmental psychology literature over the last SOyears
have found that prosocial behaviour increases linearly with age, with children gradually
learning the social norms and personal benefits of acting in the interests of another (see
Eisenberg, Fabes & Spinrad, 2006 for a comprehensive review). Hoffman (2000) has
advanced a theory of prosocial development that is closely coupled with empathic
development. In this theory, prosociality has its roots in emotional contagion and overt
prosociality emerges as a child begins to distinguish between the self and other in the
second year of life. Pure prosocial motives increase throughout childhood as role-taking
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ability develops and the child begins to feel sympathetic distress for the plight of another,
seeking to help because they feel sorry for the victim rather than in an effort to alleviate
their own distress (as would a younger child). As empathic ability matures, the child can
empathise beyond the immediate situation (the highest level of empathic ability), leading
to an understanding of the victim's long-term plight. Presumably this ultimately leads to
prosocial behaviours such as charitable donations and volunteering, where the recipient is
not necessarily present.
Hay (1994) suggeststhat, rather than a linear increase in prosociality, there is aU-shaped
function in prosocial behaviour with age. In the first two years of life the child is
indiscriminantly prosocial, performing actions such as sharing with any recipient. Indeed,
children as young as 18 months will cooperate with a stranger to achieve a shared goal or
help a stranger retrieve an out-of-reach object (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). After 2
years of age, Hay found that prosocial behaviour declines as the child learns the instances
in which it is not only acceptable but beneficial to behave self-interestedly. Prosociality
subsequently slowly increases as prosocial norms are learned and applied, becoming more
stable after toddlerhood (Hay, 1994; Hay,Castle,Davies,Demetriou & Stimson, 1999).
Hay's (1994) view of prosocial development involves acquisition of social norms, which is
dependent upon social interaction, while Hoffman (2000) takes a more maturational
approach. While these two theories predict slightly different functions of prosocial
development, they are not mutually exclusive. While, as stated above, many empirical
studies find a linear increase in prosociality (Eisenberg, Fabes & Spinrad, 2006) and this
appears incompatible with Hay's (1994) findings, it is possible that the developmental
function is dependent upon the behaviour in question. Hay's U-shaped function may
therefore be related to her focus on sharing behaviours; other behaviours that do not
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appear to show such a function, such as helping and cooperating, may have a different
developmental trajectory as they are lesscostly to the child (Eisenberg& Fabes,1998). As
such, it is possible that both empathic development and social interaction are important for
successful prosocial development.
Cialdini, Baumann and Kenrick (1981) focussed more specifically on altruism, proposing a
three-step model of its development. They argue that while altruism is not rewarding to
begin with, children learn its rewarding properties through socialisation. This occurs in two
ways: through positive reinforcement from adults and through experiencing a reduction in
empathic distress when acting to help another individual. Furthermore, they propose that
girls should internalise the rewarding nature of altruism earlier than boys as they are more
likely to be socialised to be altruistic. In the first step of internalisation, the
'presocialisation' stage, altruistic behaviour is sporadic and slightly aversive as it involves
loss of resources for the child. In the 'awareness of norms' step children are aware that
altruism is valued but have not yet internalised the reward value of altruism, and so behave
altruistically only when observed (Froming, Allen & Jensen, 1985 find that this occurs at
about 7 years of age). The 'internalisation' step occurs by young adulthood, by which time
children find altruism internally rewarding and so there is no longer any need for external
observation or reinforcement. From this viewpoint, therefore, young children are capable
of little altruistic behaviour; by middle childhood children will enact altruistic behaviours
only to gain approval from others, while true altruism does not emerge until the teenage
years.
Empirical observation supports the notion that prosocial behaviours increase through
ontogeny. Explicit prosocial behaviours have been demonstrated in infants as young as 12
months old, who will attempt to comfort another individual in distress (Eisenberg &
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Mussen, 1989; Hoffman, 2000). By 14 months, toddlers will sometimes attempt to help an
adult in difficulty (e.g. by retrieving dropped items) and cooperate to achieve a shared goal
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). These behaviours are more stable and frequently-occurring
once the child reaches 18 months, and the child often undertakes them spontaneously
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007). Warneken and Tomasello (2009) argue that this early
prosociality demonstrates innate altruism, especially since this prosociality seems to be
intrinsically motivated given that when rewards are provided, rather than encouraging
prosocial behaviour, it is decreased (Warneken & Tomasello, 2008).
Knafo, Zahn-Waxler, Van Hulle, Robinson and Rhee (2008) found that both empathy and
prosocial behaviour increased between 14 and 36 months of age. Empathy was related to
prosocial behaviour, although this relationship was stronger with prosocial behaviours
directed towards the mother than towards a stranger. In their meta-analysis of 155 studies
of prosocial behaviour, Eisenberg and Fabes (1998) confirmed that prosocial behaviour
does indeed increase with age. It appears that this is dependent upon the type of prosocial
behaviour measured, with sharing and donating but not instrumental helping or comforting
showing an increase. Nonetheless, the influence of age remains even when the influence of
behaviour type is controlled, suggesting a general age-related increase in prosocial
behaviour. Conversely, Eisenberg et al. (1999) explored the consistency of prosocial
dispositions through longitudinal comparison of prosocial behaviour at 4-5 years and in
early adulthood. They found that children who showed early prosociality were likely to be
prosocial adults, with early spontaneous sharing predicting later empathy and prosocial
behaviour.
Changes in prosociality in adulthood are less well examined but the available evidence
suggests that prosociality continues to increase throughout the life span. In a
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representative Dutch sample spanning 15-89 year olds, the proportion of prosocially-
oriented people increased with age (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997).
Furthermore, in a representative American sample with a mean age of 50 years charitable
donations were found to increase with age (Carpenter, Connolly, & Myers, 2008), although
this may reflect an increase in personal resources with age, which in turn can lead to
greater freedom to donate to charity. While prosocial behaviour is initially egoistically
motivated, as empathic ability develops the other's perspective is increasingly considered;
however, rather than simply emerging over the childhood years, prosocial behaviour
appears to continue to increase throughout a person's lifetime.
1.1.2 Influences on prosocial behaviour
Given the changes observed in prosocial behaviour through development, it is perhaps not
surprising that numerous other factors also influence prosociality. These can broadly be
divided into intrinsic factors and extrinsic factors: intrinsic factors such as personality, genes
or emotions are internal to the individual, while extrinsic factors exert their influence
through the wider environment, such as the culture the individual was brought up in or
their family situation.
1.1.2.1 Intrinsic influences on prosocial behaviour
A fundamental component of prosocial behaviour is affect: people's emotions are aroused
by others' situations, which can drive people to prosocial action (Penner et al., 2005).
Prosocial emotions include guilt and empathy (Gintis, 2003a) and can lead to both
egoistically and altruistically motivated prosociality. For instance, guilt arises when an
individual has transgressed a social or moral norm and thus feels responsible for the
suffering of another. This can induce the transgressor to seek to alleviate their own
negative emotional state by behaving prosocially towards the victim (Batson et al., 1991;
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Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce& Neuberg, 1997); however, this 'reparation' is likely to arise at
the expense of others around rather than the transgressor himself (de Hooge, Nelissen,
Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011). While egoistically motivated prosociality is the result of
experiencing personal distress, Batson et al. (1991) argue that empathic concern, in which
the individual experiences other-oriented concern, produces altruistically-motivated
prosociality with the aim only of benefitting the other person (see section 1.2.2). Altruism,
therefore, is driven only by other-oriented motives, while other prosocial behaviours (such
as helping, cooperating, comforting, sharing, etc.) may be driven by altruistic or egoistic
considerations, or a combination of the two.
An individual's personality also influences their prosociality: people who are more
Agreeable and Extraverted are more likely to indulge in prosocial behaviours (Caprara,
Alessandri, Di Giunta, Panerai, & Eisenberg,2010; Carlo, Okun, Knight, & de Guzman, 2005),
a relationship that is mediated by possessionof a prosocial social value orientation (SVO;
Carlo et al., 2005). SVOrefers to individuals' preferences for a balance in outcome between
themselves and others (Van Lange et al., 1997) and some people are predisposed to seek
prosocial outcomes. People can fall into one of three categories: prosocial, where they seek
the best outcome for all involved, individualist, where they seek the best outcome for
themselves regardless of others' outcomes, and competitor, where they seek an outcome
that is better in comparison to that of others. Having a prosocial SVO predicts prosocial
behaviours such as donations to noble causes (Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, & Van Vugt,
2007) and volunteerism (Carlo et al., 2005), with people with a prosocial SVObeing more
likely to engage in prasocial behaviours than individualists or competitors.
In order to identify that someone hasa problem and determine the course of action to take
in order to help them with that problem, one needs to be able to take another person's
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perspective (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Affective perspective taking (APT), the ability
to identify and understand others' emotions, is known to be associated with prosocial
behaviour (Knafo, Steinberg, & Goldner, 2011). However, there is a distinction between
compliant prosocial behaviour, in which a person is responding to a request from another
person, and self-initiated prosocial behaviour, where a person acts prosocially of their own
volition (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). Knafo et al. (2011) demonstrated that while APTdid
not influence 3-6 year-olds' compliant prosocial behaviour (such as helping, comforting and
sharing), children with low APTwere less likely to spontaneously respond prosocially than
those with high APT. APT therefore appears to enable children to infer the need for a
prosocial response when a request is not directly made. Furthermore, perspective-taking
appears to continue to influence prosocial behaviour as children get older. Sally and Hill
(2005) examined the behaviour of typically-developing 6-10 year-olds and high-functioning
children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in economic games designed to elicit
prosocial behaviours such as cooperation and fairness. They found that possessionof first
order false belief ability (Le. an understanding of others' mental states) was related to a
decrease in cooperation in children with ASD (all typically-developing children passed the
false belief task), implying that understanding first-order false beliefs is necessary for
strategic responding. Second-order false belief ability (Le. an understanding of others'
embedded mental states, that is a person's understanding of another person's beliefs
about a third person's mental state), on the other hand, was associated with increased
cooperation and fairness regardless of whether the child was typically-developing or on the
autistic spectrum. The authors suggest that early in development, theory of mind skills
enable the child to recognise and conform to social norms, while as theory of mind ability
develops it allows them to adapt these norms to suit their own needs (Sally& Hill, 2005).
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Gender differences are often found in prosocial behaviour. While a gender effect is not
always observed, when a difference is found females tend to behave more prosocially than
males, a finding that Eisenbergand Fabes(1998) confirmed in their large meta-analysis of
studies of prosocial behaviour. This gender difference is often attributed to girls being
socialised to be more prosocial than boys, (Cialdini et al., 1981; Croson & Gneezy, 2009;
Maccoby, 1988); however, more recently anatomical differences have been found that may
contribute to gender effects on prosocial behaviour. Yamasue et al. (2008) conducted
structural MRI scans on adult participants who had completed the Cooperativeness
subscale of the Temperament and Character Inventory (Cloninger, 1987). They found
evidence of anatomical sexual dimorphism in the form of females showing greater grey
matter volume in areas associated with social cognition (including posterior inferior frontal
gyrus and anterior medial prefrontal cortex). Moreover, they uncovered a significant
positive correlation between overall grey matter volume and Cooperativeness scores in
females but not males, independently of brain volume. This provides evidence that gender
differences in prosocial behaviour may have a biological basis, although there is of course
no evidence as to causality, Le. whether females are more prosocial because they have
greater grey matter volume or vice versa.
While it is not clear whether gender differences in prosocial behaviour are biological in
nature, prosocial behaviour does appear to have a genetic component. Numerous studies
have found that prosociality is heritable to some degree, although estimates vary (see
Eisenberg et al., 200Gfor an in-depth review). Longitidunal twin studies from Ariel Knafo's
research group has recently revealed that the reason for these differences in estimates of
heritability may in part be due to the fact that the influence of genetics upon prosocial
behaviour changeswith age. Knafo and Plomin (200Gb)found that between 2 and 7 years,
the influence of heritability upon parent and teacher report of prosociality increases, as
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does the impact of nonshared environment, while the impact of shared environment drops
over this period. By 3 years as much as 24% of the variance in prosocial behaviour (as
measured by responses to simulated pain by mothers and examiners) was due to
heritability, with 9%due to shared environment and the remaining 66% due to nonshared
environment and error (Knafo, Zahn-Waxler et al., 2008). Interestingly, in a twin study
examining the impact of genetics on adults' volunteerism, Son and Wilson (2010) found
gender differences in the heritability of prosocial behaviour (as measured by hours
volunteered per month): while women's volunteerism was heritable (although this
influence was not as strong as the effect of nonshared environment), men's was not. Men's
volunteerism was instead due to unique environmental effects. This finding is consistent
both with Knafo's findings that nonshared environment became increasingly important to
prosocial behaviour over the toddler years and Yamasue et al.'s (2008) finding that
women's but not men's cooperativeness was positively associated with their grey matter
volume. It appears that gender differences in prosocial behaviour may have a biological as
well associal component.
1.1.2.2 Extrinsic influences on prosocial behaviour
While the evidence above has demonstrated that there are a number of factors internal to
the individual that contribute to prosociality, the work of Knafo and colleagues has
demonstrated that environment also plays an increasingly important role in prosocial
behaviour (Ebstein, Israel, Chew, Zhong, & Knafo, 2010). Parenting is important, with a
more authoritative parenting style being associated with greater prosocial behaviour
(Hastings, Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, Usher, & Bridges, 2000). The parenting style of mothers
appears to be more influential than that of fathers, with mothers' authoritative style
predicting teacher report and observed prosocial behaviour of their preschool children
towards peers six months later. Fathers' parenting style showed a similar but weaker effect,
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which the authors attributed to fathers being likely to spend less time with their children
than mothers (Hastings, McShane, Parker, & Ladha, 2007). Knafo and Plomin (2006a)
conducted a twin study examining the influence of parental positivity and negativity upon
children's prosocial behaviour as assessed by parental report at 3, 4 and 7 years and
teacher report at 7 years. They found that parental positivity (e.g. disciplinary practices that
involve reasoning and explaining consequences) is associated with increased prosociality.
Parental negativity, on the other hand (e.g. punitive or power-assertive discipline) is
associated with decreased prosociality, possibly due to an emphasis on rule adherence
rather than moral internalisation. Parenting also predicted prosocial behaviour
longitudinally, even when controlling for previous prosocial behaviour.
While parents make an important contribution to their child's development, in the
preschool years a child is likely to spend far more time with their siblings than their parents
(Abramovitch, Corter, & Lando, 1979; Bank & Kahn, 1975). Opinion as to the degree of
influence a sibling has on their co-sibling's development is divided, with some arguing that
siblings have an enormous lifelong influence (e.g. Sulloway , 1996, 2001, 2007) and others
arguing that siblings are only influential in the family situation (e.g. Harris, 2000). However,
the presence or absenceof siblings and a child's position within the sibling constellation has
been little-investigated in the prosocial literature. Possessingsiblings appears to benefit
adults' social value orientation (SVO), that is a person's preferences for a balance in
outcome between themselves and others (Van Langeet al., 1997). People fall into one of
three SVOcategories: prosocial, individualistic or competitive (see section 2.1.1 for a more
detailed description of SVO).Van Langeet al. (1997) found prosocials to have significantly
more siblings in general and also more older siblings than both competitors and
individualists, leading them to suggest that possessing more siblings leads to a greater
chance of experiencing conflicts of interest and the necessity to share resources. This
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causes children to learn the benefits of cooperation and develop a prosocial SVO.Courtiol,
Raymond and Faurie (2009), on the other hand, found firstborns to be less cooperative,
being less trustful and reciprocating less in an economic game than middleborns, lastborns
and singletons.
Laterborns have been shown to score higher than firstborns on Agreeableness (Michalski &
Shackelford, 2002; Sulloway, 1996), a personality dimension that has been shown to be to
be related to college students' volunteerism (Carlo et al., 2005). Indeed, when examining
the altruism facet of Agreeableness, laterborns have been found to score significantly
higher than firstborns (Jefferson, Herbst, & McCrae, 1998) and lastborns have been found
to score significantly higher on the altruism facet than both middleborns and firstborns
(Saroglou & Fiasse,2003). However, in the only study to date to examine the impact of
siblings upon a behavioural measure of altruism in children, the opposite effect was found.
In their sharing game, in which a child must decide whether to choose one sweet for
themselves and one for another individual, or to keep both sweets for themselves (Le.
sharing is costly to the child) Fehr, Bernhard and Rockenbach (2008) found that 3-8 year-
aids children without siblings were more likely to share than children with siblings, while
lastborns were lesswilling to share than children with younger siblings. The authors suggest
that children with siblings experience more competition for resources, making them less
willing to share, while singletons, who do not experience these conflicts, are the most
generous. This opposite pattern is attributed to the use of a behavioural rather than a
questionnaire measure (see section 2.1.1 for a more detailed discussion of this study).
Given this mixed evidence in terms of both prosociality in general and altruism in particular,
the influence of siblings upon prosocial behaviour remains unclear.
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Given the frequent encouragement of prosocial behaviours in religious doctrine, religious
people are widely regarded to be more prosocially-oriented than people who are not
members of a religion. Indeed, it has been suggested that religious beliefs facilitated the
evolution of cooperation through fear of supernatural punishment (Johnson & Bering,
2006). In their review of religious prosociality, Norenzayan and Shariff (2008) note that
religious people report greater volunteerism and charitable behaviour than non-religious
people. However, religiosity is also related to social desirability and behavioural studies
suggest that where religiosity is associatedwith greater prosocial behaviour, it is the desire
to maintain a positive reputation that is responsible for this association. This is clearly
effective, as people perceived to be religious are also perceived as more trustworthy. The
authors conclude that religious prosociality is a bounded phenomenon, being driven by the
desire to maintain a positive reputation within the ingroup (Le. other members of the
religion) and that secular organisations are equally likely to produce charitable behaviour.
This idea is consistent with findings showing that people are more prosocial towards
members of their ingroup than outgroup members (see Penner et al., 2005). Grossmanand
Parrett (2011) suggest that a lack of context may have contributed to the heterogeneity in
experimental results with respect to religion and prosocial behaviour. They surveyed the
tipping behaviour and religiosity of patrons leaving restaurants (tipping can be considered
prosocial as it is to the benefit of the server and is not mandatory) and found no evidence
of religious prosociality. Consistent with Norenzayan and Shariff's (2008) conclusion that
religious prosociality is a bounded phenomenon, religious people did not tip any more than
non-religious people.
Prosociality varies from culture to culture, with individualist cultures often producing lower
levels of prosociality than collectivist cultures (Eisenberget al., 2006; Eisenberg& Mussen,
1989). Cultural differences in prosociality can be attributed to differences in the norms that
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are applicable in different societies (Gintis, 2003a). Norms are rules of behaviour that are
transmitted though imitation or teaching and enforced through the threat of sanctions for
violation (Allison, 1992). As such, an individual will punish a norm violator even if the
individual was not influenced directly by the transgression, leading to consistency in
behaviour within groups but heterogeneity between groups (Bernhard, Fehr, &
Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Conforming to norms is so important to
group interaction that individuals will internalise a norm, conforming to it even when not
externally observed. Violation of this personal norm leads to internal sanctions such as guilt
and shame (Gintis, 2003a; Perugini, Gallucci, Presaghi, & Ercolani, 2003; Schwartz &
Howard, 1980) as a personal norm is sustained by self-evaluation and self-sanctioning
rather than the threat of external sanctions in social norms.
Prosocial behaviour is an umbrella term that encompasses a variety of behaviours. This
section has described the development of prosocial behaviour and has demonstrated how
prosociality is influenced by numerous factors, both intrinsic and extrinsic. The next section
will focus on one subset of prosocial behaviour, altruism.
1.2 Altruism
Altruism can be viewed as the apogee of prosocial behaviour, in that the benefit to the
recipient comes at a cost to the actor (although a definition of altruism is remarkably
difficult to agree upon, see section 1.2.1). Numerous self-interested motives have been
suggested to account for apparently altruistic behaviour, and given the difficulty involved in
distinguishing between these, many studies have avoided the issue entirely by instead
focussing on more general prosocial behaviour. Nonetheless, there are several means of
studying altruistic behaviour and recently an economic game, the dictator game, has made
a great contribution to our understanding of altruism.
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1.2.1 Defining altruism
Before embarking upon a discussion of altruism, it is necessary to provide a definition in
order to create a framework within which the discussion will take place. However,
definitions of altruism vary depending upon the discipline within which the definition is
framed, with little consensus, even within disciplines, of what altruism means (West,
Griffin, & Gardner, 2007). Indeed, Clavien and Klein (2010) note that it is not uncommon for
authors to be inconsistent in their useof the term within a single paper. Within biology, for
instance, altruism is framed in Darwinian terms as a behaviour that increases the
reproductive fitness of the recipient at a cost to the reproductive fitness of the actor. The
intentions behind the act are not considered, merely the outcome, and so an apparently
altruistic act may have a selfish basis (de Waal, 2008; Sigmund & Hauert, 2002). Within
economics, altruism is considered an 'other-regarding behaviour', in which economic
benefits are conferred to a recipient at a cost to the actor (Clavien & Klein, 2010; Fehr &
Fischbacher, 2003); once again outcomes rather than intentions are considered. In
psychology, on the other hand, the motivation behind the behaviour is important. Altruism
is an internally-motivated behaviour through which an individual seeks to benefit the
recipient in the absence of external reward. Thus, altruism is motivated by factors within
the individual rather than by the expectation of reward or sanctions (de Quervain et al.,
2004; Eisenberg& Fabes,1998; Penner et al., 2005).
The variety of disciplines that study altruism agree on one main point - that an altruistic
behaviour must be beneficial to the recipient and have some sort of cost to the actor.
Whether this cost is in fact outweighed by the positive consequencesof engaging in such a
behaviour (e.g. positive reputation, future reciprocation, avoidance of guilt, etc.; see
section 1.2.2) is in many ways irrelevant as the outcome remains the same regardlessof the
motivation behind it. Indeed, attempting to find a selfish explanation for altruistic acts
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devalues altruism, overlooking that an altruistic act has taken place regardless of whether
the objective was 'truly' altruistic. As such, for the present purposes the term 'altruism' is
used in a behavioural sense. This approach sidesteps the issue of motives, but this
essentially comes down to a philosophical debate about the existence of altruism, one
which it is not possible to resolve here. As such, the present thesis is concerned with the
enactment of altruistic behaviours regardless of the intentions and motives behind them
and will work from the following definition: altruism is the enactment of a behaviour that is
beneficial to the recipient but costly to the actor.
1.2.2 Explaining altruism
Altruism has long been something of an evolutionary puzzle - how can a fitness-reducing
behaviour be reconciled with the tenets of evolution and Darwinian natural selection?
Similarly, economists view altruism as aberrant behaviour. From an economic standpoint all
people should seek to maximise their own utility, that is, they should be concerned with
ensuring that they derive maximal benefit from all situations: decreasing one's own utility
in order to increase that of another individual is not economically rational. Accounts of
altruism, therefore, often seek to find self-interested justifications for other-regarding
behaviours.
A number of animal species show altruism. Social insects such as ants and termites will lay
down their lives to protect the colony, birds will draw attention to themselves to warn the
flock of a predator, while vampire bats regurgitate blood for members of the colony who
have not successfully fed (Denault & McFarlane, 1995). It has been speculated that even
microbes (West, Diggle, Buckling, Gardner, & Griffin, 2007) and plants (Murphy & Dudley,
2009) show altruistic behaviour towards their relatives. However, Hamilton's theory of kin
selection (Hamilton, 1964) allows these behaviours to be interpreted within a fitness-
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enhancing framework. Kin selection focuses on inclusive rather than individual fitness - an
individual is successful when their genes, whatever their source (i.e. cousins,
nieces/nephews, grandchildren, etc.) are transmitted to the next generation. This approach
should mean that the greater the degree of relatedness between actor and recipient, the
greater the likelihood of altruism, and this is indeed the case (Stewart-Williams, 2007;
Webster,2003).
Humans are nonetheless unusual in that they direct their altruism towards non-kin as well
as kin. There are anecdotal reports of non-kin altruistic behaviour in animals (see Preston &
de Waal, 2002) but as yet there is little empirical evidence to reliably support these. As
such, many researchers have sought to explain why humans direct altruistic behaviours
towards non-kin. Trivers (1971) developed the idea of reciprocal altruism, proposing that
people will help non-kin if there is a chance of this being reciprocated in the future. While
people do respond positively to people who have behaved altruistically towards them,
people will nonetheless behave altruistically even if there is no chance of reciprocation
(Burger, Sanchez, Imberi, & Grande, 2009; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). Alexander (1987)
distinguishes between direct reciprocity, where the recipient responds directly to the actor,
and indirect reciprocity, where a third party responds to the actor. Indirect reciprocity
therefore requires the third party to learn of the actors reputation and respond
accordingly; people are as such more likely to behave altruistically when they are observed
(Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006).
Reputation formation is also used to explain altruism independently of reciprocity (Fehr &
Fischbacher, 2003). While people want to develop and maintain a reputation for being a
good person in order that people will respond in kind, some researchers also argue that
reputation may have also a reproductive component. Roberts (1998) suggested that
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altruism may be competitive - a means of signalling that one is a quality mate, comparing
altruism to an advertiser offering free samples of a product in order to draw customers'
attention to their products. It appears that this is successful as not only does altruistic
behaviour confer status (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006), but it also increases the perceived
attractiveness of the actor (Farrelly, Lazarus,& Roberts, 2007).
Despite reputation and reciprocity providing compelling explanations of why people behave
altruistically in public, they do not account for anonymous altruism (Hardy & Van Vugt,
2006). Andreoni has advanced an internal motive for altruistic behaviour: warm glow
(Andreoni, 1989, 1990). He suggeststhat people derive utility from the act of altruism, that
is to say that they experience a warm glow inside, arguing that altruism that is so motivated
is impure altruism. People do appear to derive pleasure from altruistic behaviours, with
increased activation in reward centres in the brain when making voluntary donations to the
public good. However, consistent with the idea of pure altruism, people also experience
pleasure even when donations are mandatory and therefore not attributable to the
individual's actions (Harbaugh, Mayr & Burghart, 2007). Warm glow alone does not explain
anonymous altruism (Konow, 2010).
Batson and colleagues acknowledge that altruistic responses do occur through a desire for
reward, to avoid sanctions or to reduce personal distress. However, they also argue that
altruistic behaviour is not always egoistically motivated and provide one of the few theories
of altruism that incorporates the idea of pure altruistic motivation: the empathy-altruism
hypothesis (Batson & Shaw, 1991). There are five stages to this empathic route to altruism.
The individual first must identify the other's need through adoption of their perspective -
this may occur through previous experience of a similar situation, through attachment to
the victim or through instruction. This leads to an empathic emotional response, causing
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the individual to be motivated to reduce the other person's need. The individual will then
conduct a cost/benefit analysis of helping - if the benefit is sufficiently outweighed by the
cost, the appropriate behavioural response will be considered and the action taken that
results in the greatest benefit (it is possible that inaction may be the most beneficial
response). A stronger empathic response, therefore should lead to a greater likelihood of
altruism. Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy and Varney (1986) manipulated situational
empathy by instructing participants to take the victim's perspective or be as objective as
possible and found that empathy was positively associated with helping. This was the case
even when their response was anonymous and so social evaluation was not a factor,
leading the authors to conclude that altruistic helping is not driven by a desire to avoid
negative social evaluation. Furthermore, the relationship was present both when the actor
was forced to observe the victim's distress and when escapewas easy and personal distress
could be reduced without taking altruistic action. However, Cialdini et al. (1997) found that
the relationship between the empathic concern and altruistic behaviour disappeared when
oneness (the degree of overlap between self and other) was controlled. This means that
altruistic behaviour driven by oneness is essentially helping the self rather than the other,
casting doubt on whether the link between empathic concern and altruism is truly
altruistically motivated.
1.2.3 Assessmentof altruism
There are a number of methodologies that have been used to assessaltruism in both adults
and children, including naturalistic observations, situational tests, ratings and questionnaire
measures. Naturalistic observations involve an observer watching the participant (generally
a child) in her natural environment, such as at home or at school and recording every
instance of the behaviour of interest within a defined period of time. While this method is
time-consuming, it produces reliable results and is highly ecologically valid. Situational tests
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involve putting the participant in a situation that may elicit the behaviour of interest and
recording how she responds. Ratings require the participation of somebody who knows the
participant well, such as a parent, teacher, peer or spouse. The rater is provided with a list
of characteristics and asked to score the participant according to where on a continuum she
falls for each characteristic. Questionnaire measures, on the other hand, involve asking the
participant herself to record how often she enacts the behaviour of interest, or to rate
herself for certain characteristics (Eisenberg& Mussen, 1989).
One potential criticism of situational studies, ratings and questionnaires is that they are
susceptible to demand characteristics and social desirability bias, especially when the
investigator directly interacts with the participant - she may be doing what she thinks is
expected of her or may simply desire to please the experimenter. In contrast, observational
group studies may reveal naturalistic prosocial and altruistic behaviours, but the absence of
such behaviours may simply reflect the lack of an opportunity to demonstrate them rather
than selfishness (Hay, 1994). In addition, it is impossible to disentangle the participant's
natural altruistic tendencies from general prosocial behaviours that are cued by the
presence of another individual or even direct requests from the other person - once again
social desirability makes altruism impossible to distinguish from general prosocial
behaviour.
Van Langeet al. (2007) suggest that experimental games may be less susceptible to social
desirability than alternative methods. A number of recent studies have made use of a
paradigm from experimental economics, the dictator game, which minimises the number of
confounding motives present, thus allowing a closer approximation to true altruism and
examination of the myriad influences on its expression.
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1.3 The dictator game
The dictator game (hereafter DG) is a two-person economic game designed to examine
altruism and fairness concerns (Camerer, 2003). It involves presenting a participant, the
dictator, with an endowment of money and asking him to make an anonymous unilateral
decision as to whether or not to allocate a proportion to another individual, the recipient.
The recipient has no role other than to accept whatever is offered to them by the dictator.
The 'rational' decision is for the dictator to keep all of the money as there is no external
incentive to give anything away - there is no need for strategic offers and no chance of
future reciprocity from the recipient as the interaction is one-shot, while the anonymity
renders reputational concerns irrelevant.
The DG was originally created by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), who gave the
dictator a choice between a 50:50 split and a 90:10 split in favour of himself (Le. an equal
division or an inequitable split in favour of the dictator). They found, contrary to their
expectation of rational self-interest from the dictators, that 76% of participants chose an
equal split. The procedure was subsequently modified by Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and
Sefton (1994) to the version commonly used today, where the dictator could make a free
choice of the proportion of the endowment that they allocated to the recipient. Once more,
participants violated the expectation of self-interest and allocated approximately 20% of
their endowments to recipients, a finding that has since been replicated many times (see
Camerer, 2003).
Allocating money to the recipient was initially viewed by economists as aberrant behaviour'
and numerous modifications have been made to the DG in an attempt to extinguish this
'other-regarding behaviour'. Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith (1994) introduced a
1 Indeed, Camerer & Thaler (1995) discussed DGbehaviour in the Anomalies column of the Journal of
Economic Perspectives
21
double blind procedure in which even the experimenters were unaware of the dictators'
actions in addition to the dictator/recipient anonymity. While allocations were reduced by
this increase in anonymity (referred to by the authors as social distance), they still were not
completely extinguished. Johanesson and Persson (2000) further increased social distance
by choosing recipients randomly from the telephone directory and anonymously posting
allocations to their home address rather than having them located in an adjacent room to
the dictator, as is standard in the DG. Allocations were further reduced to 9% of the
endowment, but they did not significantly differ from those in a standard double blind
procedure. Once again other-regarding behaviour was not extinguished, leading the
authors to conclude that dictators' internal considerations are driving them to give away a
portion of their endowment: it appears that an individual's altruistic propensity may be
reflected in their DGdonations.
The DGis now generally acknowledged as revealing the participant's altruistic tendencies as
the dictator receives no benefit from sharing their endowment, aside from the 'warm glow'
of giving (Camerer, 2003). It is ideal for empirically assessing altruistic behaviour as it
requires the participant to make a decision of whether to benefit the recipient at a cost to
themselves, while minimising the impact of factors that may cause participants to wish to
appear altruistic. There are no reputation concerns or threat of repercussions as the
experimenter is not aware of the dictators division and the recipient is not aware of the
dictators identity; this, along with the lack of self-report, also servesto attenuate the effect
of social desirability. In addition, in the standard version, the dictator has no information
about the recipient and so cannot be influenced by their 'deservingness' or their
relationship to the dictator (see Camerer, 2003 for an in-depth review of the DG). It can be
argued that the DG is the closest researchers have come to isolating 'pure' altruism as,
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despite the numerous manipulations described below, no-one has yet completely
eliminated donations in the DG.
1.3.1 Influences on DGbehaviour
Since its creation 25 years ago, this incredibly simple and straightforward economic game
had been the subject of extensive empirical manipulation. DGbehaviour has been revealed
to be remarkably easy to influence; indeed critics argue that this tractability renders
inferences made from DG behaviour questionable, while supporters suggest that this is in
fact a strength; this is discussed further in section 1.3.2. Camerer (2003) divides influences
upon DGbehaviour into five categories: demographic, cultural, methodological, descriptive
and structural. He states that cultural and structural variables have the strongest effects,
while the effects of methodological, demographic and descriptive variables are more
modest. The influence of each type of variable is discussed below. While the studies
described are by no means an exhaustive list of DGexperiments, they give an indication of
the scope of empirical manipulation available with the DG and the wide-ranging effects
these manipulations have.
1.3.1.1 Demographic variables
Studies examining the influence of demographic variables compare the behaviour of people
grouped according to their individual characteristics, such as gender, age or personality.
Findings according to gender are mixed, with many studies finding no effect (e.g. Ackert,
Gillette, Martinez-Vazquez & Rider, 2009; Benenson, Pascoe& Radmore, 2007; Bolton &
Katok, 1995; Lucaset al., 2008). However, of those studies that find a significant effect of
gender, females are consistently found to donate more of their endowment than males
(e.g. Eckel & Grossman, 1998; Kamas,Preston & Baum, 2008; Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller,
Parsons& Hummel, 2010; Gummerum, Keller, Takezawa& Mata, 2008; Harbaugh, Krause
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& Liday, 2003). This difference has been attributed to females being more likely to be
socialised to be prosocial and their behaviour being more context-dependent due to being
more sensitive to social cues, creating higher variability in their DGbehaviour than that of
males (Croson& Gneezy,2009).
Given the inconsistent effect of gender, it is perhaps not surprising that gender differences
in DG behaviour appear to be dependent upon the precise composition of the study.
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), for instance, found an interaction between gender and
price, with DG behaviour differing depending upon the value of the units of the
endowment. They manipulated the relative value of the units of the endowment to the
dictator and the recipient: in some casesaltruism was cheap as the dictator's allocation to
the recipient was multiplied by a fixed value before being transferred to the recipient, while
in others altruism was expensive as the dictator's allocation was divided by a fixed sum
before being transferred to the recipient. When value was consistent (as is the case in the
standard DG)or when altruism was expensive women donated more than men, while men
donated more than women when altruism was cheap.
Cox and Deck (2005), on the other hand, examined how gender influenced DG behaviour
when the economic and social cost of being generous were manipulated. 'Economic cost'
refers to the absolute amount given up by the participant. Dictators were presented with a
two alternative forced choice between keep everything and donate 37.5% of the
endowment to recipient, with a low ($20) or high ($40) payoff. As the proportion given
remained fixed, a higher payoff consequently meant giving up more money. Social cost
refers to whether or not dictators' names were associated with their decisions. Compared
to women, men were found to be more consistent in their donations acrosschanges in cost
and social distance, with no influence of these variables on their decision to donate.
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Women, on the other hand, appeared more generous in low cost or low social distance
situations, i.e. when their name was not associated with the decision and when there was
less money to split. The authors argue that women are more responsive to certain
environmental factors than men, in this casesocial distance and total income.
There is evidence to suggest that gender differences in altruism and prosocial behaviour
may in part be genetic in origin. In a recent twin study of the heritability of prosocial
behaviour, Son and Wilson (2010) found that women but not men inherit a tendency
toward prosociality. Further to this sex-related genetic influence, individual somatic genes
have been identified as contributing to altruistic behaviour on the DG. Polymorphisms in
the genes for the neuroreceptors for oxytocin and arginine vasopressin, neuropeptides that
contribute to social behaviour (Ebstein et al., 2009), have been shown to influence
donations on the DG (Israel et al., 2009; Knafo, Israel et al., 2008). Expressionof altruistic
behaviour is clearly heritable to some degree.
Due to the simplicity of the game, the DGis increasingly usedwith children to examine how
altruistic behaviour develops with age and donations are often found to increase over the
course of childhood. Harbaugh et al. (2003), for instance, found that 7-18 year-aids'
donations increased by 2% with each additional year, while Benenson et al. (2007) found
that donations increased between 4 and 9 years of age. Furthermore the relationship
between age and DG donations appears to continue throughout adulthood, with older
people being more generous (Carpenter et al., 2008). However, a significant age effect is
not always observed. Gummerum et al. (2008) found no change in behaviour with 8-17
year-olds, nor was a significant difference observed across 3-5 year-aids by Gummerum et
al. (2010). Nonetheless, children as young as 3 years of age have been demonstrated to
make donations in the DG(Gummerum et al., 2010), demonstrating that even preschoolers
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are able to act altruistically. A more in-depth discussion of the DG in children can be found
in sections 2.1.2 and 3.1.3.
Whilst religiosity has been found to be associated with self-reported prosociality
(Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008) it has not been found to reliably predict observed prosocial
behaviour, as described in section 1.1.2.2. Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) found that this
was also the case with the DG. They argue that the religious situation provides a more
reliable predictor of DG behaviour than an individual's religious disposition. Prior to
participating in a one-shot DG,they presented participants with neutral, religious or secular
primes. Implicitly activating religious concepts significantly increased donations compared
to donations that followed the neutral prime. The authors suggest that increasing the
salience of 'morally concerned deities' reduces the anonymity of the situation and
potentially implicitly raises reputational concerns. Interestingly, activation of secular
concepts increased donations to a similar extent to religious concepts. This supports the
argument that rather than religiosity per se being important in altruistic behaviour, simply
increasing the salience of others (whether deities or other people) significantly influences
DGbehaviour.
Consistent with the findings with general prosocial behaviour discussedabove (see section
1.1.2.1), altruistic behaviour in the DG is related to an individual's personality. As might be
expected, people who have a Prosocial SVO donate more in the DG than those with a
Competitive or Individualist SVO(Israel et al., 2009). Big Five personality traits also appear
to influence DG donations, with Agreeableness being positively correlated with donation
size, while the effects of other personality variables differ by gender: donations are
negatively correlated with Extraversion in males only while they are negatively correlated
with Conscientiousness and Neuroticism in females only (Ben-Ner, Kong & Putterman,
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2004). Ben-Ner and Kramer (in press) find that these personality effects only obtain when
donating to non-kin. Personality does not seem to influence donations to kin, which they
suggest supports the notion that kin altruism is hardwired and so shows fewer individual
differences.
1.3.1.2 Cultural variables
Dictator games are typically conducted with Western university students. As such, the
consistency in donations in a standard DG is hardly surprising; however, when the
behaviour of people from different cultures is examined, findings are more variable.
Henrich et al. (2010) conducted DGsin small-scalesocieties acrossthe world and found that
while no society was completely selfish, performance varied widely across cultures. DG
offers were positively correlated with the level of market integration of the society (as
assessed by the amount of food that is purchased rather than gathered, cultivated or
hunted; the higher the market integration, the greater the proportion of food that is
purchased); indeed, market integration accounted for at least S2%of the variance in mean
DGoffers. Henrich et al. (200S) argue that other-regarding behaviours are a product of an
individual's economic and social environment, and so depend upon social norms.
Gowdy, lorgulescu and Onyeiwu (2003) interviewed DG participants in rural Nigeria about
their reasons for sharing after they had made their divisions. This society, the Igbo, have a
strong sharing norm and members made a mean offer of 42%, much higher than they
typically observed in the West; fairness concerns were often cited as reasons for giving.
Conversely, Marlowe (2004) conducted the DGwith the Hadza in Tanzania. These hunter-
gatherers have a highly egalitarian socletv that is characterised by a great deal of sharing,
yet the mean allocation of 20% was no higher than that typically observed in the West.
Marlowe suggests that the Hadza were taking advantage of the anonymity that is not
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usually available in their society and so chose not to share as often as might be expected.
Whether DGbehaviour in societies where anonymity is rare (and often impossible) can be
generalised to general prosocial behaviour within that society is not clear. Gurven and
Winking (2008) found no relationship between standard DG performance and prosocial
behaviours such as food sharing in the Tsimane forager-horticulturists of Bolivia: it seems
possible that the DG situation is simply too alien to be indicative of behaviour in a more
natural setting in these small-scale societies.
1.3.1.3 Methodological variables
Methodological variables alter the way in which the experiment is conducted whilst
maintaining the original DG structure. As described above, increasing social distance by
increasing the anonymity of the dictator reduces DG donations (Hoffman et al., 1996;
Johannesson & Persson, 2000) but there are a number of additional methodological
variables that influence DG giving. For instance, compared to standard DG performance,
donations are reduced by causing the dictator to feel that he cannot be observed by
conducting the DG in the dark (Zhong, Bohns, & Gino, 2010). Conversely, giving the
impression of being observed will increase DGdonations, even when no actual observation
occurs. Burnham (2003) demonstrated that when dictators viewed a photograph of their
recipient prior to making their allocation, they were more likely to divide the endowment
equally than when no photo was provided. Furthermore, donations did not differ between
treatments where the dictator received a photo of the recipient and where recipients
received a photo of the dictator, confirming that it is the perception of privacy that is
important. Burnham argues that having a photograph of the recipient not only increases
empathy with the recipient, but makes a private situation feel more public, causing
participants to behave as if they were being watched.
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The influence of perceived observation is not limited to photographs of the participants, or
even faces in general. When participants were taking part in a computerised DG,Haley and
Fessler(2005) presented a set of stylised eyespots or a neutral backdrop on the desktop of
the computer. They found that participants donate more often when they were 'watched'
by the stylised eyes, suggesting that this provides a cue of observability, making people
behave as if their actions have reputational consequences.When donations were made to
ingroup or outgroup members, Mifune, Hashimoto and Yamagishi (2010) found that there
was an ingroup bias in eyes condition only, with no difference in ingroup and outgroup
donations in the control condition. They suggest that the 'eyes' function as a cue for the
presence of monitoring by community members, giving the impression that the dictator's
behaviour may influence their reputation and so donations consequently increase to the
ingroup. Even a 'weak social cue' of three dots in a vaguely face-shaped configuration is
sufficient to increase donations in comparison to three dots presented in a neutral
configuration (Rigdon, Ishii, Watabe, & Kitayama, 2009). While gender did not influence the
increase in donations when the cues were eye-shaped (Haley & Fessler, 2005), when the
cues were more abstract and thus weaker, men but not women showed an increase in
donations from baseline. This was because women were more generous than men in the
control condition - men seem to have exploited the double blind nature of the control
condition, while the recipient appears to have already been salient to women in the control
condition and so their donations did not show a further increase when presented with
weak social cues (Rigdonet al., 2009).
In the DG the endowment is generally bestowed upon the dictator as a windfall. Windfall
money is more likely to be spent than earned money (Arkes et al., 1994; Cattelino, 2009;
Thaler, 1999), an influence that appears to contribute to DGdonations. When participants
earn the endowment (usually by performing a mundane task) that they are then asked to
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divide between themselves and the recipient, they are both less likely to donate and give
lesswhen they do so (Carlsson,He, & Martinsson, 2010; Cherry, 2001; Cherry, Frykblom, &
Shogren, 2002; List & Cherry, 2008). Cherry and colleagues argue that participants that
have earned the money to be allocated have a more legitimate right to that money than
those that simply have it bestowed upon them and therefore are less likely to share it with
the recipient (Cherry, 2001; Cherry et al., 2002; List& Cherry, 2008). Dictators do appear to
take into account the recipient's right to the money as we" as their own, as they wi" give
more when the recipient has earned the endowment that the dictator is dividing (Oxoby &
Spraggon, 2008); further discussion of the influence of earning the endowment can be
found in section 4.1.2.
One variable that appears to have little influence upon DG behaviour is stake size.
Numerous studies have varied the size of the endowment, and allocations have been
shown to be independent of endowment size (Carpenter, Verhoogen & Burks, 2005; Cherry
et al., 2002; Forsythe et al., 1994; Harbaugh & Krause, 2000; List & Cherry, 2008), even
when endowment size is increased tenfold (Carpenter et al., 2005): it appears that people
prefer to donate a set proportion of their endowments rather than an absolute amount.
1.3.1.4 Descriptive variables
Manipulation of descriptive variables changes how the DG is described to the participant
without changing its structure. Researchersare very careful when designing DG studies to
ensure neutrality in their experimental instructions, as even small changes in wording can
have a large effect upon donations. Any information participants receive generally avoids
using the term 'game', despite this being the terminology used in the literature. This is
because using the word 'game' raises the idea of the participant being a player, whose
purpose is to win. Indeed, when questioned after making their allocations about how they
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viewed the DG, participants who were more oriented towards approaching it as a game
donated lessof their endowment (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, & Moore, 2001).
In order to explore the power of framing of the experimental instructions, Brafias-Garza
(2007) added just one extra sentence: "Note that your recipient relies on you". This
sentence reduced the neutrality of the situation without influencing the anonymity of
dictator or recipient, reminding dictators of the unfairness of the DG situation (as the
recipient has no power), and thus increasing the moral cost of selfishness. In comparison to
donations when this sentence was not included, donations in the framing DG were
significantly higher, with fewer zero donations. The authors concluded that adding
information adds context to the dictator's donation decision, thus motivating altruistic
behaviour.
In addition to increasing anonymity methodologically through implementing a double blind
procedure or decreasing it through having the dictator view the recipient (or vice versa),
anonymity can also be manipulated descriptively. For instance, informing the dictator of the
recipient's reputation increases donations, even when there is no opportunity for future
interaction. Dictators donate more when they are informed of their recipient's decision in a
previous, unrelated DGthan when they are given no information about the recipient, while
the amount donated is positively correlated with their partner's previous donations: people
appear to reward generous behaviour. Moreover, even recipients who had previously been
only mildly generous or even selfish receive more than those whose prior behaviour was
unknown (Fehr & Schneider, 2010; servatka, 2009, 2010).
Demographic information about the recipient also influences giving in the DG.People often
give more to members of their ingroup than to strangers or outgroup members and more
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still to kin, most likely becauseas ingroup and family members are most likely to have the
opportunity to reciprocate in the future (Ben-Ner & Kramer, in press; Ben-Ner, McCall,
Stephane & Wang, 2009; Bernhard et al., 2006), although Fershtman and Gneezy (2001)
found no evidence for discrimination in against outgroup members in a sample of Israeli
Jews. While it is generally accepted that people are more altruistic towards kin than non-
kin, this has rarely been directly examined using the DG. In the one study to date to do so,
Ben-Ner and Kramer (in press) asked participants to make hypothetical DG divisions
between various individuals described by only one feature (e.g. 'tall' or 'your brother-in-
law'). They found that participants made the largest mean offer, the fewest zero offers and
the most offers over 50% towards kin, followed by collaborators, then neutrals and then
competitors. This is consistent with the notion that preferentially helping kin is fitness-
enhancing (Hamilton, 1964).
When Eckel and Grossman (1996) described the recipient as a charitable organisation
rather than an anonymous individual donation size trebled, increasing from 11% to 31%.
When more information is provided this increase in generosity is even more startling.
Brafias-Garza(2006) found that when dictators were informed that their recipient was from
a poor, underdeveloped country and that the money could be very useful there, donations
increased from 10% at baseline to 66% of the endowment. When, in addition to this
information, dictators were informed that the money would be spent on medicines and
that the medicines would be of great help, donations further increased to 80%, with the
entire endowment being donated by 71% of participants; this is particularly noteworthy
given that donations of the full amount are almost unheard of in the standard DG.
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1.3.1.5 Structural variables
The structure of the dictator game can be changed by adding moves (Camerer, 2003). This
can occur in a number of ways, such as changing the dictator's response set and allowing
him to take money aswell as give it (Bardsley, 2008; List, 2007; see section 1.3.2), changing
the response set of the recipient and allowing him to reject the dictator's offer (Le. making
the game an Ultimatum Game, see Camerer, 2003 for a review) or introducing additional
players (e.g. Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong, & Magan, 2004). Given the simplicity of the
structure of the standard DG,modification generally results in a radical change in the game
and thus the type of behaviour elicited by it.
Ben-Ner, Putterman et al. (2004) added an extra round to the DG.They allowed recipients
from the first round to become dictators in the second round, half of whom were paired
with their original partner (Le. had the opportunity to give to the person who had/had not
given to them) and the other half were paired with a different individual. Behaviour in the
second round was correlated with the allocations the individual had received in the first
round, with a stronger correlation occurring when the second round dictators were
donating to their first round partners than when they were giving to an unknown person.
This behaviour is evidence of reciprocity: when giving to a new partner the reciprocity is
indirect as they have not previously interacted, while when giving to a previous partner the
reciprocity is direct, thus producing a stronger correlation.
Simply changing the dictator's partner from passive 'recipient' to active 'responder' is
sufficient to dramatically alter behaviour. In an economic game known as the Ultimatum
Game (UG) the first-mover is a proposer, who suggestsa division of the allocation to the
Responder. In contrast to the DG, the responder has two options available to him: either
accept the division of the endowment or reject the offer. However, rejection of the offer
means that neither party receives anything and so neoclassical economic theory would
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suggest that the rational responder would accept any amount, as receiving something is
better than receiving nothing. Nonetheless, responders often punish offers that they
consider too low, and so tend to reject offers of less than 20%. Proposers consequently
offer more than in the standard DG,typically dividing the endowment equally in a strategic
move to avoid rejection (Camerer, 2003). The UG was in fact the basis of the first DG
conducted by Kahneman et al. (1986): the DGwas a means of ascertaining the degree to
which offers in the UGwere strategic and whether altruism played a part in divisions.
It is clear that addition of one small step to the DG procedure adds a great deal of
complexity to the decision-making processand the motives underlying it. It is believed that
people's tendency to punish others as observed in the UG is not just revenge, but also a
means of enforcing social norms, and it is observed to varying extents in cultures around
the world (Gintis, 2003b; Henrich et al., 2005; Henrich et al., 2010). Indeed, unaffected third
parties are also prepared to bear a cost in order to punish a norm violator, a practice
termed 'altruistic punishment' (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004), although there is imaging
evidence that people take pleasure in punishing norm violators (de Quervain et al., 2004).
1.3.2 Criticisms of the DG
One criticism levelled at the DG as a means of assessing altruism is that there is no
opposing behaviour available - participants can give something or nothing but they do not
have the opportunity to take additional resources. Apparently altruistic behaviour may
therefore be an artefact of the experimental design, a product of demand characteristics
due to a situation in which the only options are to give or do nothing. Bardsley (2008)
states that if people are disposed towards altruism then this characteristic should be
revealed even if the opportunity to take from the receiver is offered. He found that giving
was greatly reduced by simultaneously presenting the opportunity to take, although giving
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was not eliminated entirely; indeed, even when taking was the only option 17% of
participants still chose to take nothing.
List (2007) systematically reduced the incidence of DG donations by introducing varying
options to take from the recipient, arguing that if a preference for other-regarding
behaviour were driving standard DGbehaviour then donations should be unaffected by this
increase in response options. In comparison to the baseline, donations were reduced by
adding the option to take $1, and the option to take $5 saw a further drop in donations. By
far the greatest reduction in donations was caused by giving the dictator the opportunity to
take $5 when both participants have first earned their money. However, while the
incidence of giving was drastically reduced by introducing taking options, when donations
were made they were approximately the same size as in the standard DG. Furthermore,
despite taking increasing between the $1 and $5 taking conditions, the majority of dictators
neither gave nor took in the earnings treatment, arguably because each participant is
viewed as having a legitimate right to their own money when it has been earned (see
section 1.3.1.3). List suggests that participants are inferring social norms from the context
of the game, thus when taking is an option it is acceptable not to be generous but when
taking is not an option it is lessacceptable to be selfish. Nonetheless, even when the choice
set is expanded to allow taking, people are not uniformly selfish: altruistic behaviour
appears to stubbornly refuse to be extinguished.
Levitt and List (2007) explain the importance of the taking DG as follows: "Real-world
contexts typically offer the option of both giving and receiving, which may help to explain in
part why, contrary to the lab environment, people rarely receive anonymous envelopes
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with cash inside."? (Levitt & List, 2007, p. 167). However, this experimental design may be
even less ecologically valid than that of the standard DG, as it essentially condones theft.
While taking is an available option in the real word it is not generally acceptable in larger
society and bears a risk of sanctions. Giving, on the other hand, is rarely deemed
unacceptable (although being too generous is sometimes punished, see Henrich et al.,
2005). A more representative version of the taking DG would perhaps involve being allowed
to give freely but taking carrying a risk of punishment: taking would most likely be far less
prevalent.
While the taking DG may not be any more ecologically valid than the standard DG, it
nevertheless provides further evidence of how susceptible the DG is to manipulation (see
section 1.3.1). This changeability, however, should not be viewed as preferences being
unstable and driven by experimenter demand but rather that changes to the experimental
situation lead to predictable and systematic changes in behaviour (Levitt & List, 2007;
Rigdon et al., 2009). As such, DG behaviour does not reflect a lack of robustness, but simply
a lack of context (Frohlich et al., 2001), which thus gives little indication as to which
particular social norm should be followed when making a division. Guala and Mittone
(2010) therefore argue that the DG is ideal for assessing social norms rather than individual
differences in preferences, as by adding information (or taking it away in double blind
studies) a particular social norm is activated, leading to predictable behavioural changes. In
its standard form, however, they believe that the DG is too abstract to trigger everyday
normative behaviours.
Given these concerns over the lack of context inherent in the DG, it is perhaps surprising
that it does appear to reflect naturally-occurring charitable behaviour: student's behaviour
2 One of the major differences between the lab environment and the real world is arguably that it
rarely spontaneously occurs to people to send out anonymous envelopes with cash inside.
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on a standard DG task with a charity recipient is related to both their past and future
incidence of donation to a university social fund (Benz & Meier, 2006). Furthermore, the
standard use of a student volunteer sample appears to underestimate altruism in the
population as a whole. Eckel and Grossman (2000) compared DGdonations to a charity by
volunteers (i.e. participants recruited in the normal fashion) and pseudo-volunteers (i.e.
students asked to remain after a lecture to complete the study). Pseudo-volunteers, who
did not initially intend to take part in the study, were more generous than volunteers;
furthermore, volunteers were more likely to request acknowledgement for their donations,
suggesting a greater desire for the warm glow of giving. Pseudo-volunteers also showed a
greater influence of individual characteristics such as gender and self-reported altruism
than did true volunteers. Similarly, Carpenter et al. (2008) conducted a 'representative' DG,
which was intended to be representative both in terms of the task and the sample.
Members of the wider community chose a charity to support and how much of a $100
endowment to donate, which was compared to students' behaviour in the same situation.
Community members donated more to charity than students and were more likely to
donate the entire sum, while age and sex were the most robust predictors of allocations
with younger people being more selfish and male students being especially selfish.
Together, these findings suggest that the DG not only reflects more general altruistic
tendencies, but also that people who volunteer for economic studies are, if anything, likely
to underrepresent the altruistic tendencies of the population as a whole.
1.3.3 The DGasa measure of altruism
Despite the DG being used as a measure of altruism and DG behaviour showing a
relationship with prosocial behaviour more generally, it is not universally accepted that DG
behaviour reflects altruism. A number of alternative factors have been advanced to explain
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DG behaviour and while these factors do not entirely preclude the contribution of a
preference for altruism, they generally have self-interest at their root.
Despite the standard DG being a one-shot game with no chance of reciprocity or future
interaction, some authors argue that participants behave as if there will nonetheless be
repetition of the game. Levitt and List (2007) suggest that due to the fact that anonymous
one-shot interactions are unlikely in the real world, some people are unable to moderate
their behaviour and so nonetheless behave as if they will build a reputation through their
actions. There is certainly evidence that people give because they do not wish to appear
selfish, even under anonymous conditions. Dictators will sacrifice 10%of their endowment
to exit without the recipient knowing about the experiment and that the dictator did not
share with them (Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006). Indeed, the dictator could have given $1 to
the recipient and kept the remaining $9 - this would have achieved the same monetary
outcome to the dictator and would have been more beneficial to the recipient.
Furthermore, people in a private DG,where the recipient doesn't know where the money
comes from, generally choose not to pay to exit the game. Dana et al. (2006) suggest that
reputation concerns are not necessarilyconsciously considered but rather are automatically
implemented and so still exert an influence even under conditions of anonymity.
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) note that donors in the DG frequently give exactly half of
the endowment and suggest that this reflects a 50-SOnorm. They argue that people wish to
appear fair and so adhere to this norm in the DG; indeed, people were more likely to split
the endowment equally when anonymity was reduced. Internalised social norms, which can
drive an individual's behaviour even in the absenceof external observation through internal
sanctions (Perugini et al., 2003; Schwartz & Howard, 1980) are often advanced as
explanations for DG behaviour. Indeed, it is argued that norms are the factor that
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distinguishes humans and their non-kin directed altruism from animals and their kin-
directed altruism (Clavien& Klein, 2010). Guala and Mittone (2010) argue that the lack of
context indicating which social norm is appropriate in the DGcausespeople to apply their
own norms. As such, people who have an internal norm of altruism are more likely to
behave altruistically in the context-poor standard DG. Camerer and Thaler (1995) state that
DG behaviour is less altruism and more manners, arguing that people leave a tip in a
restaurant that they have no intention of visiting again simply because it would be rude to
do otherwise and that DGbehaviour is no different.
Murnighan, Oeschand Pillutla (2001) recognise that people do not respond uniformly in the
DG. They propose that dictators can be divided into three categories: rational dictators
(who take the maximum amount), equal dictators (who favour an equal split) and reluctant
dictators (who give an amount between zero and half). They argue that rationals and equals
will not be influenced by restrictions of the choice set, as rationals will always behave
selfishly and equals will give half if that is an option. Reluctants, on the other hand, will be
generous when there is free choice to do so and selfish when their choices are restricted.
This is because they seek to optimise their impression of themselves and so are generous
when only they are responsible for the amount given, but when the choice set is restricted
by the experimenter then they can excuse their own greed as they have been 'forced' to
behave that way by the experimenter. Reluctants, they suggest, seek to show themselves in
a positive light, if only to themselves, and experience a warm glow from behaving in a
manner consistent with their generous self-impression.
Consistent with the idea of self-impression management, when the relationship between
dictators' actions and recipients' outcomes was unclear, dictators were more selfish (Dana,
Weber, & Kuang, 2007). It appears that many dictators give because they do not want to
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appear unfair, not just to the recipient but to themselves. However, while the flipside of
maintaining a positive self-impression is avoiding guilt, guilt aversion appears to have
minimal impact upon DG behaviour. Ellingsen, Johannesson, Tjatta and Torsvik (2010)
asked recipients to predict what they would receive and provided this information to
dictators prior to making their division. They argue that guilt aversion would predict a
positive correlation between recipients' expectations and dictators divisions; however, this
was not the case.
It seems a reasonable assumption that which of the numerous factors outlined above
contribute to behaviour in the DG depends on the individual in question and multiple
factors most likely interact simultaneously to influence the outcome. Whether these factors
act in addition to altruism, or simply give the appearance of altruism is as yet unresolved.
However, at this point it is germane to return to the original definition of altruism as it is
considered in this thesis: enactment of a behaviour that is beneficial to the recipient but
costly to the actor. DGbehaviour clearly falls into this category, whether or not the dictator
feels a warm glow, mistakenly feels that his reputation will be enhanced, wishes to see
himself as a good person, or he simply is blindly following a social norm that he has
internalised and can no longer escape. More speculatively, it is worth bearing in mind that
the presence of any or even all of the factors described above does not automatically
discount the presence of an altruistic motive. As already stated, the DG does not and
cannot discern the motives behind donation behaviours in and of itself. While clever
manipulations have enabled the isolation of influences on and moderators of altruistic
behaviour, their presence does not invalidate that of altruism. Humans and their motives
are ultimately complex and in many ways inscrutable.
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In comparison to other methods used to examine altruism (see section 1.2.3), the DG lacks
ecological validity due to its anonymity and lack of interaction involved. However, this
allows the impact of factors outside the individual to be minimised, allowing examination of
apparently altruistic behaviour. Whether the DGtruly reflects altruism or a combination of
the factors listed above (i.e. guilt, etc.) is contentious, but its use at least allows
consideration only of the participant's internal motives. The DG allows consideration of
altruistic behaviour to be undertaken in an empirical fashion, removing asmany extraneous
influences as possible before systematically varying influential factors and observing their
effect upon resultant behaviour.
1.4 Aims of the thesis
Prosocial and altruistic behaviours have been demonstrated to increase with age, yet few
studies have used a behavioural measure to assesspreschool children's altruistic abilities.
The DG is a very simple task that is suitable for usewith very young children, but as yet the
influence upon their altruistic behaviour are largely unexplored despite DGbehaviour being
known to be influenced by numerous factors. This thesis will examine the influence of
demographic, methodological and descriptive factors upon the DG behaviour of 4-5 year-
old children. This age group is particularly interesting as preschool children are just
beginning to expand their social circles as they start nursery or school, allowing exploration
of the degree to which children display early tendencies towards altruism that may not be
driven by social experience. Furthermore, examination of how altruistic behaviour is
moderated at this young age, as well as its stability into adulthood, can help to inform our
understanding of some of the driving factors behind altruism.
Chapter 2 will investigate the impact of individual differences upon 4-5 year-aids' DG
performance, focussing on the influence of sibling status but also exploring the influence of
gender, mathematical ability, theory of mind ability and time spent with peers. In order to
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ensure that a developmental increase in altruistic behaviour in the DG is not due to young
children having a poor understanding of the task, steps will be taken to ensure that
cognitive demands are minimised. Chapter 3 will directly explore whether adults' DG
behaviour is comparable to that of children and will also examine whether any sibling
influence is stable into adulthood or simply a consequence of being in the familial context.
Chapter 4 examines methodological influences on 4-5 year-olds' DG behaviour by
examining the influence of earning the endowment and whether these young children
employ a legitimacy norm to excuse selfishness. Chapter 5 explores descriptive influences
upon DGbehaviour by assessingwhether 4-5 year-old children are able to take reputational
information into account and implement an indirect reciprocity norm according to the
valence of the recipient's reputation. The influence of reducing anonymity by providing
information will also be explored. Finally, Chapter 6 will provide a summary of the findings
of the thesis and a general discussionof the themes that have emerged acrossthe chapters.
In sum, the aims of the present thesis are as follows:
• To examine prosocial behaviour, specifically altruism, using a behavioural measure
(all chapters)
• To make the task as simple as possible for such young children by minimising the
cognitive demands (all chapters, specifically Chapter 2)
• To examine how environmental influences, particularly siblings, influence the
expression of altruism (all chapters, specifically Chapters 2 and 3)
• To examine how gender influences the expression of altruism (all chapters)
• To examine the stability of the sibling influence with age (Chapter 3)
• To explore how the origin of the endowment influences children's altruistic
behaviour (Chapter 4)
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• To discover whether children's altruistic behaviour is influenced by reducing the
anonymity of the recipient (Chapter 5)
• To explore how the characteristics of the recipient influence altruistic behaviour
(Chapter 5)
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Chapter 2: Sibling status and the dictator game in preschool children
2.1 Introduction
The prosocial behaviour of altruism is susceptible to the influence of a variety of factors
such as reputation formation, knowledge of the recipient, reciprocity and social desirability
(see Chapter 1 for a full discussionof influences upon altruistic behaviour). However, much
of the literature examining altruism in children involves studies that do not control for
these influences, rendering unclear the extent to which pure altruism is shaping behaviour.
Fewer still are studies that both control these variables and examine the effect of individual
differences such as birth order (Fehr et al., 2008). The present study made use of the
dictator game in order to establish how birth order, independently of other individual
differences such associo-economic status, influences pure altruistic behaviour.
2.1.1 The influence of siblings
There are a number of factors, both genetic and environmental, that have been observed
to influence both adults' and children's prosocial and altruistic behaviour. One significant
feature of a child's environment that has been little-investigated in the prosocial literature
in recent years is the presence or absenceof siblings and a child's position within the sibling
constellation. While parents make an important and obvious contribution to their child's
development, in the preschool years a child is likely to spend far more time with their
siblings than their parents (Abramovitch et al., 1979; Bank & Kahn, 1975). Opinion as to the
degree of influence a sibling has on their co-sibling's development is divided. Researchers
such as Frank Sulloway argue that siblings are hugely influential on development, stating in
his controversial book Born to Rebel that birth order is an influential factor in the
revolutionary spirit of a number of historical figures, over and above the influence of socio-
economic status (SES)and gender. He finds that firstborns are conservative and identify
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with authority, while laterborns are rebellious and liable to flout authority in pursuit of
their beliefs and interests (Sulloway, 1996). In stark contrast, Ernst and Angst (1983) find in
their survey of studies of siblings' influence on educational attainment and personality that
almost all relationships can be explained by poor research design and confounding factors
such as SESand home disruptions such as parental divorce. Harris (2000) concludes her
discussion of birth order effects with the opinion that "Birth order affects the way we
behave with, and feel about, our parents and siblings. These behaviors and feelings are left
behind, along with other mementos of our childhood years, when we leave home" (Harris,
2000, p. 177). In other words, whatever effects birth order may have on behaviour, they are
limited only to interactions within the family and disappear altogether when no longer in a
family situation.
Despite these conflicting and often negative opinions on the influence of birth order on a
child's development, a large number of recent studies have found it to have a significant
impact in a variety of domains, the direction of the effect depending upon the domain in
question. Being firstborn appears to be beneficial to cognitive ability, with educational
attainment (Black, Devereux, & Salvanes,2005; Saroglou & Fiasse,2003), adults' episodic
memory (Holmgren, Molander, & Nilsson, 2007) and preschoolers' verbal ability (Heiland,
2009) decreasing the later in the sibling constellation the child is born. Being laterborn can
be beneficial to motor skill, with older siblings being present facilitating a toddler's
attainment of motor milestones and gross motor production (Berger & Nuzzo, 2008; Reid,
Stahl, & Striano, 2010). Personality, as measured on Costa and McCrae's (1992) five factor
model (NEO-PI-R),also appears to be influenced by birth order. Sulloway (1996), in his
meta-analysis of the studies in Ernst and Angst's (1983) survey (who concluded that there
was no influence of birth order), found that compared to laterborns, firstborns were high in
Conscientiousness and Neuroticism and low in Openness to Experienceand Agreeableness,
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although Extraversion did not show a clear effect. Consistent with these findings, other
authors have found firstborns to be more Conscientious (Healey & Ellis, 2007; Paulhus,
Trapnell, & Chen, 1999) and laterborns more Agreeable and Open to Experience (Jefferson
et aI., 1998; Paulhuset aI., 1999).
The majority of studies that find a relationship between cognitive ability, motor skill or
personality and birth order find that their results are consistent with each other in terms of
the direction of the effect. However, not all studies find a significant sibling effect. Jefferson
et al. (1998), for instance, find no difference between firstborns' and laterborns' self-report
on the broad domains of the NEO-PI-R(although laterborns did score higher on the
subscales of altruism and tendermindedness). In their attempt to replicate Sulloway's
(1996) findings, Michalski and Shackelford (2002) find very little difference in personality
between firstborns and laterborns: they only vary in terms of Agreeableness(Iaterborns are
more agreeable) and Openness (firstborns are more open to experience). In agreement
with Ernst and Angst (1983), Rodgers,Cleveland,van den Oord and Rowe (2000) state that
birth order effects in between-family studies are confounded with factors such as SESand
maternal age and that any relationship between intelligence and birth order is simply a
methodological artefact. Downey and Condron (2004) report similar conclusions, with no
relationship between possession of siblings and cognitive skill once SES and family
characteristics are controlled for. However, they did find that possession of at least one
sibling conferred an advantage in social skills to US kindergartners, with children with
siblings having better interpersonal skills and self control than those without.
In addition to Downey and Condron's (2004) findings in American kindergartners that
singletons are at a social disadvantage, USpreschoolers' social-emotional competence has
been found to benefit from having siblings no more than 30 months older than the child
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and who show positive emotional responsiveness to their younger siblings (Sawyer et al.,
2002). Kitzmann, Cohen and Lockwood (2002) compared the popularity and acceptance
with their peers of 6-12 year-old singletons (Le. children without siblings) to that of
firstborn and secondborn children. They found that singletons were less popular and less
well-accepted by their peers than children with siblings, the discrepancy being larger with
secondborns than with firstborns, suggesting an additional benefit of possessing older
siblings. The effect of siblings on social development appears to be in quite the opposite
direction to that found in cognitive ability: possessingsiblings appears to boost social skills.
Findings with theory of mind (ToM) ability are more mixed, with some studies finding no
influence of birth order (Cole& Mitchell, 2000) or family size (Peterson & Slaughter, 2003).
However, children's ToM ability has been demonstrated to benefit from the possessionof
both older and younger child-aged siblings (McAlister & Peterson, 2007), while a study
comparing twin pairs with and without additional siblings suggeststhat it is spending time
with a child of a different age, creating a mismatch in perspectives, that provides the
benefit (Cassidy,Fineberg, Brown, & Perkins, 2005). Other studies find that a larger family
size accelerates ToM development (Jenkins& Astington, 1996; Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam,
1994), while Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin and Clements' (1998) re-analysis of Perner et
al.'s data, which showed a general advantage to possessingsiblings, suggeststhat it is older
siblings in particular that are beneficial. This finding has recently been supported by
Farhadian et al. (2010), who found secondborns to have an advantage over firstborns in
ToM ablility. Older siblings have also been found to impact a child's empathy: Tucker,
Updegraff, McHale and Crouter (1999) found 10-12 year-olds' empathy to be increased by
having an empathic older sibling, a relationship which is not reciprocal - younger siblings
did not have a significant effect on their older siblings' empathy. The authors note that the
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abilities required for empathy also contribute to prosocial behaviour, implying that
possessionof older siblingsmay also be beneficial for a child's prosociality.
The influence of siblings upon altruism and prosocial behaviour has rarely been
investigated, but there are indications that being a laterborn (Le. possessingolder siblings)
may boost prosociality. Given that laterborns have been shown to score higher than
firstborns on Agreeableness, it is interesting to note that Carlo et al. (2005) found this
personality dimension to be related to volunteerism in a sample of college students.
Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Jefferson et al. (1998) found laterborns to score significantly
higher than firstborns on the altruism facet of Agreeableness, while Saroglou and Fiasse
(2003) examined first-, middle- and lastborns independently and found lastborns to score
significantly higher on the altruism facet than both middleborns and firstborns.
Van Lange et al. (1997) investigated the relationship between both adults' family size and
possession of older siblings and their social value orientation (SVO),defined as a person's
preferences for a balance in outcome between themselves and others. SVO is assessed
using Van Langeet al.'s (1997) Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Values, a decomposed
game in which the participant makeschoices between three options of how to allocate sets
of paints. Those that seek the best outcome for all concerned are classified as prosocial (Le.
equal distribution of points), while those who care only about their own outcomes are
classed as individualistic (Le. seek to maximise their own points irrespective of what the
other receives). Peoplewho prefer to maximise their own outcome in comparison to that of
others are competitive (Le. seek to acquire more points than the other, even if they could
acquire more points for themselves by making a different choice). Prosocialswere found to
have significantly more siblings than both competitors and individualists. The authors
suggest that this is consistent with their sibling-prosocial hypothesis that possessingmore
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siblings leads to a greater chance of experiencing conflicts of interest and the necessity to
share resources. Children therefore learn the benefits of cooperation and develop a
prosocial svo. Prosocialswere also found to possessmore older siblings: laterborns have
always possessedsiblings and are more likely to have a greater number of siblings than
firstborns, who have spent some of their childhood without siblings - indeed, they may
never acquire more siblings" - and, the authors argue, are therefore less likely to develop a
prosocial svo.
While it is interesting that siblings appear to influence an individual's SVO, it does not
necessarily follow that this will translate into more prosocial or altruistic actions. There is
some evidence that SVOand prosocial actions are related. For example, Van Lange et al.
(2007) took measures of participants' SVOand self-reports of donation behaviour, finding
that prosocials donated more often and to a greater variety of causes than both
individualists and competitors. In addition, aswell asassessingtheir adult participants' SVO,
Israel et al. (2009) asked them to take part in the DG(seesection 1.3 for a full description of
the DG), in which the amount given away is thought to reflect an individual's level of
altruism. Performance on the two tasks was related: after dividing their participants into
high and low allocators depending upon their donations in the DG,prosocials were found to
be more likely to be high allocators: 65% of prosocials were high allocators while only 27%
of proselfs (i.e. competitors and individualists) were high allocators. Thus, this suggeststhe
possibility that Van Langeet al.'s (1997) findings of a birth order effect on SVOmay also be
observed upon donations in the DG.
As yet there appears to have been only one study that has directly assessedthe impact of
siblings upon a behavioural measure of altruism in children. In their study of inequality
3 Vanlangeet al. (2007) includedsingletonsin their firstborngroup.
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aversion in 3-8 year-olds Fehr et al. (2008) conducted three different games in which
children had to make a choice between two potential divisions of sweets. In their sharing
treatment, which the authors consider to be equivalent to a mini DG,the child must decide
whether to choose one sweet for themselves and one for another individual, or to keep
both sweets for themselves. Fehr et al. note that the decision to share is costly to the child,
and therefore represents an altruistic act. Children without siblings were found to be 28%
more likely to share than children with siblings, while lastborns were found to be 17% less
willing to share than children with younger siblings once age is controlled for. Both of these
findings are in contrast to the literature discussed above, potentially due to the use of a
behavioural rather than a questionnaire measure. The authors suggest that children with
siblings experience more competition for resources, making them less willing to share.
Lastborns, due to their small size, are less able to resolve the competition in their own
favour, leading them to seize resources whenever the opportunity arises and therefore
keep both sweets in the sharing game. In their view, singletons are the most generous as
they do not experience these conflicts, nor do they have siblings as natural playmates
leading them to usegenerosity asa strategy to make friends.
Fehr et al. (2008) comment that their findings are in opposition to those of Sulloway (1996),
who found laterborns to be more Agreeable than firstborns, and suggest that this may be
due to the differences between questionnaire measures used by Sulloway and their own
use of a behavioural measure. However, there are additional factors that may have
influenced Fehr et al.'s findings. Sibling status was assessed by questionnaire once the
study had been completed and was therefore not counterbalanced. Furthermore, there is
no mention of potential order effects or counterbalancing of the three games (Le. the
sharing treatment and the two additional treatments). Receiving the ultimatum game
before the DGhas been found to lower children's DGdonations (Harbaugh et al., 2003) and
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it is possible that behaviour may have differed in the sharing treatment depending upon
whether it was received before, after or between the other two treatments. This is
especially likely as the child was giving to the same person each time and may have felt that
they no longer needed to share if they had already done so earlier in the study. Given the
lack of sibling counterbalancing, it is possible that an imbalance in the treatment order may
have influenced results across sibling status and agegroups. Thus Fehr et al.'s findings need
to be replicated with properly balanced groups of siblings. The ideal task to use would be
the DG, as it provides a measure of altruism that is suitable for use with young children,
which allows a behavioural response and yet permits a wider range of response options
than Fehr et al.'s forced choice. However, no study to date has implemented the DG for
examination of the influence of siblings upon altruistic behaviour in children. Use of this
task would enable the determination of whether Fehr et al/s unexpected results are a
factor of their use of a behavioural measure rather than a questionnaire, or whether they
can instead be attributed to other factors suchascounterbalancing inconsistencies.
2.1.2 The dictator game asa measure of altruism in children
Due its simplicity, the DG has recently been used with children, often with different
endowments used for different ages.Stickers have been usedwith preschoolers and young
children (e.g. Benensonet al., 2007; Gummerum et al., 2010; Lucaset al., 2008); points that
can be exchanged for goods or money have been used in middle childhood and
adolescence (e.g. Harbaugh & Krause,2000; Harbaugh et al., 2003), as has real money (e.g.
Gummerum et al., 2008). Results with children are more variable than those with adults,
with mean donations ranging from 12% in a group of 7-18 year-aids and increasing by 2%
with each additional year of age (Harbaugh et al., 2003), to a mean donation of 43% in a
group of 5 year-aids (Gummerum et al., 2010). However, this variability may be at least in
part attributable to variability in methodology, not just in the choice of endowment to be
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divided, but also how the endowment should be divided, how the decision to divide is
made and how many iterations of the DG the child takes part in. For instance, unlike most
other studies Lucas et al. (2008) did not give children the option to keep the whole
endowment; Gummerum et al. (2008) asked children to make the decision in groups of
three, while in most other studies each child takes part individually; and while many studies
are one-shot, Harbaugh and Krause (2000) asked children to divide 11 different amounts,
while Harbaugh et al. (2003) asked children to take part in an ultimatum game either before
or after the DG. However, despite this heterogeneity in methodology and results, use of the
DG with children has demonstrated that they are not consistently selfish and even children
as young as 3 years are frequently altruistic in their behaviour (Gummerum et al., 2010).
2.1.3 Mechanisms of sibling influence
It remains unclear how siblings exert their influence on their co-siblings. In the realm of
prosocial and altruistic behaviour, siblings may affect a child's altruistic development by
shaping their acquisition of those personal norms related to altruism. Social norms, i.e.
behavioural expectations within a group that are enforced by external sanctions (Fehr &
Fischbacher, 2004), play an important role in altruistic behaviour (Allison, 1992; Bowles &
Gintis, 1998; Gintis, 2003b). Adherence to social norms such as cooperation is so important
that unaffected third parties are willing to bear a personal cost to punish people that have
violated a norm, a process termed altruistic punishment (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson,
2003; de Quervain et al., 2004; Fehr & Gachter, 2002). Personal norms are social norms that
have been internalised so that the threat of external sanctions is not necessary - the
individual faces internal sanctions should violation of the norm occur (Schwartz & Howard,
1980) and will adhere to the norm even in the absence of external observation (Perugini et
al., 2003). Given that the process of internalisation occurs through socialisation throughout
childhood (Gintis, 2003a; Thegersen, 2002), it seems likely that possessing siblings may
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influence the rate at which social norms become personal norms. Cialdini et al. (1981)
suggest that the norm of altruism is internalised by late childhood/early adulthood;
however, recently children as young as three years have been shown to be aware of the
existence of social norms and that they should not be violated (Ingram & Bering, 2010;
Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008). Internalisation of the altruistic norm may
therefore occur considerably earlier than Cialdini et al. (1981) predicted, lending plausibility
to the idea that interactions with siblings, which make up a large proportion of all social
interaction in early childhood, may facilitate this process.
There are a number of mechanisms that have been suggested to drive the influence of
siblings upon their co-siblings' development (see Table 2.1). Confluence theory (Zajonc &
Markus, 1975) and the resource dilution hypothesis (Downey, 2001) will not be considered
here as they pertain to cognitive outcomes, which as discussed above show an opposing
pattern to personality and social outcomes. The remaining mechanisms can be broadly
divided into two classes,divergent and convergent: divergent mechanisms lead the child to
behave differently than their siblings while convergent mechanisms lead to increasing
similarity amongst co-siblings. Sulloway (2001; 2007) summarises the following five
divergent mechanisms in his family dynamics model: differences in parental investment,
birth-order stereotypes, dominance hierarchy effects, niche partitioning and
deidentification. Differences in parental investment, in a similar vein to resource dilution,
lead to children's outcomes declining as the number of siblings increases and parental
investment is divided accordingly; middleborns in particular are expected to suffer as they
do not experience a period of undiluted parental investment as do firstborns and lastborns.
Herrera, Zajonc, Wieczorkowska and Cichomski (2003) found that people have differential
expectations based on birth order and these are reflected in the choice of occupation a
person will make. They suggest that this choice may be influenced by birth order
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stereotypes, with parents' expectations based on birth order influencing their treatment of
a child and ultimately reinforcing the stereotype. Of course, it remains possible that these
stereotypes are not the causeof sibling differences, but in fact are a product of them. Both
stereotypes and parental investment are indirect influences, i.e., the sibling influences the
behaviour of others, who in turn influence the development of the child. The remaining
influences are direct, with the sibling personally influencing the child's development.
Dominance hierarchy effects are the result of older siblings having greater size and power,
which Sulloway suggests causes laterborns to compensate through being more agreeable
and open to experience. Niche partitioning is a process posited by Sulloway in which
children seek their own niche within the family in a manner comparable to the evolutionary
process of an organism finding a niche within an ecosystem. Laterborn children seek to
distinguish themselves from their adjacent siblings by finding different domains in which to
excel, essentially adjusting their personality in order to diversify. Similarly, deidentification
leads children to distinguish themselves from their immediately adjacent sibling in order to
reduce rivalry (Schachter,Shore, Feldman-Rotman, Marquis, & Campbell, 1976).
Given that adhering to a social norm involves conformity rather than dissociation it seems
unlikely that the divergent mechanisms described above are responsible for the
internalisation of altruistic norms. Downey and Condron (2004) propose that siblings are
resources, with children developing interpersonal skills through interaction with their
siblings, which can then be more widely applied. Brody (2004) suggests that siblings can
directly influence their co-siblings through teaching and acting as behavioural models, i.e.,
convergent mechanisms in which an increase in sibling similarity can be expected. It is not
unusual for older siblings to be given caregiving responsibility of their younger siblings,
during which time they use their greater knowledge and experience to take on the role of
teacher (Brody, Stoneman, Mackinnon, & Mackinnon, 1985). In addition, it is widely
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accepted that children often adopt their siblings as behavioural models and copy them
accordingly (Whiteman & Christiansen, 2008). Both teaching and modelling seem plausible
candidates for a potential sibling influence on altruistic behaviour: children may conform to
the altruistic norm by implicitly copying or being explicitly taught by their siblings. If this is
the case, lastborns would be likely to internalise the norm the earliest as they would have
teaching/modelling input as soon as they are able to interact with their siblings, while
firstborns of the same agewould have spent some time without siblings and still more with
infants who will provide poor input. Singletons would internalise the norm the latest as
they have no experience with siblings and would be relying on interactions with parents
and peers.
While there are clearly a number of potential mechanisms driving siblings' influence on
their co-siblings, there is surprisingly little direct examination of the extent to which they
are implemented and in which situations each mechanism is employed. Whiteman and
colleagues are one of the few research groups to directly assess the means by which
siblings exert their influence. Whiteman, McHale and Crouter (2007a; 2007b) assessedthe
degree to which adolescent younger siblings feel they model or deidentify from their older
siblings. As might be expected, they found that different children adopted different
strategies, some modelling, some deidentifying, some doing both and still others doing
neither. Later work by Whiteman and Christiansen (2008) revealed that in two-child
families firstborns both model and deidentify from secondbarns and vice versa; that is,
younger siblings have an impact on their older siblings aswell as older siblings affecting the
younger child. These studies demonstrate the complexity of the sibling relationship;
however, they were conducted with adolescents and the mechanisms at work in young
children's sibling relationships remain unexplored.
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The studies described above focus on the child's position within the sibling constellation
and the effect that this has on a child's development. However, this influence will be
modulated by the quality of the relationship between a child and her sibling, affecting the
mechanism by which a sibling exerts her influence. Deidentification may be the result when
the sibling relationship is fraught with conflict and hostility, but when the relationship is
more positive then siblings' behaviour will be more likely to converge. However, the sibling
relationship is often characterised by a mixture of positive and negative feelings, which are
often rather intense (Dunn, 2006). Nonetheless, Dunn & Munn (1986) found that 2 year-
olds whose older siblings had previously been cooperative were more likely to be
cooperative themselves six months later, creating a virtuous circle of cooperation. Clearly
the mere presence of siblings in the home is not sufficient to increase prosociality, but a
positive relationship with the siblings is also necessary.
2.1.4 Confounding variables on altruism in the DG
As discussed above, sibling status is a variable that may influence altruistic behaviour,
including performance on the DG, but with the exception of Fehr et al.'s (2008) study this
has yet to be assessedwith a behavioural measure in children. There are also a number of
variables which may influence DGbehaviour in addition to sibling status and may moderate
or drive any observed sibling effect. Possessingsiblings has often been found to influence
cognitive ability, including mathematical ability. At 4 years old there is likely to be some
variability in children's understanding of the numerosities involved in the DG, typically
conducted with an endowment of ten items, some of which may be attributable to sibling
status. However, the lesscognitively demanding strategy of subitizing, the ability to rapidly
appraise numerosity without directly counting, has a limit of four items, far lower than the
typical endowment size (Benoit, Lehalle, & Jouen, 2004; Starkey & Cooper, 1995; Wynn,
1990). Should difficulty in mathematical ability create inconsistencies in young children's
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Table 2.1: Predictions of 4-5 year-aids' altruistic behaviour in the DGbased upon mechanisms of
sibling influence
Mechanism Prediction of differences in Explanation
amount donated in the DG by 4-
5 year-old children across sibling
groups
Differences in Singletons> firstborns> lastborns As more siblings are born, parental
parental investment is reduced and outcome
investment declines.
Birth-order (Firstborns = lastborns) > singletons Singletons are often stereotyped as being
stereotypes selfish (see Mancillas, 2006); stereotypes
with regard to firstborns' and lastborns'
generosity have not been described
therefore it is likely that there is no
difference.
Dominance Lastborns > singletons> firstborns Lastborns, having less power, use
hierarchy effects agreeableness and generosity to
compensate; singletons, whose only
experience of a power imbalance is with
their parents, are expected to lie between
firstborns and lastborns.
Niche (Singletons = firstborns) < lastborns Firstborns are akin to singletons as they are
partitioning essentially singletons until a sibling is born;
laterborn siblings seek to distinguish
themselves by increasing their
agreeableness and generosity.
Deidentification Hrstboms s lastborns Siblings reduce rivalry by diverging from
their adjacent siblings. No prediction of
No prediction for singletons direction can be made from this mechanism
alone, simply that siblings will differ,
therefore no prediction can be made with
regard to singletons. Outcome is likely to be
modulated by the number of siblings as the
child deidentifies from their immediately
adjacent sibling.
Teaching Lastborns > firstborns> singletons Firstborns pass on behavioural norms that
they themselves have internalised.
OR Lastborns may therefore internalise these
norms at an earlier age than firstborns.
(Lastborns = firstborns) > singletons Singletons are less likely to have
internalised these norms at this age due to
their lack of experience with siblings.
Behavioural Lastborns > firstborns> singletons lastborns copy firstborns' behaviour. Once
modelling again, lastborns may show this behaviour at
OR an earlier age. Singletons are less likely to
show the behaviour at this age due to their
(lastborns = firstborns) > singletons lack of experience with siblings.
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DG performance one would expect that reducing the endowment size to within the limit of
subitizing, thus bypassing the necessity to understand the numerosities involved, should
reduce this variability and allow children's true intentions to be observed in their
behaviour. Should mathematical ability not have an influence on altruistic behaviour in the
DG, reducing the endowment size should not have an influence as allocations have been
shown in both children (Harbaugh & Krause, 2000) and adults (Carpenter et al., 2005;
Forsythe et al., 1994; List & Cherry, 2008) to be independent of endowment size, even
when endowment size is increased tenfold (Carpenter et al., 2005).
Gender may also influence DG behaviour, although findings to date are mixed with many
studies finding no effect of gender in both adults (Bolton & Katok, 1995) and children
(Benenson et al., 2007; Lucas et al., 2008). However, of those studies that find a significant
effect of gender, females are consistently found to donate more of their endowment than
males in both adults (Eckel & Grossman, 1998; Kamas et al., 2008) and children
(Gummerum et al., 2010; Gummerum et al., 2008; Harbaugh et al., 2003). This difference
has been attributed to females being more likely to be socialised to be prosocial (Robert B.
Cialdini et al., 1981) and being more sensitive to social cues (Croson & Gneezy, 2009).
Social factors such as SES,ToM ability and time spent with genetically unrelated peers may
also influence DG behaviour and any sibling effect. As discussed above, SES is often
confounded with sibling status and while SEShas not been shown to influence 4-year-olds'
DG behaviour, donations have been found to increase with SESin older children (Benenson
et al., 2007). Performance on a DG-like task" has been shown to differ according to role-
taking ability (the ability to take on another's viewpoint, comparable to ToM): children with
4 In Framing et al.'s (1985) study children were given 25 M&M sweets for their participation and
offered the opportunity to give some to a child from their school that was unable to take part. Those
that they gave away were placed into a container in the centre of the table which already contained
10 sweets, implying to the child that others had already donated.
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high role-taking ability gave less than those with low ability, possibly because they have a
better understanding of the implications of the anonymity of the situation (Froming et al.,
1985). Given that ToM ability is boosted by the possession of siblings this suggests the
possibility that this variable may also provide a confounding influence on any potential
sibling effect. This seems unlikely to be the case as no previous relationship has been
observed between ToM ability and actual DG behaviour in typically-developing children
(Lucaset al., 2008; Sally& Hill, 2005), although Sallyand Hill found, consistent with Framing
et al. (1985), that children on the autistic spectrum gave less in the DGas their first-order
false belief performance improved. As such, it is worth confirming that a confound is not
present. Similarly, any observed sibling effect may in fact be due to time spent with peers.
Interactions with peers provide important socialisation experience, including sharing
resources (Hay et al., 1999). While time spent with peers has previously been demonstrated
not to influence sharing behaviour (Fehr et al., 2008; Hunting, 1991), the influence of peers
on altruism in the DG is yet to be examined and it is possible that it is socialisation in
general rather than siblings in particular that is important for internalising altruistic norms.
2.1.5 Present study
The present study aimed to identify the influence of sibling status on altruistic behaviour in
the DG in 4-5 year-old children, independently of the confounding variables discussed
above. There is a great deal of inconsistency in the sibling literature of how to partition
children into groups. Somestudies compare children with and without siblings, while others
are concerned only with children that possesssiblings and compare firstborns to laterborns
(Le. middle and lastborns) or lastborns to earlyborns (Le. firstborns and middleborns). The
present study focussed on comparing singletons (children with no siblings) to firstborns and
lastborns, allowing examination of both birth order and possessionof siblings as influences
upon DG behaviour. As the present study was rigorous in its delineation of sibling status,
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twins and middleborns were not included asthey could not be satisfactorily grouped in any
of these categories.
While no previous study has directly assessedthe relationship between siblings and the
classic DG, results of studies across the personality, social and prosocial literature suggests
that possession of siblings will lead to an increase in donations on the DG. This research
making use of adult questionnaire evidence consistently shows that being lastborn (Le.
possessing only older siblings) will be more beneficial to altruistic behaviour than being
firstborn (Le. possessingonly younger siblings). However, the only behavioural measure in
children to date (Fehr et al., 2008) has shown the opposite pattern, with lastborns being
less generous than firstborns and singletons the most generous of all. If the methodology
with which altruism is assessed,whether questionnaire-based or behavioural, influences
the sibling effect then results with the DGwould be expected to mirror those of Fehr et al.
due to the DGalso being a behavioural measure. However, should Fehr et al.'s findings be
anomalous due to the sampling and methodological issues discussed above, findings with
the DGwould be expected to fall in with the remaining literature.
In order to ensure that the standard form of the DG is appropriate for use with young
children, two iterations of the DGwere conducted: one with the standard endowment of
10 items and another with a reduced endowment of 4 items. A measure of the
mathematical abilities that are likely to be used in the DG, the ability to divide equally and
discriminate less and more, was also taken to ensure that mathematical ability is not
influencing any sibling differences or the general performance on the DG. Gender was
counterbalanced across sibling groups in order to ensure that potential gender differences
do not drive any sibling differences. In addition, asmany authors have found sibling status
to be confounded with SES,a measure of this variable was also taken to ensure that any
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sibling differences found cannot be attributed to differences in SES.Similarly, ToM ability
(as measured by first-order false belief) was assessed as it has often been found to be
related to Sibling status. Finally, in order to ascertain whether any observed effects are
peculiar to siblings or as a result of increased socialisation in general, a measure of time
spent with peers was also taken.
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2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Participants
One hundred and twelve 4-5 year-old children (mean age 4:11; age range 4:0 to 5:11)
participated in the study. Thirty children were recruited from the Human Development and
Learning database and were tested in the School of Psychology, University of Nottingham.
The remaining 82 children were recruited from local Nottingham schools and were tested in
a quiet environment in their school setting. At the time of consent, parents completed a
questionnaire detailing demographic information such as home postcode, the number and
ages of each child's siblings along with average time spent with peers per week (see
Appendix 1). SESwas calculated by entering the child's postcode into the Office of National
Statistics database, which creates an Index of Total Deprivation based on the area's level of
income, employment, health, education, housing and services, crime and living
environment ("Office for National Statistics," 2007); these values were subsequently
converted into percentiles where a higher percentile represents higher SES.
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics across sibling groups (standard deviations in parentheses; ranges in
italics)
Singletons Firstborns Lastborns Group differences
Total n 22 50 40
Gender
(female:male) 11:11 25:25 20:20
Age/months
59.09 59.90 58.15
(7.43) (5.60) (5.71) H(2)=2.18, p=.34(mean)
49.00-72.00 49.00-70.00 48.00-70.00
Time spent with
30.65 30.89 29.94
unrelated peers (11.25) (8.63) (9.94) H(2)=0.30, p=.86(mean
hours/week) 9.00-45.00 3.00-42.25 10.00-45.75
64.31 81.88 72.82 H(2)=11.77, p<.Ol;
SES
(mean percentile) (20.86) (23.99) (27.54) singletons < firstborns
12.09-99-53 12.09-99.53 12.09-99.53 (U=272.00, p<.OOl)
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Children were recruited on the basis of sibling status to fall into the following groups:
singletons (no siblings), firstborns (only have younger siblings) and lastborns (only have
older siblings). Eachgroup contained equal numbers of males and females (see Table 2.2
for details).
2.2.2 Procedure
Eachchild participated in two iterations of the DG: one standard version with 10 stickers
(hereafter 10 condition) and one with a reduced endowment of 4 stickers (hereafter 4
condition). The order in which conditions were received was fully counterbalanced across
gender and sibling status. Each child subsequently completed two measures of the
mathematical abilities involved in the DG,followed by two first-order false belief measures
of ToM (seeAppendix 2 for full instructions).
2.2.2.1 DG
The child was presented with a selection of stickers and asked to choose her favourite
sticker. This sticker was removed from the selection and placed upon a felt array with
either 4 or 10 slots, depending upon the condition (see Figure 2.1 for an illustration of the
arrays); the order in which the conditions were received was fully counterbalanced. The
child was then asked to choose her favourite from the remaining stickers until all slots on
the array were filled. In total, each child chose 14 stickers: 10 stickers from a selection of 30
in the 10 condition and 4 stickers from a selection of 12 in the 4 condition (the ratio in
keeping with the 10 condition). Stickers in the 4 condition were larger than those in the 10
condition in an attempt to keep the total value of each sticker selection comparable
(assuming that larger stickers are more valuable to children). As sticker sizevaried slightly
in the 10 condition, all stickers were backed onto white felt in order to keep area
subtended constant - 4cm2 in the 10 condition and 9cm2 in the 4 condition; this also served
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to make numerosity discrimination more straightforward (as subitizing may be performed
on the basisof area; Feigenson,Carey& Hauser, 2002).
Once the child had made her selection, the remaining stickers were removed from sight.
The child was informed that the stickers were hers to keep, but if she wished she could give
some of her stickers to another child that had none. The participant was given no other
information about the other child and it was emphasised that she was not obliged to give
away any stickers at all and that her choice would be completely anonymous. In order to
achieve this, the experimenter presented the child with two envelopes, one for the
participant and one for the other child. The participant's name was written on her envelope
and she was asked to divide the stickers between the envelopes as she saw fit. To maintain
anonymity, the experimenter and any parents present covered their eyes during this
division. The arrays allowed the child to make a visual comparison between those stickers
that she had removed to donate (resulting in an empty slot) and those that remained in an
effort to ensure that the children were aware of the proportions involved.
In order that no child felt obliged to donate through guilt avoidance, the child was shown
that each envelope contained a colouring picture so that no-one would receive an empty
envelope. Once the child had made her division, the stickers were sealed into the envelopes
and the envelope for the other child was posted into a red postbox. The child was then
shown the selection of stickers for the next condition and the process was repeated. Once
the study was complete the experimenter opened the envelopes and recorded the contents
before the stickers were returned to a pool to be distributed amongst future participants.
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2.2.2.2 Mathematical ability
Following the two versions of the DG,the child was given two tasks intended to reflect the
mathematical abilities required for the DG:the equal division task and the same/more task.
For the equal division task the child was presented with blocks and asked to divide them
into equal piles, enabling the identification of whether the children were capable of making
an egalitarian split should they so desire. The task was first demonstrated by the
experimenter with two blocks to ensure understanding and then the child was given three
trials with four blocks and three trials with ten blocks. In the same/more task the child was
shown pairs of cards with various numbers of spots in the following ratios: 2:2, 1:3, 5:5 and
8:2; each pair always totalled either four or ten. Shewas askedwhether each pair was the
same and, if not, which card depicted the larger numerosity. Pairswere pseudorandomised,
with no more than three in a row requiring the same answer to avoid perseveration upon
the same response. The child first received 12 trials with the spots presented in a linear
fashion (comparable to the arrangement of the stickers in the DG) followed by a more
challenging 12 trials with the spots arranged randomly. This task revealed whether the child
could discriminate between equal and unequal divisions - if not she may not have divided
her endowment in the DG as she intended. Scoreswere summed across tasks to give a
composite maths score with a maximum of 30.
2.2.2.3 ToM tasks
Finally, the child was presented with two ToM tasks: the deceptive box task, based on
Gopnik and Astington's (1988) Smarties task and a pictorial adaptation of Baron-Cohen,
Leslie and Frith's (1985) Sally/Anne task. These tasks assess first-order false belief: the
understanding that other people can possessdifferent beliefs than the child.
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The deceptive box task assessesa child's ability to predict that a person in possessionof
different information than the child will think differently than the child would. The child
was shown a chocolate biscuit box and asked what she thought was inside. When she
answered 'chocolate' or 'biscuits' the box was opened and the unexpected content of a
banana was revealed. The child was askedwhat was inside the box and when she replied 'a
banana' the banana was returned to the box, which was then closed up. The child was then
asked the test question: what an absent parent would think was inside the box should they
see it closed as it was. If the child replied 'chocolate' or 'biscuits' she was categorised as
passing the test question, if she replied 'a banana' she was classed as failing the test
question. In order to confirm that the child fully understood the task, she was then asked
two control questions: what it looks like the box contains (the correct answer being
'chocolates' or 'biscuits') and what was really inside the box (the correct answer being 'a
banana'). If the child failed to answer either of the control questions correctly it was
impossible to interpret her answer to the test question as a true passor fail as she may not
have fully understood the question. As such, her response was classed as uninterpretable
and for the purposes of analysiscoded asa fail.
The Sally/Anne task is lesschallenging for children than the deceptive box task as the child's
own perspective is less salient. The child was shown an illustrated story in which one
character, Sally, puts her ball into her basket and leaves the room, after which the other
character, Anne, moves the ball into her box without Sally's knowledge. Sally then returns
and the child is asked the test question of where Sally will look first to find her ball. The
response 'in the basket' requires the child to understand that Sally does not possess the
same information as the child and is classedasa pass;the response 'in the box' is therefore
a fail. The child is then asked two control questions to assess her memory and
understanding of the story: where the ball was at the beginning of the story and where the
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ball actually was at the end of the story (the correct answers being 'in the basket' and 'in
the box', respectively). Failure to answer either of these questions correctly led to the
child's response on the test question being categorised as uninterpretable and for the
purposes of analysis was coded as a fail.
Scores on the two tasks were summed into a composite ToM score as follows: ali those
children whose responses were uninterpretable scored zero for that task on the composite
score, so only those children who passed one or both of the tasks could score above zero
on the composite score. Passing both tasks gave a composite score of two, passing either
the deceptive box or the Sally/Anne gave a composite score of one and passing neither
gave a composite score of zero.
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2.3 Results
Data were examined for skewnessand kurtosis. Asdata were not normally distributed, non-
parametric statistics were employed. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.
In order to be conservative in the analyses,all tests were two-tailed.
2.3.1 Mathematical ability
The relationship between scores on the equal division task and same/more task was
examined, revealing that there was only a small, nonsignifcant correlation between the
tasks (r.=.13, p=.19). Data were then compared across sibling groups for the composite
maths score, the equal division task and the same/more task (seeTable 2.4). There was an
effect of sibling status approaching significance on the composite maths score (H(2)=5.7s,
p=.06). Sibling groups did not significantly differ on the equal division task (H(2)=0.23,
p=.89) but there was a significant difference on the same/more task according to sibling
status (H(2)=8.22, p=.02). Post-hoc Mann-Whitney tests revealed that both singletons and
lastborns scored significantly lower than firstborns (U=344.50, p=.01; U=689.00, p=.03,
respectively), while there was no significant difference between singletons and lastborns
(U=367.s0, p=.52).
2.3.2 ToM ability
Performance on the deceptive box task and the Sally/Anne task was found to be consistent
for 57.14% of children (see Table 2.3). When performance was inconsistent, children were
more likely to pass the Sally-Anne task (77.08%) than the deceptive box task (22.92%;
McNemar / p<.OO1)Data were then compared across sibling groups for the composite
ToM score, the deceptive box task and the Sally/Anne task (see Table 2.4). There was no
effect of sibling status for the composite score or the deceptive box task (H(2)=0.s2, p=.77;
/(2)=0.07, p=.97, respectively); however, there was a significant effect of sibling status on
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the Sally/Anne task (1(2)=6.36, p=.04), with singletons passing the task less often than
firstborns (z=2.51, p=.Ol). There were no differences between singletons and lastborns
(z=1.41, p=.16) or firstborns and lastborns (z=1.26, p=.21).
Table 2.3: Consistency table showing the number of children in the group as a whole passing and
failing the two ToM tasks
Fail Sally- Pass Sally-
Anne Anne
Fail Deceptive box 31 37
Pass Deceptive
11 33
box
Table 2.4: Maths and ToM ability across sibling groups (standard deviations in parentheses; ranges in
italics)
Singletons Firstborns Lastborns Group differences
Equal division 5.55 5.64 5.45
task (0.91) (0.80) (1.18) H(2)=0.23, p=.89
(mean score/6) 3-6 3-6 1-6
H(2)=8.22, p=.02;
III
~ 22.64 23.33 22.65 singletons < firstbornsIII
I1l Same/more task..... (1.22) (1.18) (1.74) (U=344.50, p=.Ol).III
~ (mean score/24).....
21-24 19-24 17-24 lastborns < firstbornsI1l
~ (U=689.00, p=.03)
Composite 28.18 29.00 28.32
maths (1.65) (1.43) (2.14) H(2)=S.7S, p=.06
(mean score/se) 24-23 24-30 20-30
Deceptive box
.64 .68 .sS
task 1(2)=0.07, p=.97
(pass rate) (.49) (.47) (.50)
III
1(2)=6.36, p=.04;~
III Sally/Anne task .41 .68 .55I1l
singletons < firstborns.....
~ (pass rate) (.50) (.47) t.so)
0 (z=2.s1, p=.Ol)
f-
Composite ToM 1.05 1.06 0.95
score (0.72) (0.82) (0.71) H(2)=0.S2, p=.77
(mean score/2) 0-2 0-2 0-2
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2.3.3 Prasocial behaviour
Data were first examined in terms of the overall donation profile (i.e. the proportion oftheir
stickers donated by each child). This was then broken down into analyses of the decision to
donate (i.e. donating nothing or donating one or more stickers) and the proportion of
stickers donated by only those who chose to donate (hereafter positive donations). See
Table 2.5 for mean donations in each condition; Figure 2.2 shows the distributions of
donations in each condition. The modal offer was zero in both conditions; when only
positive donations are taken into account the modal offer was two stickers (50%) in the 4
condition and four stickers (40%) in the 10 condition.
Table 2.5: Mean proportion of endowment donated in the 4 condition and the 10 condition (standard
deviations in parentheses)
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Figure 2.2: Donation distributions in the 4 condition and the 10 condition
71
Analyses were initially conducted to establish whether there were differences in donation
profiles dependent upon the order in which the conditions were received. There were no
significant differences in donations in the 4 condition in terms of overall donation profile
(U=1461.50, p=.49), decision to donate (X2(1)=0.04, p=l) or positive donations (U=221.50,
p=.09); this was also the case for the 10 condition (U=1456.00, p=.47; X2(1)=0.33, p=.70;
U=247.00, p=.55 respectively). As such, all subsequent analyses were performed on data
collapsed acrossthe order in which the conditions were received.
Data were subsequently analysed to assessthe impact of children's sticker preferences
upon their donation behaviour. As children chose the stickers in order of preference, the
first 50% chosen were coded as most preferred and the final 50% were coded as least
preferred. The proportion of stickers donated that were most and least preferred were
calculated and Wilcoxon analyses revealed that in the 4 condition children donated
significantly more of their least preferred stickers (z=-2.20, p=.04) while there was no
difference in proportion of stickers donated according to preference in the 10 condition (z=-
1.21, p=.23).
2.3.3.1 Endowment size
In order to examine whether there was an influence of endowment size on donations, the
donation profiles for each condition were directly compared. As (for example) donation of
one sticker in the 4 condition is very different from donation of one sticker in the 10
condition, data were transformed into percentages as follows: donation of 0 stickers was
equal in both conditions (0%); donation of 1 sticker in the 4 condition was considered
equivalent to donation of 1, 2 or 3 stickers in the 10 condition (25%) and donation of 2
stickers in the 4 condition was considered equivalent to donation of 4, 5 or 6 stickers in the
10 condition (50%); no higher donations were made. See Figure 2.3 for transformed
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distributions of donations in each condition. Wilcoxon analysis revealed no effect of
endowment size on overall donations (z=-1.69, p=.09); a McNemar test using a binomial
distribution showed no effect of endowment size on donation decision (n-112, p=.81) with
83.93% of children consistent in their donation decision; nor was there an impact of
endowment size upon positive donations (z=O, p=l). Thus, children showed similar
behavioural profiles across both iterations of the DG irrespective of the endowment size .
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Figure 2.3: Donation distributions in the 4 condition and the 10 condition as transformed percentages
of total endowment size
In order to confirm that performance was similar across endowment size,intercorrelations
were conducted between performance on the 4 condition and the 10 condition (raw scores,
not scaled scores, were entered). Table 2.6 shows that overall donations in the 4 condition
were highly correlated with all measures of the 10 condition and overall donations in the 10
condition were significantly correlated with all measures in the 4 condition. There was a
marginally significant correlation across endowment size for positive donations but the
decision to donate and positive donations was not significantly correlated across
endowment size.
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The intercorrelations between donations for the two endowment sizes demonstrated that
performance on both measures was highly related and can comfortably be assumed to be
comparable. The correlation for positive donations just failed to reach significance, most
probably because there is little variance in positive donations for the 4 condition, while a
smaller number of children were included in the analysis as it was necessary for children to
have donated in both conditions. The decision to donate and positive donations were not
significantly correlated, which is not surprising given that those children who gave nothing
in both conditions were not included in the analyses, reducing the number of consistent
data points. On the whole, performance was highly comparable across the two conditions.
Table 2.6: Intercorrelations for performance in the 4 condition and the 10 condition of the DG.
10 overall 10 decision to 10 positive
donation donate donations
4 overall '5=.70, p<.OOl rpb=.66, p<.OOl r5=.38, p=.OO8
donations
4 decision to 'pb=.67, p<.OOl fpb=.20, p=.17
donate
4 positive '5=.33, p=.02 fpb=.20, p=.17 f5=.30, p=.06
donations
2.3.3.2 Gender
The impact of gender upon donations was assessed. In the 4 condition gender did not have
a significant impact upon overall donation behaviour (U=1535.00, p=.86), the decision to
donate (X2(1)=O.04, p=l) or on positive donations (U=295.00, p=l). In the 10 condition
gender did not have a significant effect upon overall donation behaviour (U=1329.00,
p=.12), the decision to donate (l(1)=4.44, p=.06) or on positive donations (U=192.00,
p=.12); however, there was a trend towards girls choosing to donate more often than boys.
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The impact of sticker preference according to gender was also assessed.When directly
comparing boys and girls, there was no effect of gender on the proportion of donations
that were most liked or least liked in either the 4 condition (U=227.50, p=.14) or the 10
condition (U=231.50, p=.26). However, when comparing the proportion of most and least
favourite stickers donated within subject for each gender individually, girls donations were
composed of a significantly larger proportion of their least favourite stickers in the 4
condition (z=-2.52, p=.02) with no difference in the 10 condition (z=-1.29, p=.21); boys
donations were not composed of significantly different proportions of most and least
preferred stickers for either the 4 condition (z=-0.50, p=.80) or the 10 condition (z=-0.32,
p=.80).
In sum, gender had little effect upon donations on the whole, with a trend for girls to
choose to donate more often than boys in the 10 condition and girls, unlike boys, giving a
larger proportion of their least preferred stickers in the 4 condition.
2.3.3.3 Sibling effect
Data were analysed to establish whether there were differences in donations according to
sibling status. Kruskal-Wallis analysis revealed a significant effect of sibling status on the
overall proportion of stickers donated in the 4 condition (H(2)=8.67, p=.Ol). Planned
pairwise comparisons (using Mann-Whitney) showed no significant difference in proportion
donated between singletons and firstborns (U=535.00, p=.89), but both singletons and
firstborns donated significantly fewer stickers than lastborns (U=316.00, p=.05; U=691.50,
p=.Ol, respectively). Sibling status did not have a significant effect on percentage of stickers
donated in the 10 condition (H(2)=2.33, p=.31), although as Figure 2.4 shows, the trend was
similar to that in the 4 condition.
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Chi-square analyses revealed a significant effect of sibling status on the decision to donate
in the 4 condition (X2(2)=6.71, p=.04). Planned pairwise comparisons using two-sample z-
tests revealed no significant difference between the number of singletons and firstborns
choosing to donate (z=.19, p=.8S); there was a trend for singletons choosing to donate less
often than lastborns (z=1.78, p=.07) while firstborns chose to donate significantly less often
than lastborns (z=2.46, p=.Ol). No significant effect of sibling status was found on the
decision to donate in the 10 condition (X2(2)=2.07, p=.38) although once again Figure 2.5
reveals a similar trend to that of the 4 condition .
• Singletons Firstborns. Lastborns
4 condition 10 condition
Figure 2.4: Percentage of endowment donated in the 4 condition and the 10 condition as a function
of sibling status (error bars represent standard error of the mean)
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Figure 2.5: Percentage of children choosing to make a donation in the 4 condition and the 10
condition as a function of sibling status
Kruskal-Wallis analyses demonstrated that of those children choosing to donate, the
proportion of stickers donated did not differ significantly across sibling status for either the
4 or 10 condition (H(2)=2.61, p=.28; H(2)=.43, p=.92, respectively).
The impact of sticker preference according to sibling status was assessed. When sibling
status was directly compared, there was no effect of sibling status on the proportion of
most and least preferred stickers donated in either the 4 condition (H(2)=1.42, p=.49;
H(2)=0.00, p=l, respectively) or the 10 condition (H(2)=0.76, p=.70; H(2)=1.28, p=.54,
respectively). When comparing within-subject for the individual sibling groups, there was
no effect of favourites in either the 4 condition or the 10 condition for singletons (z=-1.19,
p=.34; z=O, p=l, respectively), firstborns (z=-1.75, p=.ll; z=-0.85, p=.45, respectively) or
lastborns (z=-1.07, p=.35; z=-1.64, p=.10, respectively),
In sum, there was an effect of sibling status on the overall proportion of stickers donated in
the 4 condition (and a similar but nonsignificant trend in the 10 condition), with both
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singletons and firstborns donating fewer stickers than lastborns. This was due to an effect
of sibling status on the decision to donate, with singletons and firstborns choosing to
donate less often than lastborns. Sibling status did not influence positive donations or the
proportion of most and least preferred stickers donated.
2.3.3.4 Confounding variables
Analyses were conducted to examine the contribution of the potential confounding
variables to DG donations (summarised in Table 2.7). As there was not a significant
correlation between the maths tasks and there was a significant difference between the
frequency of passing the two ToM tasks, individual scores were entered into the
correlations rather than composite scores. In the 4 condition, SEScorrelated negatively
with both overall amount donated (r5=-.22, p=.02) and the decision to donate (rpb=-.24,
p=.Ol), with children being less likely to donate and donations decreasing as SESincreased.
ToM correlated negatively with positive donations in both conditions, although this effect
failed to reach significance in the 4 condition (4 condition: t, =-.27, p=.06; 10 condition: r, =-
.29, p=.OS).The variables above were subsequently entered into regression analyses along
with possession of older siblings to determine whether the sibling effect remains when
their effects are controlled for.
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Table 2.7: Influence of potential confounding variables upon donations in the 4 condition and the 10
condition
Amount donated 4 condition 10 condition
Equal division task '5=-.05, p=.61 '5=-.08, p=.38
Same/more task '5=-.11, p=.24 '5=.04, p=.72
Time with peers '5=-.11, p=.24 '5=-.15, p=.l1
SES fs=-.22, p=.02 '5=-.03, p=.79
Deceptive box task 'pb=-.06, p=.55 'pb=-.14, p=.15
Sally/Anne task 'pb=-.15, p=.13 'pb=-.12, p=.22
Decision to donate 4condition 10 condition
Equal division task 'pb=-.04, p=.68 'pb=-.11, p=.25
Same/more task 'Pb=-.09, p=.35 'Pb='OO,p=.99
Time with peers 'Pb=-.09, p=.35 'pb=-.04, p=.65
SES rpb=-.24, p=.Ol 'pb=-.07, p=.47
Deceptive box task 1(1)=0.01, p=1 1(1)=3.39, p=.09
Sally/Anne task 1(1)=1.07, p=.33 1(1)=0.30, p=.69
Positive donations 4condition 10 condition
Equal division task '5=-.09, p=.56 '5=-.11, p=.46
Same/more task ,,=-.16, p=.28 '5=-.10, p=.51
Time with peers '5=.04, p=.78 '5=-.20, p=.18
SES '5=.03, p=.84 '5=.08, p=.62
Deceptive box task 'pb=-.19, p=.18 'pb=-.19, p=.20
Sally/Anne task 'pb=-.22, p=.14 'Pb=-.24, p=.11
As there were no differences in donations between singletons and firstborns, data were
collapsed across these groups to create a new dichotomous variable: possession of older
siblings. Simultaneous multiple regressions were conducted in order to establish whether
the effect of possession of siblings on size of overall donations could be observed when
additional variables were controlled. As such, possession of older siblings, gender and SES
were entered as predictor variables (variables that produced a significant relationship with
overall donations above were entered as predictors), with overall donations in the 4
condition as the dependent variable. Data were significantly skewed (z-score=2.77) and
kurtotic (z-score=-2.98) and so the results should be interpreted with caution. A significant
model was produced (F3•107=5.31, LlIi=.13, p=.002) and possession of older siblings and SES
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emerged as significant predictors: children with older siblings donated more, while
donation size decreased as SESincreased; coefficients are summarised in Table 2.8.
Table 2.8: Summary of multiple regression analysis for variables predicting overall donations in the 4
condition (n=111)
8 (SE) Significance 95% Cl for 8
Constant 1.08
(0.27) <.001 0.56-1.61
Possession of older siblings 0.49
(0.16) .003 0.17-0.81
Gender -0.06
(0.15) .71 -0.36-0.25
SES -0.01
(0.003) .02
-0.01--0.001
A simultaneous multiple regression was also conducted with the predictor variables above
and with overall donations in the 10 condition as the dependent variable. Data were
significantly kurtotic (z-score=-2.89) and so the results should be interpreted with caution.
The model failed to reach significance (F2,l09=1.92, Ll#f=.03, p=.15) and no variables
emerged as a significant predictor of overall donations (coefficients are summarised in
Table 2.9).
Table 2.9: Summary of multiple regression analysis for variables predicting overall donations in the
10 condition (n=112)
8 (SE) Significance 95% Cl for 8
Constant 1.50
(0.30) <.001 0.91-2.09
Possession of older siblings 0.60
(0.39) .13
-0.17-1.36
Gender -0.45
(0.37) .23 -1.18-0.29
Possession of older siblings, gender and SES were entered as predictor variables into a
simultaneous logistic regression (predictors were derived from variables that produced a
significant influence above on the decision to donate). The dependent variable was the
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donation decision (Le. donate something or donate nothing). In the 4 condition, the
possession of older siblings and SESsignificantly predicted donation decision, with between
11% and 15% of the variance being accounted for by the model (((3)=13.44, p=.004). Those
who chose to donate had a lower SES and were more likely to have older siblings;
coefficients, Wald statistics and exponentiated b are summarised in Table 2.10.
Table 2.10: Summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting donation decision in the 4
condition ojtne DG (n=lllj
8 (SE) Wald (df) Significa nce Exp b (95% Cl)
Constant 1.81 5.97 (1) .02 6.17
(0.75)
Possession of older siblings -1.08 6.53 (1) .01 0.34
(0.42) (0.15-0.78)
Gender 0.18 0.20 (1) .65 1.20
(0.41) (0.54-2.68)
SES -0.02 0.98 (1) .02 6.17
(0.01) (0.96-1.00)
In the 10 condition there were no significant relationships with donation decision, so a
regression was not conducted on these data.
There were no significant relationships with positive donations in either the 4 condition or
the 10 condition, so regressions were nt conducted on these data.
In sum, the strongest sibling effects were observed in the 4 condition and affected both the
overall amount donated as well as the decision to donate. The result from the regression
analyses confirmed that this sibling effect can be translated into an effect of possessing an
older sibling, and that this effect was a significant predictor even when the effect of SES,a
variable which significantly correlated with the donation profile, was partialled out.
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2.4 Discussion
The current study sought to examine the influence of individual differences upon 4-5 year-
olds' altruistic behaviour in the dictator game. It has demonstrated that even when steps
are taken to reduce the cognitive demands of the task and when the least possible
incentive is given for children to donate, almost half of children choose to make an altruistic
donation in the dictator game. While this behaviour appears to be independent of
mathematical understanding of the task, it is influenced by gender, sibling status, SESand
ToM ability.
2.4.1 Overall altruistic behaviour
Behaviour was comparable whether the children were allocating an endowment of 4
stickers or 10 stickers: a mean of 18% (4 condition) or 15% (10 condition) of the total
endowment was donated, with 44% (4 condition) or 42% (10 condition) of children
choosing to donate at least one sticker. These findings are broadly consistent with previous
studies in children of the same age, although there are a number of methodological
differences that must be taken into account. Children in the current study donated less
than those in Lucaset al.'s (2008) experiment, although this is only to be expected given
that their children, unlike those in the current study, were not given the option to keep the
entire endowment. However, when the mean donations of only those children who chose
to donate (i.e. eliminating all of those who kept the entire endowment) are compared to
the mean donation in Lucaset al.'s study, the results are very similar: in the current study,
children who donated gave 40% in the 4 condition and 36% in the 10 condition, while Lucas
et al. observed a mean donation of 40%. Interestingly, children in the present study were
more likely to donate their lesspreferred stickers, suggesting that children are not acting at
random but may be strategic in their altruistic behaviour, perhaps making a token gesture
by donating less-preferred stickers.
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Only one child (0.89% of total) in the present study chose to make a hyperiair allocation
(Le. donating more than 50%of the endowment, see Figure 2.2). Gummerum et al. (2010)
found 12 children (15.58% of 3-5 year-olds) made hyperiair allocations, while for Lucaset
al. (2008) 6 children (18%of 4-5 year-olds) made hyperiair allocations. This difference may
be due to the child being allowed to choose individual stickers in the present study, while in
both Gummerum et al. and Lucaset al.'s studies children were given 10 identical stickers,
thus potentially reducing the value of each subsequent sticker and increasing the likelihood
of donation. Adults, like the children in the present study, rarely make hyperfair offers
(Camerer, 2003); as such it seems likely that allowing the child to choose different stickers
provides a pie to divide that is more comparable to monetary endowments. Alternatively, it
may be harder for the child to keep track of identical stickers, while in the present study,
the use of different stickers along with the use of an array showing how many stickers have
been removed and how many remain may have aided the children in their division and
contributed to reduce the occurrence of hyperiair allocations.
The present study is most similar to that of Benenson et al. (2007), who also allowed the
children to choose 10 different stickers and observed a mean donation of approximately
25% in their 4 year-olds. This mean is lower than those of Lucas et al. (2008) and
Gummerum et al. (2010), but is higher than those of the present study. However, children
in Benenson et al.'s study were aware that they were donating to children from their own
classroom, while donations were completely anonymous in the present study. Giving to
ingroup members is known to increase adults' DGallocations (Ben-Ner et al., 2009) and can
cause a small increase in the allocations of children as young as 7 years even when group
allocation is arbitrary (Gummerum, Takezawa,& Keller, 2009), and this may be responsible
for the differences observed here. It must be borne in mind that the present study
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attempted to give the children the least possible incentive to donate (donations were made
to a stranger, the dictator was anonymous to both the recipient and the experimenter and
a colouring picture was provided in each envelope to reduce donations through guilt
avoidance) yet children, rather than taking the opportunity to be selfish without
repercussions, persisted in donating. This suggests that if altruism is learned rather than
innate, this norm is internalised early in ontogeny and quickly results in spontaneous
implementation.
The findings from the present study are also in line with those from work with adults, who
give a mean of approximately 25% of the endowment, with over 60% of participants
choosing to make an allocation (Camerer, 2003; Levitt & List, 2007). Children in the present
study give slightly less (17% of the endowment in the 4 condition and 15% in the 10
condition) and less often (44% in the 4 condition and 42% in the 10 condition choosing to
donate) than do adults. This is consistent with the idea that altruism increases with age
(Benenson et al., 2007; Harbaugh et al., 2003). Note that there was no effect of age in the
present study, but this was most likely due to the small age range in question: previous
findings of an increase in altruism with age have examined a much wider range of ages
(Benenson et al., 2007; Harbaugh et al., 2003).
2.4.2 Sibling status
The present study has demonstrated that when sibling groups are clearly delineated, an
effect of sibling status can be observed in the altruistic behaviour of 4-5 year-olds. While
patterns of donations were similar in both the 4 condition and the 10 condition, the effect
of sibling status only reached significance in the 4 condition. While a difference in the
influence of sibling status according to endowment size was unexpected, this finding is
consistent with Hay, Castle, Stimson and Caplan (1991), who state that individual
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differences emerge under conditions of scarcity. It has been suggested that sibling effects
can only be observed in within-family studies as they are too subtle to be elicited by
between-family studies (Ernst & Angst, 1983). The present study examined sibling status
between-family: perhaps constraining options in the 4 condition and essentially forcing
participants to choose between selfishness and generosity evokes a sibling effect that is
otherwise too subtle to be observed in a between-family study.
The strongest sibling effect was found in the overall donation profile in the 4 condition with
lastborns donating significantly more than both firstborns and singletons, who did not differ
in their donations. When this profile was decomposed into the decision to donate and the
size of positive donations, it could be seen that the overall effect was driven by the decision
to donate. Lastborns were found to choose to donate more often than both singletons and
firstborns (with no difference between these groups), although the difference between
lastborns and singletons did not quite reach significance, possibly due to the small size of
the singleton group. There was no effect of sibling status on positive donations: once the
decision to donate had been made sibling status did not influence the amount that was
given. This may be due to lastborn children internalising a sharing norm earlier than
children without older siblings, causing them to be more likely to choose to make a
donation in the OG,but not influencing the amount given one that decision has been made.
This has yet to be directly examined in children, but there is evidence of such a distinction
in adults. Saunders and Lynn (2010) examined the influence of helping motives and social
norms on altruistic behaviour in South Africa, as demonstrated by tipping car guards.
Consistent with the present findings, they found that social norms were related to whether
or not people chose to tip but not tip size,while helping motives were related to tip sizebut
not the decision of whether or not to tip.
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Despite SEShaving been posited to be responsible for many differences attributed to sibling
status (e.g. Ernst & Angst, 1983; Rodgerset al., 2000), the observed effect of sibling status
cannot be explained by SES.SESwas negatively related to the decision to donate - the
higher the SES, the more likely the child would donate nothing - however, logistic
regression confirmed that in the 4 condition only, possession of older siblings influenced
donation decision and this was independent of SES,which made a separate contribution to
altruistic behaviour. While there were differences in SESaccording to sibling status, these
were not consistent with the observed altruistic behaviour and are unlikely to be a
confounding factor. Were SESto be driving the sibling effect one would expect firstborns
(highest SES)to donate least often and singletons (lowest SES)most often, when in fact
these two groups did not differ in terms of donations - it is lastborns, who lie between
these two groups on SES,who donated most often. There was no effect of SESin the 10
condition, consistent with Benenson et al. (2007), who found no effect of SESon 4-year-
aids' donations in a 10-sticker DG.Like lastborns, low SESchildren may also internalise and
act upon a sharing norm earlier than high SESchildren as, having fewer resources available,
low SESchildren have a greater necessity to share resources. This influence may, like the
influence of siblings, be more readily observable under conditions of scarcity when
response options are limited. Benesonet al. found that by 9 years of age, high SESchildren
donate more than low SESchildren and suggest that high SESchildren adopt stronger
fairness norms. This opposite effect may be due to differences in the calculation of SESor
may represent an interaction between age and SES.Sharing norms may become more
strongly ingrained with age, while high SESchildren experience a decrease in the value of
stickers as they become increasingly aware of their greater resources and therefore
experience a sharper increasewith age in their likelihood of donating than low SESchildren.
However, consistent with the present findings, Kameda,Takezawaand Hastie (2005) found
low SESuniversity students to be more likely than high SESstudents to endorse an
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egalitarian norm over a merit-based norm as they have fewer safeguards to manage
resource uncertainty. In addition, Carpenter et al. (2005) found that adults showed a 9%
reduction in DGallocations with every standard deviation increase in family income, which
is often used asa proxy for SES.As such, the pattern observed in the present study of lower
SESchildren being more likely to donate may continue into adulthood.
Interestingly, it seems that at this young age it is not simply the possessionof siblings that
influences altruistic behaviour, but rather the possessionof older siblings. Firstborns, who
have spent part of their lives as only children, did not show a benefit of possessingsiblings
and behaved similarly to singletons, who both donated less often than lastborns; whether
this effect obtains throughout childhood and into adulthood warrants further investigation.
It is likely that the younger siblings of firstborns are too young to influence their older
siblings' behaviour at this age. As the firstborns ageand their siblings begin to exert more of
an influence, the difference between firstborns and lastborns may disappear. Whether
singletons ultimately catch up as their social experience increases also merits further
investigation. However, the observed effect also seems to be a product of siblings in
particular rather than general socialisation - at this age there is no effect of time spent with
peers on altruistic behaviour in the DG. This lack of relationship observed between time
with peers and altruistic behaviour may in fact reflect insufficient detail in parents' report.
Inaccuracies and variability in questionnaire responses may have influenced findings, and
the measure did not distinguish between same-age and older/younger peers - Benenson,
Markovits, Roy and Denko (2003) suggest that similarity in age is important for peers to
influence sharing as they have similar perspectives. Alternatively, peers may have an
increasing influence as children get older and the total time spent in their company
increases, or there may be a critical amount of interaction needed before peers have an
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effect. Should this be the case, singletons would be expected to catch up with lastborns in
time.
The relationship between possessionof older siblings and altruistic behaviour is consistent
with the majority of previous studies that examine the influence of sibling status.
Possessionof older siblings has been demonstrated to be related to a greater likelihood of
possessinga prosocial social value orientation (Van Langeet al., 1997) aswell asan increase
in altruism as measured on the Agreeablenessscale of the NEO-PI-R(Jefferson et al., 1998;
Saroglou & Fiasse, 2003). However, the only previous study to directly examine the
influence of sibling status on altruistic behaviour found the opposite pattern of results -
lastborns were the least generous and singletons the most generous (Fehr et al., 2008).
Fehr et al. attributed the discrepancy between their findings and those of previous studies
to their use of a behavioural measure over questionnaires; however, the fact that the
present study also made use of a behavioural measure and its findings are consistent with
the questionnaire studies casts doubt upon this explanation. Their results may be due to
the specific behavioural task chosen by Fehr et al., although why limiting the child to a
forced choice between selfishness and generosity would invert the direction of sibling
differences is difficult to explain. Rather, it may be that Fehr et ai's treatment groups were
not appropriately counterbalanced due to the post hoc acquisition of sibling data and their
results were consequently skewed. Further study is necessaryto confirm whether this is the
case.
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2.4.3 Confounding variables
No relationship was found between altruistic behaviour on the DGand mathematical ability
as measured in the equal division task (making equal splits) and the same/more task
(discriminating numerosities). This may be due in part to the efforts made to make the task
as accessible as possible to such young children. Controlling the area subtended by the
stickers to avoid a confound between area and number, aswell as placing the stickers on an
array so that the children were able to keep track of how many stickers they had removed
and how many remained, may have abolished any differences between the children
attributable to mathematical ability. Alternatively, the maths tasks chosen may simply have
been too easy; indeed, 44% of children performed at ceiling and even the lowest-scoring
child achieved 66% correct. Addition of more challenging tasks such as mental arithmetic
would give greater variability in mathematical performance but these more complex tasks
would not only reflect those abilities necessaryfor the DG.They would instead be likely to
tap into underlying abilities such as working memory and processing speed (Bull &
Johnston, 1997; Bull & Scerif, 2001). Children had little trouble with the mathematical tasks
in the present study and the lack of relationship between these abilities and DGbehaviour
indicates that individual differences in the abilities required for the DGdo not account for
the performance of young children on this task.
Two iterations of the DGwere conducted, one with a standard endowment of 10 stickers
and one with a reduced endowment of 4 stickers. The 4 sticker condition was an attempt to
make the task less cognitively demanding by keeping the numerosities to be dealt with
within the limits of subitizing ability. Contrary to expectations, there were no differences in
donation behaviour between the 4 condition and the 10 condition, suggesting that children
have no more difficulty dividing the endowment in the 10 condition than they do in the 4
condition. It is unclear whether there would have been a difference between the conditions
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had not the steps described above been taken to make the task accessible to the young
children, although a facilitated split with 10 identical stickers placed in two horizontal lines
did not influence DG allocations compared to when the stickers were placed in a circle
(Blake & Rand, 2010). Studies in adults have also found that endowment size does not
influence DGallocations (Carpenter et al., 2005; Forsythe et al., 1994; List & Cherry, 2008) -
it seems likely that the 4 and 10 conditions are truly comparable in terms of DGdonations.
Greater variability in behaviour is provided by a larger endowment, which is essential for
experimental manipulation of DGvariables in order to allow for increases or decreases in
donations depending upon the manipulation in question. Nonetheless, a smaller
endowment size provides broadly comparable results yet seems to tease out individual
differences (see section 2.4.2), with the added bonus of reducing the resources required.
Further study should therefore be conducted to inform whether use of smaller
endowments would prove useful for eliciting individual differences in DGbehaviour.
Although sibling status did not have an effect on the amount donated by those who chose
to make a donation, positive donations were influenced by ToM ability as assessedby first-
order false belief understanding: with increasing ability, donation size decreased. This
finding is not entirely surprising as, despite previous studies that examined the influence of
ToM ability having found no impact on DGdonations in typically-developing children (Lucas
et al., 2008; Sally & Hill, 2005), high ToM ability did decrease donations in a DG-like task
(Framing et al., 1985) and children on the autistic spectrum (Sally & Hill, 2005). Framing et
al. suggested that children with a high ToM (asmeasured by role-taking) were able to take
advantage of the anonymity of the situation, as high ToM children donated more than low
ToM children when the experimenter observed donations. It is also possible that children
with better ToM have a superior understanding of their own minds as well as those of
others, causing them to be more able to predict the consequences for themselves when
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making an allocation and realise that donating more is not in their own best interests.
Alternatively, consistent with Sally and Hill's suggestion that first-order false belief is
necessary for strategic responding, children with a better ToM may have a greater
understanding of the implications of making a token donation, that making a donation
fulfils the altruistic norm at minimal cost to themselves, and therefore choose to give a
smaller amount. Given that the relationship with ToM in the present study was only
significant with positive donations, this seemsplausible.
Contrary to previous findings that possessingolder siblings accelerated ToM development,
sibling status did not influence composite ToM ability in the present study. When the tasks
were examined individually, there was no influence of sibling status on the deceptive box
task, while singletons scored significantly lower than firstborns on the Sally/Anne task, with
no difference between firstborns and lastborns. This is consistent with McAlister and
Peterson (2007) and supports the idea that when a difference according to sibling status
arises, ToM ability is boosted by possessionof siblings,whether older or younger.
Gender had little direct impact upon altruistic behaviour, but in line with expectations
those gender differences that were observed showed girls to be more altruistic than boys.
No overall gender differences were found in the 4 condition, but in the 10 condition there
was an effect on the decision to donate that just failed to reach significance, with girls
choosing to donate more often than boys. There was not a significant effect of gender on
positive donations in either condition, but when examining the means we can see that
those boys who chose to donate gave a mean of 39.44% of their endowment in the 10
condition, a slightly higher proportion than the 33.10% from those girls who chose to
donate. This can be interpreted as girls making more token donations than boys (Le. only
one or two stickers) in the 10 condition - the slightly higher level of positive donations in
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boys may therefore not be due to boys being more generous than girls, but rather may
demonstrate a decrease in token donations as they choose to donate lessoften (SeeFigure
2.6).
Examination of the impact of gender when looking at the proportion of most and least
favourite stickers donated helps to explain the effects observed above. There was no effect
of sticker preference for boys but girls were found to donate more of their least favourite
stickers in both conditions. These findings imply that girls are more likely to supplement
their allocations with their least preferred stickers, and taken together with the findings
above, suggest that girls demonstrate a more sophisticated understanding of the nuances
of altruism - that one can make an altruistic responsewhilst minimising the cost to the self.
2.4.4 Mechanisms of sibling influence
While the present study cannot confirm the influence of different mechanisms of sibling
influence, which can only be distinguished with further investigation, the findings are
inconsistent with the following mechanisms described in Table 2.1: differences in parental
investment, birth order stereotypes and dominance hierarchy effects. The parental
investment mechanism predicted that a child's outcome would decline the later in the
constellation she was born, yet firstborns and singletons behaved similarly while lastborns,
who would be expected to be the least generous due to having the least parental
investment, were the most generous. Perhapsdifferences in terms of parental investment
are minimal at this young age and only become apparent later in life as inequities have had
the opportunity to accrue. Should this be the caseone would expect the predicted pattern
to emerge with age, although it seems unlikely that this will occur given that the children
who should have been the most generous were the least generous. In terms of birth order
stereotypes, singletons are stereotyped to be selfish yet they behaved comparably to
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firstborns, about whom there is no such stereotype. It is possible that firstborns, due to
having been singletons for a portion of their lives, are conforming to the singleton
stereotype and have not yet adjusted to the presence of siblings. If this were the case, the
difference between firstborns and lastborns may lessen or even disappear with age;
however, were this to be the case it could be due to stereotypes reflecting a real-world
difference rather than the difference being due to the stereotype. Indeed, while
conforming to a gender stereotype, for example, may help an individual to fit in socially, it
is hard to see a similar benefit to conforming to the stereotype of being selfish. The greater
altruism of lastborns was consistent with the dominance hierarchy model, but singletons,
rather than being intermediate in terms of generosity due to their inexperience with power
imbalances, were the least generous. It may be that dominance hierarchy effects only
influence children with siblings, in which case the observed pattern is consistent with the
mechanism. Replication of the study with adults would confirm whether this was the case
as lastborns would continue to show more altruistic behaviour than firstborns.
The results of the present study are consistent with the following mechanisms from Table
2.1: niche partitioning, deidentification, teaching and behavioural modelling. Niche
partitioning states that younger siblings choose to be more altruistic in order to distinguish
themselves from their older siblings. Should this be the casethen this difference is likely to
be stable with time and persist into adulthood; further study with older children and adults
would confirm this. The different patterns exhibited by lastborns and firstborns is
consistent with deidentification and the idea that lastborns are more generous in order to
establish an identity distinct from that of their siblings. Should the difference between
lastborns and firstborns be due to deidentification, it would be expected to continue into
adulthood and perhaps even increase as people continue to seek to establish a distinct
identity. Similarly, the difference between firstborns and lastborns is consistent with both
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teaching and behavioural modelling, as lastborns are likely integrate altruistic norms earlier
than firstborns due to their experience with siblings from birth. Examiningadults' behaviour
would help to reveal whether modelling contributes to altruistic behaviour, as firstborns
continuing to be less altruistic and lastborns more altruistic would be inconsistent with
lastborns modelling their older siblings' behaviour. Similarly, in this event direct teaching
would seem implausible as a selfish teacher is unlikely to advocate generosity. Of course,
older siblings may indirectly teach altruism through demanding more resources at home
(Le. causing conflict), leading lastborns to acquiesce and learn that altruism leads to
harmony as suggested by Van Lange et al. (1997) in their sibling-prosocial hypothesis.
However siblings exert their influence, it seems plausible that they influence children's
acquisition of personal altruistic norms. The present study has demonstrated that this can
occur far earlier than suggested by Cialdini et al. (1981) as children donated their stickers
even in the absence of external observation; lastborns are likely to do so earlier than
singletons and firstborns, presumably due to socialising with an older sibling from birth as
the effect is independent of time spent with peers.
In addition to examining whether the influence of siblings changes with time, future work
should observe the influence of the number of siblings upon altruistic behaviour. There was
not enough variability in sibling numbers in the present study to examine this (only two
children possessedmore than two siblings), particularly in firstborns as their siblings are so
young. Nonetheless, having more siblings present at home will increase socialisation time,
potentially increasing the likelihood that an altruistic personal norm will be acquired.
Within-family study would be particularly illuminating as it would reveal similarities and
differences in related siblings' behaviour that are missedwith the present type of between-
family study.
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In sum, the present study has demonstrated that under conditions of scarcity, 4-5 year-old
children possessingolder siblings are more likely to donate in the DG. Although low SES
children are also more likely to donate, the effect of sibling status is independent of SES,
while high ToM decreases the amount donated by those who choose to make a donation.
Girls are more likely to donate than boys and show more sophistication in their donation
behaviour. DG behaviour is independent of mathematical ability and time spent with
genetically unrelated peers. The finding that siblings influence altruistic behaviour does not
mean that parents, other family members and other social interactions are not important
to the development of altruism (seeJellal & Wolff, 2002). Indeed, the influence of siblings is
likely to be mediated at least in part by parents exhorting their children to cooperate and
share; however, the present study has demonstrated that older siblings provide an
important and often-overlooked contribution to young children's altruistic development.
While the finding that possessionof older siblings contributes to the expression of altruistic
behaviour in 4-5 year-old children is undoubtedly noteworthy, it must be borne in mind
that sibling status is only one of a number of facets of the sibling constellation that may be
influential. In order to fully understand older siblings' influence upon altruistic behaviour, it
is important to examine the relative impact of such factors as the number of siblings, the
age difference between siblings, gender of siblings and gender congruence (Le. whether
siblings are the same gender as the child or not), not to mention those aspects that were
excluded from the present study - middleborns and multiple births. All of these factors may
modulate altruistic behaviour in different ways. For instance there is evidence to suggest
that possessing a sister rather than a brother increases the likelihood of developing a
prosocial SVO (Van Lange et al., 1997). In addition, the stability of this effect over time
should be explored as it is possible that singletons and firstborns may compensate later in
life with increasing experience with peers and, in the case of firstborns, siblings who will
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provide increasingly valuable input as they move from infancy and through childhood.
Studying whether and how the impact of siblings changes into adulthood would also serve
to help distinguish between the various mechanisms by which siblings may influence
altruistic behaviour. This can be achieved by replicating the present study with a group of
adults and comparing their performance to that of children and will be the focus of Chapter
3.
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Chapter 3: Sibling status and the dictator game in adults
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the dictator game (OG) was used to demonstrate an effect of
possessionof older siblings upon altruistic behaviour in 4-5 year-old children. This was one
of the first studies to examine the influence of sibling status upon a behavioural measure of
altruism in children; however, this relationship has yet to be assessed in adults. In the
present chapter the OGwas conducted with a sample of adults in order to observe the
stability of the influence of siblings into adulthood, allowing discrimination between the
various mechanisms of sibling influence that may be driving the relationship.
3.1.1 The influence of siblings in adults
The influence of sibling status upon adults' behaviour is rarely examined as it is often
assumed that it is only when interactions are frequent that siblings exert an effect, i.e.
when a child is living with their siblings. Moreover, a number of authors assert that any
influence exerted by siblings is apparent only in the context in which it was originally
exhibited and therefore disappears once the child leaves the family home (Ernst & Angst,
1983; Harris, 2000; Kitzmann et al., 2002). EvenSulloway, who advocates the concept that
sibling status has a long-term influence upon personality, states that many of the effects of
sibling status are latent in adulthood and may require intense emotions or familial cues in
order to be precipitated (Sulloway, 2007). Given the specificity of circumstances that seem
to be necessaryto produce a sibling effect in adults, one might expect differences in adult
behaviour according to sibling status to be rare and perhaps even specious. Nonetheless,
robust sibling effects have been observed across a variety of cognitive and personality
variables.
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The relationship between sibling status and IQ has been of interest to researchers for many
years, and while some researchers maintain that any between-family association between
the two is simply a factor of confounding variables such as SESand educational level
(Rodgers et al., 2000), relationships have nonetheless been observed in large, well-
controlled studies. Kristensen and Bjerkedal (2007) examined birth order effects upon IQ in
male Norwegian conscripts, comparing biological birth order to functional birth order.
Biological and functional birth order are not necessarily the same; for instance a child may
have been born second in the sibling constellation but raised first due to the death of the
older sibling. The child would therefore be biologically secondborn but functionally
firstborn. Kristensen and Bjerkedal found both biological and functional birth order to
influence IQ, with IQ declining the later in the constellation the child was born. However,
once functional birth order was controlled, the relationship with biological birth order
disappeared, suggesting that it is the social impact of rearing order that causesbirth order
differences rather than biological changes. In a highly representative Norwegian sample of
1.5 million participants, Black et al. (2005) found a strong effect of birth order on
educational attainment that was of a similar magnitude whether assessedwithin-family or
between-family. As women showed a larger effect than men, it is possible that Kristensen
and Bjerkedal's finding that functional birth order is important may also extend to women.
In a longitudinal study of episodic memory, Holmgren et al. (2007) found that adults had a
better outcome the earlier in the sibling constellation they were born. This effect was
robust over time, both in terms of the five year period of the study and across the age
cohorts tested (adults between 35 and 80 years). This demonstrates that sibling status can
continue to be influential over the course of adulthood and not just in the childhood years.
This should perhaps not be surprising - siblings are a constant throughout an individual's
life and people make an effort to keep in contact with their siblings for the simple reason
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that they are related to them. Cicirelli (1982) notes that it is very unusual to break contact
entirely with siblings, while most people meet up with siblings several times a year, often in
gatherings of the entire family. It seems reasonable to suppose that roles adopted within
the family are therefore regularly reinforced (indeed, it is common to have surviving
siblings until late in life) and should a sibling effect extend beyond the context of the family,
it is likely to continue throughout life.
When comparing adults with and without siblings, singletons are found to be broadly
similar to adults with siblings on a variety of measures. Kwan and Ip (2009) found that
Chinese adults who had been raised in only child families (who are more common in China
than elsewhere due to the one child policy) were generally similar to those with siblings,
and even exceeded them in terms of health, life satisfaction and charitable donations. A
meta-analysis conducted by Polit and Falbo (1987) supports this finding, and they suggest
that singletons may in fact have an advantage over adults with siblings due to better quality
and quantity of parental interaction. Riggio (1999) found singletons to be marginally more
Neurotic (as measured by the EysenckPersonality Questionnaire; Eysenck& Eysenck,1975)
than those with siblings, otherwise there were no differences in personality variables
according to the possessionof siblings, nor were there any differences in social skills as
measured by the SocialSkills Inventory (Riggio,1989).
Sulloway (1996) conducted a meta-analysis of studies examining birth order effects on the
NEO-PI-Rmeasure of personality. He found firstborns to be high in Conscientiousnessand
Neuroticism, while laterborns were high in Openness to Experience and Agreeableness.
Findings for Exraversion were less dear, with the facet of dominance being higher in
firstborns while the facet of sociability is higher in laterborns. A number of studies have
tested this finding and, as described in section 2.1.1, have come up with mixed results.
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Freese, Powell and Steelman (1999) sought to explore Sulloway's assertion that firstborns
are more conservative and supportive of authority. They found no support for this theory,
as political attitudes from the USGeneral SocialSurveydid not differ as a function of sibling
status. Michalski and Shackelford (2002) compared firstborns and laterborns on a measure
of five major personality dimensions - Surgency, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness,
Emotional Stability and Openness to Experience (after Botwin, Buss,& Shackelford, 1997).
They found very little support for Sulloway, with only Agreeableness and Opennessshowing
an effect of sibling status. Consistent with Sulloway, firstborns were found to be less
Agreeable, but contrary to Sulloway they scored higher on Openness.Jefferson et al. (1998)
found that the effect of birth order depended upon the source of the personality rating.
Self-report on the NEO-PI-Rshowed no difference between firstborns and laterborns on the
five domains, although laterborns evaluated themselves as high in the facets of altruism
and tendermindedness compared to firstborns. When rated by their peers, laterborns
scored higher on Openness, Agreeableness and Extraversion, but when rated by their
spouses there were no differences. The authors concluded that personality is largely
unaffected by birth order.
Despite the studies above finding little or no support for Sulloway (1996), those that do find
an effect of birth order on personality are commensurate with Sulloway in the direction of
their effect. Beck, Burnet and Vosper (2006) conducted a within-family analysis of
differences in extraversion according to birth order. Consisent with Sulloway, they found
firstborns to be more dominant and laterborns more sociable. Paulhus et al.'s (1999)
within-family comparison found firstborns to be more Conscientious, while laterborns were
more Agreeable and Open to experience. These differences do not appear to be driven by
birth order stereotypes as results were comparable whether or not stereotypes were
elicited. Paulhus et al. suggest that birth order differences truly exist and that this is the
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reason for the existence of birth order personality stereotypes, rather than stereotypes
being self-fulfilling prophecies. Similarly, Healey and Ellis (2007) found that in pairs of
siblings firstborns were more Conscientious and achieving and secondborns were more
Open to experience, while Saroglou and Fiasse (2003) found that middleborns and
lastborns, who are often grouped together in studies of sibling status, are quite distinct in
terms of personality (as assessedby the NEO-PI-R)and school performance. Compared to
firstborns and lastborns, middleborns were more impulsive, less conscientious and had
poorer school performance. Lastborns, on the other hand, were the most agreeable and
warm; in particular they scored higher than the other groups on the facet of altruism.
As described in section 2.1.1, Agreeableness, a personality dimension that contains the
facet of altruism and is often stronger in laterborns (Jefferson et al., 1998; Saroglou &
Fiasse,2003; Sulloway, 1996), is related to an individual's volunteerism (Carlo et al., 2005).
Lastborns have been found to be more risk-taking than firstborns, with middleborns the
least likely to take risks (Wang, Kruger, & Wilke, 2009). Similarly, Courtiol et al. (2009) have
found differences according to birth order in an investment game, an economic game
which assessescooperation (a prosocial behaviour that involves an element of risk). In an
investment game, two participants are given identical endowments of money or points.
Player A can give a portion of their choosing to a player B; once B receives the sum, it is
multiplied by a set amount by the experimenter and then B is given the opportunity to
return a sum of their choosing to A. There is an element of trust involved in A's decision as
B may legitimately return nothing, and because of this the amount returned by B
demonstrates reciprocity. Courtiol et al. found firstborns to be less cooperative, being less
trustful and reciprocating less than other sibling types (middleborns, lastborns and
singletons behaved similarly and were therefore grouped together). These findings
demonstrate individual differences according to birth order can be observed in an
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economic game conducted with adults that involves prosociality and furthers the possibility
that adults' behaviour on the DGmay alter asa function of sibling status.
There has been little direct study of the influence of sibling status upon prosociality in
adults. Van Langeet al. (1997) found adults with a prosocial social value orientation (SVO)
to have significantly more older siblings than both competitors and individualists,
suggesting that laterborns are more likely to have a prosocial disposition than earlyborns.
This disposition seems to translate into behaviour, as SVO is related to self-report of
donation behaviour, with prosocials making charitable donations more often than
competitors and individualists (Van Lange et al., 1997). Furthermore, prosocials are more
likely to be high allocators in the DG (Israel et al., 2009) although, as noted in section 2.1.1,
when SVOwas assessedpoints were allocated that would later be redeemed for money. As
hypothetical points are normally used in SVOassessment, Israel et aL's measure would be
more likely to reflect behaviour in the DG as decisions have a real-world impact for the
participant. Nonetheless, if these findings are taken together with the sibling effect
observed in 4-5 year-olds in Chapter 2, it is possible that adults' donations in the DGmay be
influenced by sibling status; however, the DG has yet to be used to examine birth order
effects in adults.
3.1.2 Mechanisms of sibling influence
As outlined in Chapter 2.1.2, there are a number of mechanisms by which siblings are
thought to influence their co-siblings: differences in parental investment, birth-order
stereotypes, dominance hierarchy effects, niche partitioning, deidentification, teaching and
behavioural modelling (see Chapter 2.1.2; Brody, 2004; and Sulloway, 2001, 2007 for
descriptions of these mechanisms). Comparing the influence of siblings in children and
adults can help to distinguish which of these mechanisms may be contributing to altruistic
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behaviour. Given the young age at which children in Chapter 2 were tested, it is possible
that the differences in altruistic behaviour between lastborns and other children may not
hold into adulthood. Firstborns at age 4-5 years have only had siblings for a short time but
as they age their experience with their siblings increases. In addition, the quality of this
experience will also increase as the siblings move out of infancy and through childhood.
These changes may lead to firstborns' altruistic behaviour changing accordingly, causing
their behaviour to more closely resemble that of lastborns. Singletons, on the other hand,
may catch up with lastborns as they progress through their schooling and spend more time
with their peers. Conversely, lastborns may learn that a reduction in altruistic behaviour is
socially acceptable and decrease their donations accordingly. Each of these potential
outcomes (along with the possibility that the effect remains stable with age) is consistent
with different mechanisms of sibling influence, while some outcomes are consistent with
multiple mechanisms. Table 3.1 summarises predictions of DGbehaviour for each of these
mechanisms; predictions are derived from Sulloway (2001; 2007) and Brody (2004). These
predictions are not all mutually exclusive; however, it is possible that there are multiple
mechanisms working in concert.
3.1.3 Comparing DGbehaviour in adults and children
While the DG has been used with children of varying ages, data have yet to be directly
compared with those obtained from adults; however, studies have often found patterns
broadly similar to those observed in adults. Harbaugh and Krause (2000) found that 6-12
year-old children donated on average 29% of their endowment of tokens (each worth 10
cents), an amount comparable to that observed in adults, who typically give 20-30%
(Camerer, 2003). Benensonet at. (2007) conducted the DGwith 4, 6 and 9 year-olds with an
endowment of stickers, where children were asked to pick their favourite 10 stickers from a
selection of 30. They found an effect of age, but this was only significant between the 4 and
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9 year-olds, suggesting a gradual increase in altruistic behaviour. However, the authors
note that even by 4 years the children donate approximately 25% of their endowment, an
amount once again comparable to that observed in adults. It should be noted, however,
that children were donating to members of their own class, i.e. children that they knew,
even if they did not know to which individual they would be given. Four to six year-old
children have been found to give more often to a friend than to an ingroup nonfriend or a
stranger in a sharing game where they could choose one sticker each for themselves and
another individual, or keep both stickers for themselves (Moore, 2009). Children's prosocial
behaviour is clearly sensitive to social distance and as such, giving to a classmember (thus
reducing the anonymity and therefore the social distance between dictator and recipient)
may have increased DGdonations in Benensonet al.'s study.
While many studies have found similar rates of altruism in adults and children, there is a
great deal of variability in children's DG behaviour across studies. Harbaugh et al. (2003)
found levels of altruism to be much lower than typically observed in adults, with 7-18 year-
olds donating a mean of 12% of their endowment of 10 tokens and a 2% increase in
donation size with each additional year. This finding is consistent with the idea that
altruistic behaviour increases across childhood and into adulthood. However, this mean is
likely to have been artificially lowered by some children taking part in another economic
game, the ultimatum game, beforehand and others afterwards - those that received the
DGfirst donated significantly more than those where the DGfollowed the ultimatum game.
If it is the case that altruism truly increases with age, it is perhaps surprising that many
studies with children have found higher rates of altruism in the DG than that generally
observed in adults; however, these studies also often introduce methodological alterations
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Table 3.1: Predictions of adult altruistic behaviour in the DGbased upon mechanisms of sibling
influence
Niche partitioning (Singletons = firstborns) < lastborns
Mechanism
Differences in
parental
investment
Birth-order
stereotypes
Dominance
hierarchy effects
Deidentification
Teaching
Behavioural
modelling
(Firstborns = lastborns) > singletons Firstborns pass on behavioural norms
that they themselves have internalised.
Lastborns >firstborns> singletons Lastborns may therefore internalise these
norms at an earlier age but by adulthood
OR firstborns will be comparable. Singletons
may be less likely to internalise these
Singletons = firstborns = lastborns norms due to their lack of experience
with siblings; alternatively, they may
(Lastborns = firstborns) > singletons acquire the norms as experience with
peers increases.
(Firstborns = lastborns) > singletons Lastborns copy firstborns' behaviour.
Once again, lastborns may show this
Lastborns > firstborns> singletons behaviour at an earlier age but by
adulthood firstborns will be comparable.
OR Singletons may be less likely to show the
behaviour due to their lack of experience
Singletons = firstborns = lastborns with siblings; alternatively, they may
acquire the behaviour as experience with
(Lastborns =firstborns) > singletons peers increases.
Prediction of DG donations in
adults
Predictions for 4-5 year-aids in
italics
Singletons> firstborns> lastborns
Singletons> firstborns> lastborns
(Firstborns = lastborns) > singletons
(Firstborns = lastborns) > singletons
Lastborns > singletons> firstborns
Lastborns > singletons> firstborns
(Singletons = firstborns) < lastborns
Firstborns ~ lastborns
Firstborns ;t lastborns
No prediction for singletons
No prediction for singletons
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Explanation
As more siblings are born, parental
investment is reduced and outcome
declines
Singletons are often stereotyped as being
selfish (see Mancillas, 2006); stereotypes
with regard to firstborns and last barns
generosity have not been described
therefore it is likely that there is no
difference
Lastborns, having less power, use
agreeableness and generosity to
compensate; singletons, whose only
experience of a power imbalance is with
their parents, are expected to lie between
firstborns and lastborns
Firstborns are akin to singletons as they
are essentially singletons until a sibling is
born; laterborn siblings seek to
distinguish themselves by increasing their
agreeableness and generosity
Siblings reduce rivalry by diverging from
their adjacent siblings. No prediction of
direction can be made from this
mechanism alone, simply that siblings will
differ, therefore no prediction can be
made with regard to singletons. Outcome
is likely to be modulated by the number
of siblings as the child deidentifies from
their immediately adjacent sibling
that may contribute to these discrepant results. Gummerum et al. (2008) found that 8-17
year-aids donated 35-40%of their monetary endowments, an amount approximately three
times asmuch as the mean donation in Harbaughet al.'s (2003) 7-18 year-aids and with no
impact of age on donations. Indeed, this is a higher mean than that typically observed in
adults. However, this difference may be due to the children making the decision of how
much to donate in groups of three, making social desirability a consideration. The authors
also suggest that differing cultural norms in their German sample may have an influence, in
addition to the possibility that money is a lesssalient incentive to young children and hence
more readily donated. Lucaset al. (2008) observed a mean donation of 40%of the pie in 4-
5 year-aids, far higher than the 25% given by Benenson et al.'s (2007) 4-year-olds and
approximately twice that given by adults. However, the children were offered ten identical
stickers (potentially causing each additional sticker to have a lower value to the child than
the last, leading to an increase in the likelihood that it is donated) and told that they must
donate at least one. As most DGsoffer the option to keep the entire endowment, leading
to a significant proportion of zero donations, this alteration will of course inflate the sizeof
the mean donation in comparison. Gummerum et al. (2010) have conducted the DGwith
the youngest sample to date, examining the behaviour of 3-5 year-aids when given ten
identical stickers to distribute. They found a small but nonsignificant increase in donations
with age, from a mean of 27% in 3-year-olds, to 31% in 4-year-olds and 43% in 5 year-aids.
Once again, this is a larger amount than that observed in both adults and by Benensonet al.
Similar to Lucas et al., these means may have been increased by offering ten identical
stickers rather than allowing the child to choose different stickers that may have a higher
personal value. While each individual coin may be identical in endowments of money, the
coins can represent a variety of objects for which they may be exchanged and so using
different stickers may be a more comparable currency for young children.
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Despite the variability observed across studies, use of the DG in children has consistently
demonstrated that they, like adults, are frequently altruistic in their behaviour. However, it
is unclear the extent to which this behaviour is attributable to the influence of
methodological differences across studies, while meaningful comparison of children's
behaviour to that of adults requires use of a DG procedure that is as similar as possible
acrossgroups. The present study will therefore replicate the 4 condition from Chapter 2, in
which sibling status was found to have a significant effect upon DG behaviour. The most
frequently used endowment size used in adults is ten monetary units, or multiples thereof.
As such, use of four monetary units (Le. four pounds) in the current study is unusual. While
the impact of endowment size has not been examined using this precise sum, it has
consistently been found that subjects on average tend to allocate a fixed proportion of
their endowment (approximately 25%), irrespective of endowment size (Carpenter et al.,
2005; Dufwenberg & Muren, 2006; Forsythe et al., 1994; List & Cherry, 2008). As such,
mean donations should be comparable to previous studies using the DG.
3.1.4 Confounding variables
A number of studies have examined the influence of gender upon adults' DGbehaviour but
findings remain inconsistent: while some studies found a gender difference in donations,
many others found no gender effect (Ackert et al., 2009; Bolton & Katok, 1995). However,
when a significant gender difference was present, women were generally found to be more
generous than men (Eckel & Grossman, 1998; Kamas et al., 2008). However, gender
differences in DG behaviour appear to be dependent upon the precise composition of the
study. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) sought to examine gender differences in DG
behaviour in greater detail by manipulating the relative value of the units of the
endowment to the dictator and the recipient. In some casesthe value was the same to both
dictator and recipient, in others the dictator's allocation to the recipient was multiplied by a
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fixed value before being transferred to the recipient (i.e. the sum was worth more to the
recipient than the dictator and so altruism was 'cheap') and in yet others the dictator's
allocation was divided by a fixed sum before being transferred to the recipient (i.e. the sum
was worth lessto the recipient than to the dictator, rendering altruism 'expensive'). Gender
and price interacted, with DGbehaviour differing depending upon the value of the units of
the endowment. When value was consistent (as is the case in the standard DG) or when
altruism was expensive, women donated more than men, while men donated more than
women when altruism was cheap. Cox and Deck (2005), on the other hand, found men to
be more consistent in their decision to donate than women across changes in cost and
social distance, while women appeared more generous in low cost or low social distance
situations (in this case, the term cost relates to the absolute amount given up by the
participant with the proportion remaining fixed). As such, it is difficult to predict how
gender will influence donations in the present study: it is possible that there will be no
difference. Alternatively, it is plausible that women would be less likely to donate but more
generous than men when they do so, as the value of one unit in the present study (with an
endowment of four units) is proportionally higher than the value of one unit from an
endowment of ten and so altruism can be viewed asexpensive in the present study.
In Chapter 2 ToM ability was assessed as a potential contributing factor to children's
altruistic behaviour. This ability to take another's perspective was found to be related to
the amount donated in the DGby those who chose to make a donation, with superior ToM
being associated with a reduction in donation size. Adults also vary in their perspective-
taking ability, which is a component of more general empathic ability (Davis, 1980);
empathy may also be related to altruistic behaviour. Batson and colleagues have advanced
an empathy-altruism hypothesis, which states that both personal distress and empathic
concern (two further components of empathy) can be the source of helping behaviours.
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When personal distress outweighs empathic concern, the motive to help the victim is a
selfish desire to alleviate one's own anxiety at the victim's plight. However, when empathic
concern is the motivating factor, the desire to help the victim is altruistic as the individual
wishes to alleviate the victim's distress rather than their own. Batson and colleagues have
conducted numerous experiments in which they have manipulated the level of empathy
elicited by a situation in which an individual requires help. Participants in the high empathy
condition are more likely to help the individual than those in the low empathy condition,
supporting the theory that empathy induces altruistic helping (Batson et al., 1981, 1991,
1995, 1997; see section 1.2.2). However, it has been suggested that prosocial behaviours
such as helping are elicited by a sense of oneness with the victim rather than a sense of
empathy for their plight (R. B. Cialdini et al., 1997; Maner et al., 2002). Maner et al. (2002)
define oneness as a senseof shared identity with another person (mediated by perspective-
taking ability; Davis, Conklin, Smith, Luce, 1996) in which self and other come to overlap.
They suggest that this selfish motivation is the root of helping behaviour as when oneness
is high the actor is essentially seeking to help himself. They found a significant relationship
between empathic concern and helping; however, it disappeared once nonaltruistic factors
such as oneness, sadness and personal distress were controlled. They suggest that
measures of empathic concern cannot disentangle other-oriented emotion from general
negative affect, and it is the latter that is associated with helping behaviours in previous
studies. Comparison of DG performance with a measure of empathy, the Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), would inform this debate as the nonaltruistic factors of
oneness, sadness and personal distress should not be elicited by the anonymous DG.
Should oneness with an imagined other be involved, a positive relationship between DG
donations and perspective-taking would be expected as this ability mediates the sense of
shared identity involved in oneness (Daviset al., 1996). Furthermore, a positive relationship
between empathic concern and DG donations would provide additional support for the
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notion that altruism can be induced by empathy, possibly through experiencing empathic
concern for an imagined other. It should be noted that should a positive relationship with
personal distress also emerge it would not necessarily be inconsistent with the empathy-
altruism hypothesis. The hypothesis does not state that the individual does not feel
personal distress, only that this feeling is not as strong as a feeling of empathic concern.
Conversely, a negative relationship between IRI scores, particularly perspective-taking
(which is the subscale that is the most comparable to ToM), and DG donations would be
consistent with the findings in Chapter 2 and would suggest that adults who donate more
are lessable to assimilate and take advantage of the anonymity of the DGprocedure due to
their poorer mentalising abilities; however, this outcome seems improbable as adults are
unlikely not to fully grasp such a simple task asthe DG.
3.1.5 Present study
The present study aimed to explore whether the influence of possession of older siblings
upon altruistic behaviour observed in Chapter 2 persists into adulthood. While no previous
study has directly compared sibling status and DG performance, the birth order literature
demonstrates that adults can show personality and behaviour differences attributable to
their sibling status despite no longer being in the familial context. While not all studies
show an effect of birth order, those that do demonstrate that lastborns are more likely to
exhibit a prosocial SVOand score higher on the altruism facet of Agreeableness. As such,
adults are likely to show a difference between lastborns and firstborn sibling groups in DG
performance comparable to that observed in the 4-5 year-aids in chapter 2. However,
should the difference between firstborns and lastborns observed in children be due to
firstborns' relative lack of high quality interactions with their siblings, it is possible that this
difference will disappear in adults as they and their siblings age. Singletons will obviously
not be able to show an increase in donation behaviour attributable to siblings ageing, and
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may therefore become the least altruistic group; alternatively they may benefit from an
increase in interactions with their peers and may therefore also increase their donations on
the DG. Given that altruistic behaviour is generally found to increase with age, it is likely
that adults will donate more than children.
In order to further examine the relationship between mentalising ability and altruistic
behaviour, participants completed the IRI questionnaire (Davis, 1980). Gender was
counterbalanced where possible in order to minimise its impact on potential sibling
differences; however, due to low numbers of singletons this was not possible for this group.
As in Chapter 2, a measure of SESand time spent with peers asa child was taken in order to
ensure that these variables were not driving any observed differences.
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3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Participants
78 adults (mean age 21:7; age range 17:1 to 36:4) participated in the study. Participants
were recruited through advertisement across the University of Nottingham campus.
Following participation, participants were assigned to sibling status groups according to
their responses on the questionnaires (see Procedure for details of the questionnaires and
Table 3.2 for sample characteristics).
Table 3.2: Sample characteristics across sibling status in adults (standard deviations in parentheses;
ranges in italics)
Singleton Firstborn Lastborn Group differences
Total n 16 24 38
Gender/female:male 11:55 12:12 19:19
268.19 255.67 257.92
Mean age/months (42.32) (28.77) (34.54) H(2)=0.66; p=.72
229-377 205-334 220-436
50.49 59.95 58.39
Mean SES6 (31.37) (24.56) (29.76) H(2)=1.20; p=.55
5.50-96.75 18.91-99.01 0.18-99.59
% experienced childcare 68.75 66.67 57.89 .((2)=0.79, p=.71
3.2.2 Procedure
Once consent had been obtained, each participant completed one iteration of the dictator
game followed by a set of questionnaires: one giving personal details such as date of birth,
gender, home post code and sibling status; and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI;
Davis, 1980). The experimenter gave the participant a set of instructions (see Appendix 3)
5 There were insufficient numbers of singletons recruited to allow a balance of gender for this group.
However, should this imbalance have an influence on DGperformance, we would expect an increase
in donations as there were more women than men. As Figure 3.2 shows, the results for singletons
are not consistent with this prediction, therefore we do not consider this to be a confound and, due
to the low number of participants, the whole group was retained.
6 This refers to current SES. While the post code of participants' longest place of residence as a child
was also requested, there was a large amount of missing data. The data collected was consistent
with the adult SES so only adult SES was therefore analysed.
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which she then explained verbally to ensure full understanding. The experimenter then
gave the participant their questionnaires and their coins, which served as their endowment
in the DG (see procedure below), and left the room to allow complete anonymity; she
returned once the participant had completed both the DGand the questionnaires. Finally,
the experimenter debriefed the participant and entered their details into a £20 prize draw
as an inconvenience allowance for their participation.
3.2.2.1 Dictator game
Participants were presented with four £1 coins and informed that they were theirs to keep
but if they wished they could anonymously give some to another person. They were given
two envelopes, and asked to divide the coins as they saw fit between them. The envelope
for the coins the participant wished to keep was marked "take this envelope with you"
while the envelope for donations to an anonymous other was marked only with an
individual number in order that any donations could be matched with the appropriate
questionnaire. It was stressed that this number could never be traced back to the individual
participant and that this code was present to ensure complete anonymity. Eachenvelope
contained a Sudoku puzzle so that no-one received nothing in their envelope, reducing
donations through guilt avoidance in a comparable fashion to the colouring picture in
Chapter 2. The donated envelope was posted into a locked postbox, while the participant's
envelope was placed in a bag or pocket out of sight of the experimenter. The participant
was informed that the donated envelope would be passed on to a random person on
campus.
3.2.2.2 Questionnaires
Upon completion of the dictator game, the participant turned over and completed a set of
questionnaires. The first questionnaire detailed the participant's date of birth, gender,
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course, post code, sibling status and details of time spent with peers" (see Appendix 4). The
participant then completed the IRI, a 28-item questionnaire comprising four constructs
related to empathy: fantasy (tendency to identify with fictional characters), empathic
concern (tendency to feel concern or sympathy for someone else), perspective-taking
(ability to take another person's point of view) and personal distress (tendency to feel
anxious in response to another person's distress). Items were rated on a five point Likert
scale from 0 (does not describe me at all) to 4 (describes me very well) and each construct
was scored out of a maximum of 28. See Appendix 5 for the IRI and Appendix 6 for alpha
coefficients for the IRI. When the questionnaires had been completed the participant
sealed them into an envelope with a matching number to that on the donation envelope
and posted it into the locked box.
7 As all participants who reported spending time with peers referred to time in childcare, with little
knowledge of length of time, this was converted to the dichotomous variable of whether or not an
individual spent time in childcare with other children.
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3.3 Results
Data were examined for skewness and kurtosis. As data were not normally distributed, non-
parametric statistics were employed. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.
In order to be conservative in the analyses, all tests were two-tailed.
3.3.1 Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Data were first examined for the group as a whole, with intercorrelations being conducted
between the scales of the IRI. All of the variables significantly correlated with one another,
with the exception of Personal Distress and Empathic Concern (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Intercorrelations between IRI scales for the group as a whole
Perspective Empathic Personal
taking concern distress
Fantasy r=.24, p=.04 r=.54, p<.OOl r=.29, p=.Ol
Perspective
r=.38, p=.OOl r=.27, p=.02taking
Empathic
r=.07, p=.57
concern
Intercorrelations were then conducted between the scales of the IRI for each gender and
compared to the original intercorrelations of Davis (1980). The test for differences between
two r values reveals that there were no significant differences between the
intercorrelations of the present study and those from Davis (1980), with the exception of
the correlation between Personal Distress and Fantasy for males, which was significantly
stronger in the present study (see Table 3.4). As such it can be safely assumed that as a
group the participants in the current study responded normally and comparably to those in
Davis' original study.
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Table 3.4: Intercorrelations between IRIscales by gender for the present study (top value) and for
Davis (1980; in parentheses) with z-scores representing the difference between the two r values,
Males Perspective Empathic Personal
taking concern distress
Fantasy r=.09 r=.43 r=.S4
(r=.10) (r=.30) (r=.16)
z=-0.06; p=.95 z=0.20 ; p=.40 z=2.47 ; p=.Ol
Perspective r=.32 r=.12
taking (r=.33) (r=-.16)
z=-.06 ; p=.95 z=1.58; p=.l1
Empathic r=.37
concern (r=.l1
z=1.55 ; p=.12
Females Perspective Empathic Personal
taking concern distress
Fantasy r=.26 r=.55 r=-.07
(r=.12) (r=.31) (r=.04)
z=0.88; p=.38 z=1.80 ; p=.07 z=-0.67 ; p=.50
Perspective r=.37 r=-.08
taking (r=.30) (r=-.29)
z=0.48 ; p=.63 z=1.32 ; p=.19
Empathic r=.04
concern (r=.Ol)
z=0.18 ; p=.86
Data were compared across sibling groups for the total IRI score and the individual IRI
subscales (see Table 3.5). There were no significant effects of sibling status for IRI total
(H(2)=0.57, p=.75), fantasy (H(2)=1.01; p=.60), empathic concern (H(2)=O.89; p=.64) or
perspective-taking (H(2)=3.47; p=.18). There was a significant effect of sibling status on
personal distress (H(2)=7.S6; p=.02); post-hoc Mann-Whitney analyses revealed that
firstborns scored significantly lower than lastborns on personal distress (U=261.S0, p=.004)
while there were no differences between singletons and firstborns (U=147.50, p=.22) or
singletons and lastborns (U=261.00, p=.42).
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Table 3.5: IRI scores across sibling groups in adults (standard deviations in parentheses)
Singletons Firstborns Lastborns Group differences
Mean fantasy 17.56 17.62 16.68 H(2)=1.01; p=.60
x (4.31) (5.38) (5.31)
Cl)
-0
C Mean empathic 18.12 19.42 18.55-
>- H(2)=O.89; p=.64.... concern (4.27) (4.86) (3.98).:;
..;:;
u
Mean perspective- 19.44 16.71 17.24ctlCl) H(2)=3.47; p=.180::: taking (4.56) (4.46) (4.22)
-
ctl
c H(2)=7.S6; p=.020 Mean personal 13.00 10.77 14.63VI... Firstborns<lastbornsCl) distress (S.34) (S.13) (S.06)o, (U=261.50, p=.OO4)...Cl)
....
c 67.33 64.58 67.11- IRI total (11.91) (14.20) (13.10) H(2)=0.57, p=.75
3.3.2 Prosocial behaviour
As in Chapter 2, data were first examined in terms of the overall donation profile (i.e. the
proportion of their endowment donated by each adult). This was then broken down into
analyses of the decision to donate {i.e. donating nothing or donating one or more coins} and
the proportion of endowment donated by only those who chose to donate (hereafter
positive donations). Overall, adult participants donated 10.26% (s.d.=16.33) of their
endowment. 32.05% of participants chose to make a donation while the mean donation by
those who chose to donate was 32.00% (s.d.=11.46). See Figure 3.1 (grey bars) for the
distribution of donations.
117
• Children Adults
80
70
Co
= 60e
~ 50
'-0
fo 40
III
.. 30c::
~ 20
cf
10
0
1 2 3 4 5
Donation
Figure 3.1: Donation distributions for children and adults
3.3.2.1 Gender
Mann-Whitney analyses showed no effect of gender upon overall donations for the adult
sample as a whole (U=698.50, p=.S2), Chi-square analyses showed no effect of gender upon
the decision to donate for the sample as a whole (1(1)=0.56, p=.48), Mann-Whitney
analyses showed no effect of gender upon overall donations for the sample as a whole
(U=72.50, p=l). Thus, gender did not influence adults' donation profile
3.3.2.2 Sibling status
As it was hypothesised that the influence of the possession of older siblings observed in
Chapter 2 may change with time, data were compared in terms of individual sibling groups.
Analyses were first conducted in terms of overall donation profile, followed by the decision
to donate and size of positive donations.
Kruskal-Wallis analysis revealed no significant differences between the adult sibling groups
in terms of overall donations (H(2)=3.79, p=.18). However, planned comparisons using
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Mann-Whitney tests revealed marginal differences between singleton and firstborn adults
(U=141.00, p=.10) and between singleton and lastborn adults (U=226.00, p=.08), with both
firstborn and lastborn adults donating more than singleton adults. No difference was
observed between firstborn and lastborn adults (U=450.00, p=.93); see right hand panel of
Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Mean overall donations in children and adults as a function of sibling status (error bars
represent standard error of the mean)
Chi-square revealed no significant differences in the decision to donate between the adult
sibling groups (1(2)=3.54, p=.20). Planned comparisons with two-sample z-tests revealed
marginal differences between singleton and firstborn adults (z=1.73, p=.08) and between
singleton and lastborn adults (z=1. 79, p=.07), with both firstborn and lastborn adults
choosing to donate more often than singleton adults. No significant difference was
observed between firstborn and lastborn adults (z=0.05, p=.96); see right hand panel of
Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Percentage of children and adults choosing to make a donation as a function of sibling
status
Kruskal-Wallis analysis revealed no significant differences between adult sibling groups in
the amount donated (H(2)=O.87, p=.8S). Planned comparisons using Mann-Whitney
revealed no differences between singleton and firstborn adults (U=6.00, p=.56), singleton
and lastborn adults (U=10.00, p=l) or firstborn and lastborn adults (U=60.00, p=l); see right
hand panel of Figure 3.4.
Thus, both firstborn and lastborn adults donated more overall than singleton adults. This
appears to be driven by the decision to donate, as firstborn and lastborn adults chose to
donate more often than singleton adults while there were no sibling differences in positive
donations.
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Figure 3.4: Mean positive donations in children and adults as a function of sibling status (error bars
represent standard error of the mean)
3.3.2.3 Confounding variables
Correlations were conducted to examine whether any potential confounding variables
influenced donation behaviour (see Table 3.6). There was a significant positive relationship
between overall donations and empathic concern (rs=.32, p=.01), personal distress (rs=.24,
p=.04) and IRI total (rs=.29, p=.01). There was a significant positive relationship between
decision to donate and both empathic concern (rpb=.34, p=.002) and IRI total (rpb=.30,
p=.01). No other variables had a significant influence on donation behaviour (p>.OS).
Table 3.6: Relationships between confounding variables and donations in adults (standard deviations
in parentheses)
Overall donation Decision to Positive
profile donate donations
Age rs=.07, p=.52 rpb=.17, p=.13 rs=-.25, p=.23
SES rs=-.20, p=.l1 rpb=-.22, p=.09 rs=-.21, p=.45
Childcare rpb=.08, p=.50 1(1)=0.42, p=.62 rpb=.05, p=.83
Fantasy rs=.16, p=.16 rpb=.14, p=.22 rs=.14, p=.50
Empathic concern '$=.32, p=.Ol 'pb=.34, p=.OO2 rs=.11, p=.62
Perspective-taking rs=.19, p=.10 rpb=.18, p=.l1 rs=-.21, p=.33
Personal distress '$=.24, p=.04 rpb=.19, p=.10 rs=.27, p=.19
IRI total '.=.29, p=.Ol 'pb=.30, p=.Ol rs=.12, p=.56
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As there were no differences between firstborns and lastborns, data were collapsed across
these groups to create a new dichotomous variable: possession of siblings. This was
entered as a predictor variable into regression analyses along with variables that produced
a significant relationship above in order to examine the influence of siblings upon donation
behaviour when these variables were controlled. In cases where significant effects were
obtained with both an overall measure (e.g. IRI) and a subscale from the same measure
(e.g. empathic concern) only the overall measure was entered into the regression.
Possession of siblings and IRI total were entered as predictor variables into a simultaneous
multiple regression, with overall donations as the dependent variable. Data were
significantly skewed (z-score=4.94) and so the results should be interpreted with caution. A
significant model was produced (F2,7s=7.01, L1~=.lS, p=.002), Total IRI score emerged as a
significant predictor of overall donations, with donations increasing with IRI score.
Possession of siblings also significantly predicted donations, with adults with siblings
donating more than those without siblings; coefficients are summarised in Table 3,7.
Table 3.7: Summary of multiple regression analysis for variables predicting overall donations in the
DG in adults (n=78)
B (SE) Significance 95% Cl for B
Constant '0.96
(0.39) .02 '1.74-'0.18
IRI total 0.02
(0.01) .004 0.01-"0.03
Possession of siblings 0.39
(0.17) .03 0.05-0.73
Possession of siblings was subsequently entered as a predictor variable into a simultaneous
logistic regression along with IRI total. The dependent measure was the decision to donate.
Data were significantly skewed (z-score=2.25) and so the results should be interpreted with
caution. Both IRI total and possession of siblings significantly predicted donation decision,
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with between 15%and 21%of the variance being accounted for by the model (.((1)=12.63,
p=.002); people with siblings and a high IRI score were more likely to donate. Coefficients
are summarised in Table 3.8.
Table 3.B: Summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting donation decision in the DG
in adults (n=7Bj
B (SE) Wald (df) Significance Expb (95%Cl)
Constant -4.69 8.54 (1) .003 0.01
(1.61)
IRItotal 0.06 7.17 (1) .01 1.06
(0.02) (1.02-1.11)
Possessionof siblings -1.64 3.88 (1) .05 0.20
(0.83) (0.04-0.99)
As no variables significantly predicted positive donations, a regression was not run on this
measure.
In sum, in adults the effect of sibling status took the form of an effect of possessingsiblings
(either older or younger). Furthermore, possessingsiblings was a significant predictor even
when the effect of empathic concern (a variable which significantly correlated with the
donation profile) was partialled out.
3.3.3 Age: adults and children
In order to examine how donations change with age from childhood to adulthood, adults'
donations were compared to those of 4-5 year-old children in the 4 condition in Chapter 2
(only those children who completed the 4 condition first were included; see Figure 3.1.).
Mann-Whitney analysis revealed a significant difference between adults' and children's
overall donation profile (U=3666.00, p=.03), with children donating more than adults. Chi-
square revealed no difference between children and adults in terms of the decision to
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donate (i(1)=2.6S, p=.13); Mann-Whitney analysis showed that children made significantly
larger positive donations than adults (U=421.S0, p=.Ol).
3.3.3.1 Sibling status and age
In order to further examine how the impact of sibling status upon donations changeswith
age, adults' and children's donations were compared for individual sibling statuses.
Analyses were first conducted in terms of overall donation profile, followed by the decision
to donate and sizeof positive donations.
Mann-Whitney analyses revealed no difference between firstborn adults' and children's
overall donations (U=S89.S0, p=.89). Singleton children donated marginally more than
singleton adults (U=130.00, p=.09) and lastborn children donated significantly more than
lastborn adults (U=S13.00, p=.Ol); see Figure 3.2. Chi-square revealed no differences in the
decision to donate for singletons (i(1)=2.72, p=.14) or firstborns (i(1)=O.09, p=.80) but
lastborn children chose to donate significantly more often than lastborn adults (i(1)=4.18,
p=.OS); see Figure 3.3. Mann-Whitney analysesshowed no differences in positive donations
for singletons (U=4.00, p=.47) or firstborns (U=66.00, p=.68), but lastborn children donated
significantly more than lastborn adults (U=97.00, p=.02); see Figure 3.4.
Thus the change in the donation profile of sibling groups across age was driven mainly by
lastborn adults being lessgenerous than lastborn children.
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3.4 Discussion
The present study sought to establish whether the sibling differences in 4-5 year-olds'
altruistic behaviour on the DG observed in Chapter 2 persist into adulthood. It has
demonstrated that under conditions of scarcity adults are less altruistic than children and
adults' behaviour is influenced by the possessionof siblings aswell as by empathy traits.
3.4.1 Overall altruistic behaviour in adults
The present study differed from previous instances of the DG in adults in that it made use
of a reduced endowment of four £1 coins. Indeed, to date only one similar study has been
conducted: participants were given an endowment of $5 and donations did not differ
significantly from those given an endowment of $10 (Forsythe et al., 1994). However, the
present study made use of a double blind procedure and so the current findings are listed
with only those of other double blind studies in Table 3.9. As this table shows, the current
findings sit comfortably with those of other studies with larger endowments and supports
previous findings that participants tend to allocate a fixed proportion of their endowment
regardless of its size (Carpenter et al., 2005; Forsythe et al., 1994; Harbaugh & Krause,
2000; List& Cherry, 2008).
While the overall mean sits in the middle of the distribution of means in Table 3.9, in terms
of the decision to donate approximately 32%of participants in the current study chose to
make a donation, which is at the lower end of the studies listed in Table 3.9. This is most
likely due to the lack of variability available with an endowment of four coins - the
participant has five possible options available to them compared to the eleven options with
an endowment of ten coins. As such, donation of just one coin, which represents 10% of
the total in an endowment of ten, represents 25% of the current endowment and is
therefore a greater sacrifice for the participant. People who may have given one coin from
125
a larger endowment may have chosen to keep the entire endowment in the present study,
thus decreasing the proportion of participants who chose to make a donation. The fact that
the mean given by only those who chose to donate is at the higher end of the spectrum in
Table 3.9 supports this idea - participants are not consistently selfish in the present study,
but the likelihood of donating nothing is increased. However, it would be a leap to say that
those that donate are more generous, as the same lack of variability will inflate the mean
positive donation in comparison to those of studies with larger endowments; these
opposing effects counteract one another to create an overall mean that is consistent with
previous results.
The lack of variability in the present study also appears to have extinguished all donations
above 50% (see Figure 3.1), which, while rare, do occur with larger endowments (Camerer,
2003). Indeed, in some casesparticipants give 100%of their endowment and these outliers
can skew results when they are not removed, as Frohlich et al. (2001) demonstrated (see
Table 3.9). While removal of outliers is undoubtedly statistically necessary, it also removes
interesting data that may give insight into the correlates of highly altruistic behaviour;
removal of outliers has not been necessary in the present study and so all participants'
responses are represented.
It is possible that the results for the group as a whole may have been influenced by the
attempt to balance the sibling groups. This, in combination with the exclusion of
middleborns and twins, may have resulted in a different distribution of sibling groups than
that observed in the general population, and this should be borne in mind when comparing
the present results to other DGstudies in adults. Given the consistency of results from the
present study with those of previous studies, however, it is unlikely that the
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overrepresentation of some sibling groups and underrepresentation of others had a
significant effect upon findings.
The results of the current study were compared to those children in Chapter 2 who
received the 4 condition first. This is the first time that adults and children's DGbehaviour
has been directly compared using a comparable measure and children were found to
donate more than adults on all measures - the overall donation profile, the decision to
donate and positive donations. This implies that findings of higher level of altruism in young
children than that typically observed in adults (Gummerum et al., 2010; Lucaset al., 2008)
are not merely a factor of differences in methodology, but in fact reflect a genuine decrease
in adults' altruistic behaviour. However, comparison of behaviour of adults and young
children does not allow inference of the trajectory in between these points of assessment
and the function may not be linear. DGstudies in young children have previously found an
increase in altruistic behaviour acrossthe primary years (Benenson et al., 2007; Gummerum
et al., 2010), although other studies with large age ranges have found no impact of age
upon donations (Gummerum et al., 2008; Harbaugh et al., 2003). Longitudinal study is
necessary in order to properly examine how altruistic behaviour changeswith age.
3.4.2 Confounding variables in adults
Gender did not have a direct impact upon donations in the present study: there was no
difference between the donations of men and women. While it is not unusual to find a null
effect of gender in the DG (Ackert et al., 2009; Bolton & Katok, 1995), it is possible that
potential gender differences were masked due to the lack of variability in the response
options, with women (who are generally found to be more altruistic when a gender effect is
found) donating less often in the current study due to the increased cost of giving.
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However, this is unlikely aswomen have been found to be the more generous group when
altruism is expensive (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001).
There was a positive relationship between IRI score and both overall donations and the
decision to donate, which emerged from the regressions as a more significant predictor
than sibling status: as empathic ability increased so did overall donations, while those who
chose to donate had a higher IRI score. This supports Batson's empathy-altruism
hypothesis, that empathic concern can initiate altruistic behaviour (Batson & Shaw, 1991).
Indeed, use of the DG provides additional credibility to this finding given that selfish
concerns such as oneness should not be elicited by the DG (an assumption confirmed by
the lack of a relationship between DG behaviour and perspective-taking, which mediates
the sense of shared identity involved in oneness; Davis et al., 1996), suggesting that
empathy can be related to altruism independently of oneness. Moreover, although both
empathic concern and personal distress significantly correlated with altruistic behaviour in
the DG, when these were entered into the regressions instead of IRI, empathic concern
emerged as a significant predictor while personal distress did not, suggesting that the
influence of personal distress on altruistic behaviour is mediated by empathic concern.
Nonetheless, personal distress cannot be directly elicited by the DG as there is no
observable distress to elicit anxiety in the participant.
There was no effect of IRIupon positive donations (where a relationship was observed with
children's ToM ability in Chapter 2), nor was there any effect of perspective-taking upon
altruistic behaviour in adults. It appears that while the size of children's positive donations
depends upon their ability to take advantage of the anonymity in the DGand anticipate the
consequences for themselves, the size of positive donations is less reliant on these
cognitive factors in adults. While perspective-taking ability does vary in adults, they appear
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to have passed a threshold beyond which it no longer influences their altruistic behaviour.
It remains unclear what is driving the size of positive donations in adults. Altruistic
propensity is the most likely influence, as this is a personality variable rather than a factor
that requires cognitive considerations, but further investigation is required to confirm this.
There was not a significant relationship between SESand DG behaviour in the present
study. However, a marginal relationship was observed with the decision to donate, with
those that chose to donate having a lower SES.Furthermore, the nonsignficant correlations
with overall donations and positive donations were also negative: it appears that those who
donate more tend to have a lower SES,consistent with the findings of Chapter 2. This is also
consistent with Carpenter et al. (2005), who observed a 9% reduction in DGallocations with
every standard deviation increase in family income (a proxy for SES),and with the findings
of Kameda et al. (2005), who found that low SESstudent were more likely to endorse a
norm based on equity for all rather than one based on merit. It is possible that a stronger,
significant, effect of SESwould have been observed with a larger endowment or more
response options, although no such relationship was observed in the 10 condition of
chapter 2. While there were no differences in SESaccording to sibling status (seeTable 3.2),
it is interesting to note that singletons had the lowest mean SESyet they also donated the
least, the opposite pattern to that observed in the group as a whole. SESis clearly not
driving the decrease in donations by singletons; indeed whatever is driving the behaviour in
singletons, it is overriding the influence of SES.
3.4.3 Sibling status
The current study has demonstrated that with a restricted endowment of £4, adults show
an effect of sibling status upon altruistic behaviour. Contrary to expectations, both
firstborns and lastborns, who did not differ in their donations, donated more overall than
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singletons; this appears to be driven by the decision to donate, with both firstborns and
lastborns choosing to donate more often than singletons. Regressionanalyses reveal that
even when confounding variables such as IRIscore are controlled possessionof siblings has
a significant effect on overall donations and the decision to donate (see section 3.4.2 for
discussion of the influence of IRIscore). Positive donations, however, did not differ in terms
of sibling status (or for any other variable measured), supporting the idea that siblings
influence the norms governing whether or not to give, but how much is given once that
decision has been made is down to individual altruistic propensity (see section 2.4.2;
Saunders & Lynn, 2010). It would be informative to conduct a DG alongside collection of
questionnaire data on altruistic propensity in order to further examine this hypothesis.
The lack of a difference between firstborns and lastborns in the present study
demonstrates that the reduced altruism observed in firstborns relative to lastborns in
Chapter 2 is not a permanent state of affairs. Indeed, as Figure 3.2 demonstrates, firstborns
do not appear to catch up with lastborns in adulthood, but rather lastborns decrease their
donations to fall in line with those of firstborns. Furthermore, singletons' donations also
decrease from childhood into adulthood (although the effect was only marginally
significant). As adults give less than children, it seems that young children are overly
generous in the DG. When adults' and children's DGbehaviour is compared for individual
siblings statuses, it appears that lastborns and singletons are reducing their donations in
adulthood, while firstborns remain consistent. If lastborns do internalise the altruistic norm
earlier than firstborns and singletons, as suggested in Chapter 2, it may be that application
of the norm so young carries with it a greater risk of error, while acquisition at an older age
(Le. firstborns) brings a superior understanding, making behaviour more stable with time.
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The small reduction of donations in adult singletons is harder to explain. It is possible that
many singletons have acquired the altruistic norm as a social norm but not a personal
norm; that is they do not act upon the norm in the absence of external pressure to do so.
As such, should singleton children not fully appreciate the anonymity of the DG situation
they may implement the altruistic social norm as if they were being observed and donate
some stickers. By adulthood, singletons would understand the anonymity of the DG but
they may still not have internalised the altruistic norm and so would not implement it in
anonymous conditions, causing a drop in donations. Reducingthe anonymity of the DGand
examining how behaviour changes according to sibling status would help to clarify this
issue.While altruistic behaviour would undoubtedly increase due to social desirability being
an issue in non-anonymous conditions, it would be likely to do so across the board.
However, if a lack of a personal altruistic norm were driving singletons' behaviour it would
be expected to increase further to mirror that of adults with siblings.
The finding that singletons exhibited different behaviour than people with siblings is
inconsistent with a number of previous studies, who have found the personalities and
prosocial behaviour of people with and without siblings' to be comparable (Kwan & lp,
2009; Riggio, 1999; Polit & Falbo, 1987). However, these studies have relied on self-report
and consequently are more open to the effects of social desirability than the present study.
As discussed above, singletons may decrease their altruistic responses to a greater degree
than people with siblings under conditions of anonymity. Moreover, personality differences
according to sibling status depend upon the source of the rating and do not necessarily
emerge with self-report (Jefferson et al., 1998).
The current finding that the influence of sibling status changesfrom the possessionof older
siblings to the possessionof siblings in general is also unexpected. In light of the personality
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literature (e.g. Jefferson et al., 1998; Michalski & Shackelford, 2002; Paulhus et al., 1999)
and the findings of Van Lange et al. (1997) firstborns were expected to be less altruistic
than lastborns. The reduced endowment size in the present study, while emphasising
individual differences in children, may have masked them in adults and differences
between firstborns and lastborns may emerge with the greater variability provided by a
larger endowment. Given that firstborns do not increase their donations to fall in line with
lastborns, but rather lastborns decrease their donations to the level of firstborns, it is
possible that as discussed above, lastborns who would have donated when the cost of
giving was not so high kept the endowment for themselves. Further study with a standard
endowment is required to confirm whether the influence of siblings truly shifts in
adulthood.
Sibling effects are more likely to be found in within-family analyses as these tend to
exaggerate differences by making direct comparisons with specific individuals (Sulloway,
1996); however, finding a sibling effect in between-family analyses in the present study
demonstrates that sibling status is capable of exerting an influence on an individual's
behaviour out of the family context in adulthood. This effect appears to be driven
specifically by siblings rather than the increased socialisation associated with living with
other individuals as neither adults nor children exhibited a relationship between time spent
with peers and altruistic behaviour. As such, spending time with peers does not seem to
help singletons to compensate for the sibling interactions they are missing. However, the
measure may not have captured potential differences attributable to peers - it is possible
that there is a critical period where peers are particularly influential but the measure would
have missed this as it assessedtime spent with peers acrossthe entirety of childhood.
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3.4.4 Mechanisms of sibling influence
Assessingthe influence of sibling status in adults allows extension of the assessmentof the
mechanisms which may be driving sibling effects upon altruistic behaviour described in
section 2.4.4. The data from the current study are inconsistent with the following
mechanisms (see Table 3.1): differences in parental investment, dominance hierarchy
effects, nice partitioning and deidentification. The differences in parental investment
mechanism predicts a decline in outcome the later in the constellation the child is born,
with singletons having the best outcome. However, although adults have had ample time
for inequality to accumulate between siblings, which was not the casewith children (whose
behaviour was also inconsistent with this mechanism), the predicted pattern did not
emerge. As both adults and children did not behave in keeping with the predictions of this
mechanism, it can safely be ruled out as contributing to differences in altruistic behaviour
according to sibling status in the present study. Similarly, data from both adults and
children were inconsistent with the dominance hierarchy effects mechanism. Lastborns,
according to the predictions of this mechanism, were expected to be the most altruistic in
order to compensate for their lack of power, while firstborns were expected to be the least
altruistic; this difference would be stable over time. While lastborn children were more
altruistic than firstborns, in adults there were no differences between these groups and this
mechanism can also therefore be ruled out as driving behaviour in the present study. Niche
partitioning predicted that lastborns would differ from both singletons and firstborns in
their altruistic behaviour due to them seeking to distinguish themselves by increasing their
generosity. While this mechanism was supported by the data from Chapter 2, findings from
the present study are not consistent as lastborns decreased their altruistic behaviour in
adulthood, behaving comparably to firstborns. Equally, deidentification predicted that
firstborns and lastborns would differ as they sought to establish their own, unique
personalities. While the data from the present study were inconsistent with this
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mechanism, data from Chapter 2 were consistent with the deidentification hypothesis.
While it was expected that differences due to this mechanism would increase in adults as
people established themselves as different from their siblings, it is possible that some
people in the present study increased their generosity while others decreased their
generosity with the net result being no difference between the groups. It is difficult to
accept that someone would be selfish merely to mark themselves apart from their siblings;
nonetheless, this mechanism cannot be ruled out based upon the findings from the current
study and those of Chapter 2.
Data from the present experiment are consistent with the following mechanisms from
Table 3.1: birth order stereotypes, teaching and modelling; these mechanisms are also
consistent with the results from Chapter 2. Singletons being lessaltruistic than people with
siblings in the present study is consistent with the birth order stereotype that singletons are
selfish. Should stereotypes be driving altruistic behaviour, it is possible that the firstborns in
Chapter 2, who behaved comparably to singletons, did not yet have enough experience
with their siblings for the singleton stereotype to have ceased having an influence on their
behaviour. It seems unlikely that singletons would suppress the altruistic urge merely to
conform to a stereotype, especially when a negative reputation would surely ensue in real-
world encounters. In addition, it is unnecessary to conform to a stereotype in anonymous
conditions, implying that should singletons' behaviour be driven by stereotypes they have
been internalised even by 4-5 years of age. However, the fact that singletons' altruistic
behaviour decreases in adulthood is consistent with stereotypes being increasingly
internalised into adulthood. Thus, the influence of stereotypes upon altruistic behaviour
cannot be ruled out based on the current findings. It must be noted, however, that it is
plausible that stereotypes arise becausethey reflect real-world differences rather than the
differences arising becausethe stereotypes exist.
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Both teaching and behavioural modelling mechanisms predicted that while firstborn
children would be less generous than lastborn children, this difference would disappear
with age as firstborns' experience with their younger siblings increased. This is consistent
with the present findings, as is the prediction that singletons would be the least generous
as they do not have siblings to act as teachers or models. It is not possible to distinguish
between these mechanisms based upon the current findings, nor is it clear how exactly
these mechanisms exert their influence. Given that firstborns' behaviour does not change
with age, it seems that interactions with younger siblings are sufficient to maintain that
level of altruistic behaviour, unlike singletons who have no such interactions and whose
altruistic behaviour decreases with age. It may be the act of teaching/modelling that
maintains firstborns' level of altruism; conversely they may follow the example of their
younger siblings although given that they do not increase their altruistic behaviour to
match that of lastborns this is less likely. Indeed, lastborns' altruistic behaviour decreases
with age to match that of firstborns. This may be due to their older siblings teaching or
showing them that their behaviour was unnecessarily generous and that it is socially
acceptable to be lessso, a behaviour that is then generalised to the anonymous conditions
of the DG.
It is likely that rather than only one mechanism driving differences in altruistic behaviour,
there are multiple mechanisms interacting and different children may adopt different
strategies depending upon their relationship with their siblings (Whiteman et al., 2007a,
2007b). It is possible that different mechanisms contribute at different points in life:
stereotypes for instance may not have a strong impact upon children's behaviour but their
influence may increase with age, while teaching and modelling may be less necessary as a
child grows up. While the results of the present study can shed light on the mechanisms
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that may drive sibling differences, only direct assessmentof these mechanisms can reliably
confirm the current conclusions. It would also be informative to repeat the study with a
larger endowment in order to ensure that the lack of variability in the present study is not
masking potential differences, which would potentially support different mechanisms of
sibling influence. However, based upon the current findings, a combination of teaching,
modelling and stereotypes appear to be driving the influence of siblings upon altruistic
behaviour.
The present study has demonstrated that differences in altruistic behaviour according to
sibling status can arise in adults' DG performance, even when individual differences in
empathy are controlled. This highlights the necessity for studies of altruism to record
participants' sibling status, as differing ratios of sibling groups may contribute to the
heterogeneity observed acrossstudies. Furthermore, the influence of sibling status changes
over time with older siblings benefiting children while siblings in general benefit adults.
However, in addition to individual differences there are also a number of situational factors
that can influence DG behaviour, such as the source of the endowment and the
characteristics of the recipient. The following chapters will examine how these factors
influence the altruistic behaviour of 4-5 year-aids and whether sibling groups are
differentially affected.
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Chapter 4: The influence of earning the DG endowment in preschool children
4.1 Introduction
While previous chapters have focussed on how the characteristics of the allocator in the DG
influence their donations, the current chapter will examine how the characteristics of the
endowment itself influence how it is allocated. Adults who have earned their endowment
tend to donate less of it to the recipient than when they have not worked for it. The
present chapter will examine whether this earning effect can also be observed in 4-5 year-
old children who have had to work for their stickers.
4.1.1 Windfall and earned resources
The economic principle of fungibility states that all money of the same currency is freely
interchangeable, with one monetary unit possessingequal value to any other. However,
despite fungibility being a core principle of normative economic theory, windfall gains are
often treated differently than earned resources. A windfall is the acquisition of a resource
that is unearned and often unexpected, such as a lottery win, inheritance or even finding
money in the street and windfall money is more likely to be spent than earned money
(Arkes et al., 1994; Cattelino, 2009; Thaler, 1999). This has been demonstrated by Arkes et
al. (1994), who presented participants with questionnaires about the likelihood of spending
money that has been acquired by being earned or by a windfall. Participants were more
likely to report that they would spend windfall money than earned money, a finding that
was confirmed with follow-up studies using real money. Furthermore, manipulation of the
sources of both earned and windfall money revealed that the effort invested in acquiring
the money did not influence an individual's propensity to spend it; rather it was the
anticipation of the money that mattered - unanticipated money was more likely to be
spent than anticipated money. In a similar, more recent study, Kameda, Takezawa, Tindale
and Smith (2002) found both Japanese and Americans to be more likely to share an
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endowment when is has been obtained under uncertain rather than certain conditions,
although Japaneseparticipants shared to a greater extent. Contrary the fungibility principle,
it seems that lithe history of the dollar seems to influence subjects' willingness to part with
it" (Arkes et al., 1994, p. 347 ): earned money is not freely interchangeable with unearned
money.
Arkes et al. (1994) suggest that the earning effect may occur because people
compartmentalise their assets, a process Thaler (1999) calls mental accounting. Mental
accounting involves mentally dividing resources into different 'accounts' according to how
it is to be spent, such as budgeting one sum for household bills and another for
entertainment. Assets in these accounts are not freely interchangeable and thus also
violate the principle of fungibility. Arkes et al. propose that windfall wealth is either
allocated to a 'frivolous' account or may not even have time to be allocated to an account
at all and is therefore more likely to be spent than money that has been allocated to more
mundane, necessaryaccounts.
4.1.2 Earningand the DG
In the DGthe endowment is usually separate from the inconvenience allowance given to a
participant for their participation and its receipt is generally unexpected and unearned by
the participant. As such, these endowments can be viewed aswindfalls and findings suggest
that they are also treated differently than when the same sums are earned by participants.
Hoffman et al. (1994) conducted a treatment in which participants in the DGwere required
to earn the right to be the first mover (i.e. be the dictator and divide the endowment rather
than the recipient and simply accept the division given to them) by scoring in the top 50%
of participants in a current events quiz; allocations were lower in this treatment than in the
standard DG.Cherry and colleagues have confirmed this finding in numerous DGstudies in
which participants earn their endowment; they are both less likely to donate and give less
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when they do so (Cherry, 2001; Cherry et al., 2002; List& Cherry, 2008). Cherry argues that
participants that have earned the money to be allocated have a more legitimate right to
that money than those that simply have it bestowed upon them and therefore are less
likely to share it with the recipient. Similarly, Carlssonet al. (2010) found that participants
who had spent 20 minutes filling in a survey to earn their endowment allocated more to
charity than those who had not. Furthermore, when participants were compared on the
basis of gender, women donated slightly more on average in the windfall treatment and
slightly less in the earned treatment; however these differences were not significant.
The influence of the legitimacy of the assets is so strong that it influences how participants
treat others' wealth as well as their own. Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) gave the receiver in
the DGthe opportunity to earn the endowment that the dictator will divide by answering
quiz questions. They provided one of three reward levels dependent upon performance,
with it being possible to have answered no questions correctly to receive the lowest reward
level. Dictators gave significantly more to receivers who had earned the middle and high
reward levels than those who had acquired the same sum in the baseline treatment.
However, there was no difference in donations between the baseline and those who
earned the lowest reward level, as it was impossible to ascertain the receiver's entitlement
to the endowment as they could conceivably have not exerted any effort and not answered
any questions but still receive the sum. Similarly, Ruffle (1998) found that when the
receiver took part in a quiz to decide how much the allocator would divide, with the top-
scoring 50% being given $10 and the rest $4, those in the $10 treatment were offered
significantly more than those in the baseline treatment who acquired the same sum by
chance. List (2007), on the other hand, asked all participants, both dictator and recipient, to
stuff envelopes for 30 minutes to earn the endowment and gave the dictator the
opportunity to not only donate up to $5 to the recipient, but also the option to take $1
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from the recipient. When the endowments were earned both giving and taking were
reduced compared to the baseline treatment, with the majority of dictators choosing to
give and take nothing, possibly due to the greater moral cost of taking earned wealth (List,
2007). These studies confirm that earned wealth is treated differently than windfall wealth
along a variety of dimensions; however, the influence of the source of a resource is not
limited to economic games.
Anthropological studies of hunter-gatherers such as the Ache in Paraguay reveal that
hunted game is more likely to be distributed throughout the community than collected
resources. This strategy is thought to collectively reduce risk as (similar to a windfall) the
acquisition of meat is more uncertain and susceptible to failure than that of foraged fruit
and vegetables (Kaplan & Hill, 1985). Work with the Hadzaof Tanzania, on the other hand,
suggests that sharing meat is a means of reputation enhancement rather than risk
reduction (Hawkes, O'Connell, & Blurton Jones, 2001). While it seems plausible that a
similar process is governing this sharing behaviour and that observed in the DG, (Gurven &
Winking, 2008) found no relationship between standard DGperformance and food sharing
in the Tsimane of Bolivia. However, whilst the caloric load of shared food was factored into
the analysis, a distinction was not drawn between hunted meat and harvested foods and
this combined with a sample of only 14 participants may have contributed to the null result.
4.1.3 Influence of earning in children
While it is widely accepted that requiring adults to earn their DG endowment reduces
donations, this has never been directly examined in children. However, there is evidence to
suggest that children would also modulate their DGdonations according to whether or not
it was earned. Staub and Noerenberg (1981) asked 8-10 year-old boys to playa bowling
game and subsequently gave them candy as either an expected reward or an unexpected
windfall. These children were allowed to eat their candy immediately but were not allowed
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to take it with them when they returned to the classroom. Shortly afterwards, another child
was introduced to the room and the pair were left alone to listen to a story, giving the
original child the opportunity to eat or share his candy. Boys who believed that they had
earned their candy ate significantly more of it than those who did not; they also ate more
relative to what they shared than did those who did not earn the candy. The authors
suggest that the children are adhering to a 'norm of deserving' (hereafter legitimacy norms)
in which it is acceptable to keep more of a resource for oneself when it has been earned.
Conversely, Willis, Feldman and Ruble (1977) found that when 5-9 year-old children were
presented with an unexpected monetary windfall or an earned, expected sum and given
the opportunity to give some of this money to charity, donations did not vary as a function
of earning at any age.
Previous work hasalso examined how a child's entitlement to their reward affects how they
share it, i.e. how the legitimacy of the assets influences sharing. Long and Lerner (1974)
paid 9-10 year-aids to 'market test' a toy and told them either that they had been given an
appropriate amount or that they had been overpaid, thus decreasing their sense of
entitlement to the reward. When given the opportunity to donate some of their earnings to
charity, those children who had been overpaid donated more. Similarly, Staub (1971)
rewarded 9-11 year-old boys with candy for their participation in a bowling task. These
children were informed that they had been successfulat the task, performed at an average
level, or that they had failed at the task (a" children were nonetheless given the same
amount) and their willingness to share with an absent child was assessed.They found that
younger children in the successful group shared less than those in the intermediate and
failure groups, while older children in the successful group shared the more than those in
8 In order to avoid confusionwith Chapter5, in which the influenceof the deservingnessof the
recipient upon DG behaviouris assessed,the 'deservingnorm' will hereafter be referred to asthe
'legitimacynorm'.
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the intermediate and failure groups. They suggest that should a legitimacy norm influence
behaviour, then it no longer applies by 11 years of age.
4.1.4 Present study
Findings on the influence of earning and the legitimacy of assets in children are clearly
mixed. The present study aimed to ascertain whether 4-5 year-olds modulated their
donations on the DG according to whether or not the endowment was earned, allowing
exploration of whether a legitimacy norm hasyet been acquired at this young age. Children
were asked to spend 15 minutes completing a series of maths and theory of mind tasks in
order to earn their endowment of stickers and then took part in the DGwith their earned
stickers. Donations were then compared to those from Chapter 2 in which the DG was
conducted before the maths and ToM tasks,with the stickers given asawindfall.
Four to five years is a much younger age group than has generally been used to investigate
the earning effect, but the evidence in adults and older children suggests that young
children may donate less when they have earned their endowment than when they have
acquired it as a windfall; however, this may not be the case as the single study that has
used a young age group hasfound no earning effect (Willis et al., 1977). Given that many of
the previous studies in children have used only boys, the present study will also investigate
the impact of gender upon the earning effect, however, given the lack of a gender effect in
Chapter 2 and the lack of gender differences in adults (Carlsson et al., 2010), gender
differences are not expected. Finally, given the findings of Chapter 2, the influence of
possessing older siblings upon the earning effect will be assessed. Children with older
siblings donated more in the ClassicDGand so it is likely that they will show a greater drop
in donations when the endowment is earned than those without older siblings.
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4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Participants
Fifty-six 4-5 year-old children (mean age 4:11; age range 4:0 to 5:10) participated in the
study. Four children were recruited from the Human Development and Learning database
and were tested in the School of Psychology,University of Nottingham. Eight children were
recruited from local Nottingham schools and were tested in a quiet environment in their
school setting. The remaining 44 children were recruited from the University of Nottingham
Summer Scientist week, a week-long event during which parents can bring their children
along to a morning or afternoon session to participate in a variety of psychology
experiments. Children were tested in a quiet area away from other children. At the time of
consent parents completed a questionnaire detailing demographic information such as
their child's age, gender, the number and agesof the child's siblings and the average time
the child spends in childcare and extracurricular activities per week (see Appendix 1).
Children were recruited on the basis of sibling status to fall into the following groups:
singletons (no siblings), firstborns (only younger siblings) and lastborns (only older siblings).
In order to ascertain whether children who had earned their endowments modulated their
donations accordingly, data were compared to those from the 10 condition in Chapter 2
(hereafter the ClassicOG).Only those who received the 10 condition first were included
and groups were balanced on size, age, gender and sibling composition; see Table 4.1 for
sample characteristics for the group as a whole. SeeTable 4.2 for sample characteristics for
the Earning DGby sibling status.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics in the Earning DG and the Classic DG (standard deviations in
parentheses; ranges in italics)
Earning DG Classic DG Group differences
Total n 56 56
Gender
29:27 28:28(female:male)
Siblings
11:24:21 11:25:20(singletons:firstborns:lastborns)
Age/months 59.05 59.41(6.11) (6.00) U=1533.00, p=.84(mean)
48-70 49-72
Time spent with unrelated
27.49 30.02
(10.80) (10.85) U=1371.00, p=.25
peers (mean hours/week) 3.00-45.83 3.00-45.75
SES 66.78 74.20
(mean percentile) (22.05) (25.79) U=1019.S0, p=.03
5.76-95.63 12.09-99.53
Table 4.2:_Descriptive statistics across sibling groups for the Earning DG (standard deviations in
parentheses; ranges in italics)
Singletons Firstborns Lastborns Group differences
Total n 11 24 21
Gender
(female:male) 3:8 14:10 12:9
Age/months
58.45 59.00 59.43
(4.41) (6.81) (6.25) H(2)=0.15, p=.92(mean)
50-67 48-70 49-69
Time spent with
23.73 29.11 27.60
unrelated peers (12.71) (9.89) (10.79) H(2)=1.98, p=.37(mean
hours/week) 3.00-41.00 11.00-44.50 12.00-45.83
SES
65.28 67.52 66.62
(mean percentile) (30.96) (20.61) (19.87) H(2)=0.15, p=.93
22.92-95.63 5.76-95.46 34.89-94.59
4.2.2 Procedure
In the Earning DG, each child first participated in an earning phase followed by one iteration
of the DG with 10 stickers. Children were given 10 stickers in order to provide sufficient
variability in donations to be able to capture differences according to whether or not the
endowment was earned. The earning phase entailed completion of a series of tasks
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(measures of mathematical ability and ToM ability) in order for the child to earn her
endowment of 10 stickers. All children spent approximately 15 minutes earning their
stickers. In the Classic DG each child was first given her endowment and offered the
opportunity to share it in the DGand subsequently completed measures of mathematical
ability and ToM ability; for the full procedure of the ClassicDGsee section 2.2.2.
4.2.2.1 Earning phase
The child was informed that the experimenter would like her to complete a series of tasks
and if she worked hard and completed them all she would be allowed to choose some
stickers. It was emphasised once during completion of these tasks that the child was
working very hard and should she continue to do so she would receive her stickers. It was
not implied that receipt of the stickers was contingent on the child's performance, simply
that she needed to work hard, and all children were allowed to choose their stickers
irrespective of their successat the tasks. The tasks in the earning phase were modelled
closely on the measures used to measure mathematical ability and ToM ability in Chapter 2.
The child began with the division task, dividing blocks into two equal piles as in the equal
division task in Chapter 2: first four blocks and then ten blocks. Additional divisions were
then added: nine blocks divided into three equal piles (a ratio of 1:1:1); nine blocks divided
into two piles in a ratio of 2:1; ten blocks divided into two piles in a ratio of 4:1; and ten
blocks divided into two piles in a ratio of 3:2. Three trials were conducted for each division
and the task was intended to be of increasing difficulty, both so that the child had to work
increasingly hard and so that the task could be discontinued should the child be unable to
complete it. If this was the case, the child was allowed to attempt the task for several
minutes before moving on to the next set of tasks to ensure that she was working for a
comparable amount of time as the other children. The divisions that were introduced for
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the current experiment were described to the child as following a rule, such as "each time
you put one block on the red mat I'd like you to put two blocks onto the blue mat". Each
time the 'rule' changed the child was shown an example with a small number of blocks to
ensure her understanding of the rule.
Once the child had divided all of the blocks shewas then presented with a modified version
of the same/more task from Chapter 2 in which the child was shown pairs of cards
depicting various numerosities with coloured spots and askedwhether both cards depicted
the same numerosity. If the child answered 'no' she was asked which card depicted the
larger numerosity, whether or not the pair actually differed. As in the original task, each
pair always totalled four or ten. However, in the present experiment, additional pairs
totalling ten were added, once again to make the task more difficult and effortful for the
child. As such, in addition to receiving pairs of 2:2, 1:3, 5:5 and 8:2, the child also received
pairs of 7:3 and 6:4. The ratio is closer for the latter pairs, meaning that the child would
most likely need to count the spots to be able to ascertain whether or not they were the
same as these ratios lie outside the limits of subitizing. In all casesthe child was presented
with a linear arrangement as this is how the stickers were presented in the DG and the
random arrangement would be likely to make the task too difficult. The order in which the
pairs were received was pseudorandomised, with no more than three trials in a row
requiring the same response to avoid perseveration on the same response. As there were
three trials for each pair, the side on which each numerosity appeared was fully
counterbalanced across every two participants to avoid a bias towards one visual
hemisphere. The number of correct responses on each of the tasks above was summed to
give a composite maths score with a maximum score of 39.
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Upon completion of the maths tasks above, the child was presented with the ToM tasks
used in Chapter 2: the deceptive box task, based on Gopnik and Astington's (Gopnik &
Astington, 1988) Smarties task and a pictorial adaptation of Baron-Cohen et ai's (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985) Sally/Anne task. Scoreswere summed to give a composite ToM score,
with a maximum possible score of 2 (see Chapter 2 for full details of the procedure and
scoring).
4.2.2.2 DG
Upon completion of both the maths tasks and the ToM tasks the child was allowed to
choose her favourite 10 stickers from a selection of 30. As in the ClassicDG,the child chose
her favourite sticker from the selection and placed it upon an array with 10 slots, repeating
this process until all of the slots were filled. The remaining stickers were then removed
from sight. The DGprocedure was identical to that in the ClassicDG: once the participant
had made her selection she was informed that the stickers were hers to keep, but if she
wished she could give some of her stickers to another child that had none. The participant
was given no other information about the other child and it was stressed that her choice
would be completely anonymous and that she was not obliged to give any away at all if she
did not wish to, although it was emphasised that the child had worked very hard for her
stickers. The experimenter presented the child with two envelopes, one for the participant
and one for the other child. The participant's name was written on her envelope and she
was asked to divide the stickers between the envelopes as she saw fit. To maintain
anonymity, the experimenter and any parents present covered their eyes during this
division. Once again, each envelope contained a colouring picture so that no child would
receive an empty envelope, limiting the likelihood that the participant felt obliged to
donate through guilt avoidance. Once the child had made her division the stickers were
sealed into the envelopes and the envelope for the other child was posted into a red post
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box. This action completed the study and the child was then free to leave. Once the study
was complete the experimenter opened the envelopes and recorded the contents before
the stickers were returned to a pool to be distributed amongst future participants.
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4.3 Results
Data were examined for skewness and kurtosis. As data were not normally distributed, non-
parametric statistics were employed. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.
In order to be conservative in the analyses, all tests were two-tailed. Data were first
examined in terms of the overall donation profile (Le. the proportion of their stickers
donated by each child). This was then broken down into analyses of the decision to donate
(Le. donating nothing or donating one or more stickers) and positive donations (the
proportion of stickers donated by only those who chose to donate).
4.3.1 Classic DG
In order to later directly compare data from the Earning DG with data from Chapter 2, only
those children who received the 10 condition first (hereafter referred to as the Classic DG)
were included; as such results were first reanalysed for only those children. Consistent with
findings in Chapter 2, the modal offer in the Classic DG was zero, while when only positive
donations were taken into account the modal offer was four stickers. See Table 4.3 for
mean donations; Figure 4.1 shows the distributions of donations.
Table 4.3: Mean proportion of endowment donated in the Earning DG and the Classic DG (standard
deviations in parentheses)
Earning DG Classic DG
Overall donation
12.50 13.75
(19.09) (18.64)
Decision to donate:
proportion choosing to donate
37.50 39.29
33.33 35.00
Positive donations (16.53) (11.44)
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Figure 4.1: Donation distributions in the Earning DG and the Classic DG
As in section 2.3.3, the first 50% of stickers chosen were coded as most preferred and the
final 50% chosen were coded as least preferred. The proportion of stickers donated that
were most and least preferred were calculated and Wilcoxon analyses show that unlike in
Chapter 2 (where there was no effect of sticker preference in the 10 condition) children in
the Classic DG donated significantly more of their least-preferred stickers [z= -2,49, p=.Ol).
4.3.1.1 Gender
Consistent with the trend observed in Chapter 2, in the Classic DG girls made larger overall
donations than boys (U=2740.00, p=.03) and chose to donate more often than boys
(l(1)=4.79, p=.OS); however, girls and boys did not differ in the size of their positive
donations (U=46.S0, p=.66). Consistent with Chapter 2, when sticker preference was
assessed by gender, neither boys nor girls showed a significant effect of sticker preference
(z=-2.00, p=.13; z=-1.61, p-.12, respectively).
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4.3.1.2 Sibling status
Consistent with findings in Chapter 2, there were no differences in donations in the Classic
DG according to sibling status for overall donations (U=296.00, p=.21), the decision to
donate (X2(1)=1.50, p=.26) or positive donations (U=56.00, p=.78). When sticker preference
was assessed by sibling status, neither children without older siblings nor children with
older siblings show a significant effect of sticker preference (z=-1.57, p=.14; z=1.83, p=.09,
respectively), although children with older siblings did show a trend towards donating more
of their least preferred stickers.
4.3.2 Earning DG
4.3.2.1 Prosocial behaviour
In the Earning DG the modal offer was zero, while when only positive donations are taken
into account the modal offer was four stickers. See Table 4.3 for mean donations; Figure 4.1
shows the distributions of donations.
The impact of sticker preference upon children's donation behaviour when stickers were
earned was also assessed. Wilcoxon analyses revealed no difference in donations in the
Earning group according to sticker preference (1=-1.56, p=.13).
4.3.2.2 Gender
The impact of gender upon donations when the endowment was earned was assessed.
Gender did not have a significant impact upon overall donation behaviour (U=381.50,
p=.86), the decision to donate (X2(1)=0.01, p=l) or on positive donations (U=41.50, p=.36).
The impact of sticker preference in the Earning treatment was also assessed for girls and
boys independently and revealed that neither girls nor boys showed an effect of preference
(1=-0.52, p=.66; 1=-1.70, p=.ll, respectively).
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4.3.2.3 Sibling status
The donations of singletons and firstborns in the Earning DG were compared in order to
confirm whether these groups could be combined. There were no differences between
singletons and firstborns in the Earning treatment in overall donation profiles (U=124.00,
p=.39), the decision to donate Ci(1)=0.09, p=l) or positive donations (U=19.00, p=.92). As
such, these groups were combined and subsequent analyses were performed according to
whether or not children possessed older siblings. While there were no differences in overall
donation profile (U=317.00, p=.33) or the decision to donate (1(1)=0.25, p=.78), children
with older siblings made significantly smaller positive donations than children without older
siblings in the Earning treatment (U=23.00, p=.05; see left hand panel of Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2: Mean positive donations in the Earning DGand the Classic DG as a function of possession
of older siblings (error bars represent the standard error of the mean)
The impact of sticker preference in the Earning treatment was also assessed for children
with and without older siblings independently. Consistent with findings in Chapter 2,
children with older siblings did not show an effect of sticker preference (z=·0.14, p=l).
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However, children without older siblings did show a significant effect of sticker preference
in the present study (z=-2.50, p=.Ol), with more least liked stickers being donated.
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4.3.2.4 Confounding variables
Table 4.5 shows descriptive statistics for maths and ToM ability by sibling status, For the
group as a whole the maths equal division and same/more tasks were found to be
significantly correlated (rs=.41, p=.002). For ToM, 55.36% of children were consistent in
their response on the deceptive box task and Sally/Anne task (see Table 4.4). Of those who
were inconsistent, children were more likely to pass the Sally-Anne task (84.00%) than the
deceptive box task (16.00%; McNemar / p=.OOl).,
Table 4.4: Consistency table showing the number of children in the group as a whole passing and
failing the two ToM tasks
Fail Sally- Pass Sally-
Anne Anne
Fail Deceptive box 16 21
Pass Deceptive
4 15
box
Table 4.5: Moths and ToM ability in the Earning DG across sibling groups (standard deviations in
parentheses; ranges in italics)
Singletons Firstborns Lastborns Group differences
14.00 15.21 14.36
Equal division task (4.65) (3.22) (4.46) H(2)=1.25, p=.54(mean score/18)
4-18 7-18 4-18
'"~ 20.18 20.38 19.61
'"
"' Same/more task..... (1.08) (1.01) (2.11) H(2)=1.35, p=.51
'"s: (mean score/21).....
18-21 18-21 14-21ro
~
Composite maths
34.18 35.58 33.19
(4.94) (3.50) (5.72) H(2)=1.45, p=.48(mean score/39)
25-39 28-39 21-39
Deceptive box task .27 .46 .24
/(2)=2.57, p=.31(pass rate) (.47) (.51) (.44)
VI
~ Sally/Anne task .45 .67 .71
'" /(2)=2.18, p=.37ro
..... (pass rate) (.52) (.48) (.46)
~
0
.73 1.13 .95I-
Composite ToM score (.65) (.80) (.74) H(2)=2.15, p=.34(mean score/2)
0-2 0-2 0-2
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Analyses were conducted to ascertain whether any of the additional variables measured
contributed to the observed donation behaviour (summarised in Table 4.6). As there was a
significant correlation between the maths tasks the composite score was entered into the
correlations. As there was a significant difference between the frequency of passing the
two ToM tasks, individual scores were entered into the correlation rather than composite
scores. Positive donations in the Earning DG showed a significant negative relationship with
time spent with peers ('s=-.43, p=.05) and SES('s=-.52, p=.02): as these variables decreased,
positive donations increased. Positive donations in the Classic DG showed a significant
negative relationship with performance on the deceptive box task, with children who
passed the task donating less ('pb=-.45, p=.03). No other relationships were significant.
Table 4.6: Relationships between confounding variables and donations in the Earning DG and the
Classic DG
Overall donation profile Earning DG ClassicDG
Maths composite score 's=-.14, p=.31 's=-.06, p=.66
Time with peers 's=.04, p=.76 's=-.13, p=.34
SES 's=.06, p=.66 's=-.15, p=.28
Deceptive box task 'pb=-.14, p=.32 'pb=-.16, p=.23
Sally/Anne task 'pb=-.14, p=.31 rpb=-.OS,p=.71
Decision to donate EarningDG Classic DG
Maths composite score 'pb=-.09, p=.53 'Pb=-.09, p=.51
Time with peers 'Pb=.08, p=.54 'Pb=-.06, p=.66
SES 'Pb=.16, p=.28 'pb=-.21, p=.12
Deceptive box task .((1)=0.43, p=.57 .((1)=0.20, p=.79
Sally/Anne task 1(1)=0.753, p=.57 1(1)=0.01, p=l
Positive donations EarningDG Classic DG
Maths composite score 's=.10, p=.67 's=-.24, p=.31
Time with peers ,.=-.43, p=.05 's=-.18, p=.43
SES ,.=-.52, p=.02 's=.32, p=.14
Deceptive box task 'pb=-.20, p=.40 'Pb=-.45, p=.03
Sally/Anne task 'pb=.13, p=.57 'pb=-.17, p=.45
A simultaneous multiple regression was subsequently conducted in order to establish
whether the effect of possession of siblings on size of positive donations in the Earning DG
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could be observed when additional contributing variables were controlled (no other
regressions were conducted as no relationships were observed with overall donations or
the decision to donate). As such, possessionof older siblings, age, time with peers and SES
were entered as predictor variables (variables that produced a significant relationship with
positive donations above were entered as predictors), with overall donations in the 4
condition as the dependent variable. The sample size was very small (n=19) so the results
should be interpreted with caution. A significant model was produced (F3.1s=15.59,
Ll,r=<.71, p=<.OOl) and possessionof older siblings, time with peers and SESemerged as
significant predictors: children with older siblings donated less while donations decreased
as time with peers and SESincreased; coefficients are summarised in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Summary of multiple regression analysis for variables predicting positive donations in the
Earning DG (n=19)
8 (SE) Significance 95%Cl for 8
Constant 9.60
(1.03) <.001 7.42-11.79
Possessionof older siblings ·1.47
(0.45) .005 ·2.43--0.52
Time with peers ·O.OB
(0.02) .001 -0.13--0.04
SES -0.05
(0.01) .002 -0.07--0.02
4.3.3 Effect of earning the endowment
The Earning and Classicgroups were directly compared to ascertain whether an earning
effect could be observed. Overall, there were no significant differences between the
Earning DG group and the Classic DG group in terms of their overall donation profiles
(U=1517.00, p=.74), the decision to donate (1(1)=.34, p=l), or positive donations
(U=20B.00, p=.57).
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In order to ascertain whether there was an influence of gender upon the earning effect,
data were examined for girls and boys independently. Neither girls nor boys showed a
difference in donations between the Earning DG and the ClassicDG for overall donations
(U=321.00, p=.14; U=330.00, p=.33, respectively) the decision to donate (i(1)=1.41, p=.29;
.((1)=0.93, p=.39, respectively), or positive donations (U=61.00, p=.27; U=32.50, p=.83).
Data were also examined independently according to possessionof older siblings in order
to explore its impact upon the effect of earning the endowment. Children without older
siblings did not show a significant effect of earning their endowments for overall donation
profile (U=S78.00, p=.49), the decision to donate (i(1)=0.34, p=.63) or positive donations
(U=74.00, p=.62). Children with older siblings did not show a significant effect of earning
their endowments for the overall donation profile (U=lS8.00, p=.13) or the decision to
donate (i(1)=1.17, p=.3S). However, out of those who made positive donations, there was
a trend towards children with older siblings donating less in the Earning DG than in the
ClassicDG (U=18.00, p=.10; see Figure4.2).
4.3.4 Summary of results
Re-examining the Classic DG data (Le. data from Chapter 2 including only those who
received the 10 condition first) made little difference to the results, although children
donated more of their least-preferred stickers in the Classic DG (this difference was not
significant in Chapter 2) and the trend towards girls donating more often in Chapter 2
became significant in the ClassicDG.While gender did not influence the amount donated in
the Earning DG, sibling status did have an effect, with children with older siblings making
smaller positive donations. Sticker preference did not influence the amount donated in the
Earning DG group as a whole, for boys and girls individually, or for children with older
siblings. Children without older siblings, however, donated more of their least-liked than
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their most-liked stickers. No difference in donations was observed between the whole
Earning DGgroup and the whole ClassicDGgroup, nor was there a difference between the
two when boys and girls were examined independently. There was a trend towards children
with older siblings making smaller positive donations in the Earning DG; no difference was
observed for children without older siblings. When the relationship between donation
behaviour and potential confounding variables was examined, positive donations in the
Earning DGshowed a significant negative relationship with time spent with peers and SES,
decreasing as these variables increased. When these variables were entered into a
regression along with the possession of older siblings, possession of siblings, time with
peers and SESall emerged as significant predictors, with children with older siblings
donating lessand donations decreasing as time with peers and SESincreased.
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4.4 Discussion
The current study is the first to examine whether an earning effect can be observed in the
DG performance of 4-5 year-old children. It has demonstrated that at this young age the
earning effect is still to fully emerge, with only those children with older siblings showing a
small decrease in positive donations when endowments are earned. However, earned
endowments appear to be influenced by a greater variety of social factors than windfall
endowments.
4.4.1 Earningeffect
While adults show a consistent earning effect in the DG(Carlssonet al., 2010; Cherry, 2001;
Cherry et al., 2002; List & Cherry, 2008; Hoffman et al., 1994) and children in middle
childhood have also demonstrated an earning effect in a non-DG sharing task (Staub &
Noerenberg, 1981), 4-5 year-old children showed little effect of the origin of their
endowment upon donations in the DG. Consistent with the only other study to date to
examine the effect of earning in young children (Willis et al., 1977), no earning effect was
observed for the group as a whole, for boys and girls individually or for children without
older siblings. Children with older siblings demonstrated only a small influence of earning
their endowment, showing a nonsignificant tendency to make smaller positive donations in
the Earning DGthan in the ClassicDG(see Figure4.2). While it is possible that the lack of an
overall earning effect is due to a lack of power, a power analysis on the basisof Carlssonet
al.'s (2010) findings, in which a significant earning effect (with an effect size of 1.39 and
power of .99) was obtained with adults, demonstrates that a sample size of only 16
participants per group would be necessary to find a similar effect should one be present.
Given that there were 56 participants in each group, we can be confident that a lack of
power is not an issuewith regard to the current null result.
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There are a number of factors that may have contributed to the lack of an earning effect in
4-5 year-aids. It may be that at this young age children are not yet equipped to factor the
characteristics of the endowment into their allocation decision. However, 3-6 year-old
children can modulate their DG donations according the desirability of the endowment,
donating more of a less desirable resource (Blake & Rand, 2010). As they are able to
incorporate information about the endowment into their donations, it seems unlikely that
they are not capable of incorporating information about the source of the endowment into
their decisions.
Alternatively, the present findings may be due to the design of the study. Children may not
have felt that they had earned their stickers, either becausethe earning tasks were not long
enough or they were not sufficiently tedious. Longer or more uninteresting tasks may yield
a different result; however, at this young age 15 minutes is a long time. Indeed, many of the
children expressed a desire to undertake a different task so it seems likely that the maths
tasks were onerous enough to causethe children to feel that they had earned their stickers.
An effect might have been observed if the number of stickers earned had been contingent
upon performance as is often the casewith the monetary endowment in adult studies (e.g.
Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008), which would increase the legitimacy of
ownership of the stickers. However, a significant earning effect can be observed in adults
when effort (time spent filling in a survey) rather than achievement is the means of
acquisition of the endowment (Carlsson et al., 2010). Furthermore, young children are
routinely given things without necessarily earning them (food, clothing, shelter, not to
mention pocket money, etc.) and so legitimacy may not even be a salient factor at this
young age. Making rewards contingent upon performance may therefore not be sufficient
to elicit an earning effect at this young age. Conversely, the present study may not
minimise the difference in uncertainty of the assetsbetween the two conditions. Studies in
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adults have found that the unexpectedness of the endowment is a significant influence
upon the likelihood of sharing it (Arkes et al., 1994; Kameda et al., 2002); perhaps
decreasing the uncertainty in the Earning DG by giving the child time to reinforce their
ownership of the stickers would create a larger difference in donation behaviour between
the two conditions. Arkes et al. (1994) suggest that the earning effect may occur through
mental accounting, in which resources are mentally allocated to different budgets, and that
due to their unexpectedness windfall assetsmay not have time to be allocated to a budget
which causes them to be more spendable. Asking the child what she plans to do with her
stickers may encourage her to allocate them to a mental account, decreasing their
'spendability' and increasing the earning effect.
Despite these possibilities, it is plausible that children simply need time to learn that it is
socially acceptable to be less generous when sharing an earned rather than a windfall
endowment. Lastborn children, who appear to learn a sharing norm more rapidly than
children without older siblings (see Chapter 2), came the closest to demonstrating an
earning effect. Indeed, while sibling status did not influence overall donations or the
decision to donate, children with older siblings made significantly smaller positive
donations in the Earning DG treatment than those without older siblings (a change from
findings in the ClassicDG, in which no sibling effect was observed). Furthermore, the effect
of possession of older siblings remained a significant predictor of positive donations even
when the influence of other variables was controlled. This, combined with the trend of
children with older siblings making smaller positive donations in the Earning DG than the
ClassicDG9, suggeststhat children with older siblings are beginning to learn the legitimacy
9 Althoughthesegroupssignificantlydiffered in termsof SES,this is unlikelyto be drivingthe trend
for a differencein positivedonationsof childrenwith oldersiblings.Childrenin the EarningOG hada
lower SESthan children in the ClassicOG, while SEShad a negative relationship with positive
donationsin the EarningOG, with donationsincreasingasSESdecreased.This is inconsistentwith
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norm. While children without older siblings did not show any kind of earning effect, they
did demonstrate some modulation of their donations in the Earning DGby donating fewer
of their most liked stickers, while in the Classic DG no such difference was observed.
Children with older siblings showed a trend towards donating more of their least-preferred
stickers in the ClassicDG but no effect of sticker preference in the Earning DG, possibly
because they made smaller positive donations than children without older siblings,
consequently keeping for themselves the least preferred stickers that those without older
siblings were donating. It is possible that the earning effect initially manifests by keeping
more preferred resources for oneself, and reduced sharing when an endowment is earned
appears afterwards.
The influence of siblings appears to change when the endowment is earned, with children
with older siblings making smaller positive donations than those without when the
endowment was earned (with no difference in the decision to donate), while in the Classic
DG possessingolder siblings did not significantly influence donations. While the change in
the sibling effect according to the source of the endowment does not translate into a
significant earning effect, it appears that children with older siblings are slightly more
sensitive to the effect of having earned their endowment.
No previous study has examined the influence of gender upon the earning effect in
children. As expected, and consistent with Carlssonet al.'s (2010) findings in adults, gender
did not influence the earning effect. While those studies using the Classic DG that have
found a gender effect have found women (Eckel& Grossman, 1998; Kamaset al., 2008) and
girls (Gummerum et al., 2008, 2010; Harbaugh et al., 2003) to be more generous than men
and boys (and indeed, re-analysis of the ClassicDG data in section 4.3.1 to include only
the observedtrend of childrenwith older siblingsdonating lessin the EarningDGthan the Classic
DG.
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those who received the 10 condition first showed girls to donate significantly more often
than boys}, it appears that both genders modulate their donations to an equal extent (or
perhaps more appositely, both genders show equal lack of modulation) when the
endowment is earned.
4.4.2 Confounding variables in the EarningDG
In the 10 condition in Chapter 2, a trend towards girls donating more often than boys was
observed. This, combined with a larger proportion of girls' donations being composed of
their less-preferred stickers, led to the interpretation of this pattern as girls making slightly
more token donations than boys (see section 2.4.3). When the Classic DG data were re-
examined in section 4.3.1, the influence of gender became significant, with girls donating
more often (there were no gender differences in the sizeof positive donations or in term of
sticker preference). However, when the Earning DG data from the present study were
examined independently, no effect of gender was found upon any measure of donation
behaviour (overall donations, decision to donate, positive donations or proportion of least
preferred stickers donated). Girls may therefore slightly decrease their token donations in
the Earning DGand while this is clearly not a significant difference, it may demonstrate the
beginnings of earning-based modulation in 4-5 year-old girls. It has been suggested that
women may be more generous and more influenced by experimental design than men as
they are more sensitive to social cues (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). This increased sensitivity
may also lead them to internalise a legitimacy norm more rapidly, although further study
with older children would be necessaryto confirm this.
A significant relationship was found between age and positive donations in the Earning DG,
with donation size decreasing as children aged. While this may reflect the developmental
acquisition of the legitimacy norm, the age effect did not obtain in the regression when
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other variables were controlled. Given the small age group used in the present study and
the lack of an age effect in the Classic DG it seems more likely, therefore, that age is
confounded with sibling status, SESor time spent with peers and the correlation with
positive donations is spurious.
A significant relationship was observed between SESand positive donations in the Earning
DG, with the size of the donation decreasing as SESincreased; moreover, this was the
strongest predictor of donations in the regression. This is contrary to the findings in the
ClassieDGand those of Benenson et al. (2007), whieh showed no relationship between DG
performance and SES.However, this is consistent with Carpenter et aL's (2005) findings in
adults; similarly, SESshowed a significant negative relationship with overall donations and
the decision to donate in the 4 condition of Chapter 2 (see section 2.4.2). It was suggested
that low SESchildren may internalise a sharing norm earlier due to the increased likelihood
that they need to share resources. It is interesting, therefore, that the opposite appears to
be the case with the legitimacy norm, given that children who have internalised this norm
would be more likely to make a small donation or even not donate at all. However, low SES
leads to stronger egalitarianism (Kameda et al., 2005) and so it may be that the sharing
norm simply overrides the legitimacy norm in low SESchildren.
The present study confirmed the finding in the ClassicDGthat maths ability had no impact
upon donations, despite more complex tasks being included as part of the earning phase: it
appears that mathematical ability does not influence DG behaviour. ToM ability also
showed no relationship with performance on the Earning DG, consistent with previous
findings in young children (Lucaset al., 2008; Sally & Hill, 2005) and the ClassicDGgroup.
While behaviour in the Earning DGwas not influenced by cognitive factors, social factors
appear to have a strong influence. Indeed, contrary to findings with the ClassicDG (which
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showed no relationship) time spent with peers showed a significant negative relationship
with positive donations, with the amount donated decreasing as time with peers increases.
This supports the notion that learning a legitimacy norm is an important factor in the
behaviour observed in the present study and children do so from their peers aswell as from
their siblings. This is particularly interesting as peers do not appear to influence the
acquisition of the sharing norm (see section 2.4.2) but do seem to influence the acquisition
of a norm that modulates its implementation.
It is interesting that only positive donations showed any effects in the present study but
overall donations and the decision to donate did not, while in the ClassicDG the reverse
was the case. Furthermore, Saunders and Lynn (2010) found that helping motives rather
than social norms influence prosocial giving, also the opposite pattern to that observed in
the Earning DG. The present study may provide the first evidence that social norms can
influence how much a person gives as well as the choice to give in the first place. Further
study is necessaryto confirm this finding and further investigate how social norms influence
altruistic behaviour.
The present study has examined how the characteristics of the endowment influence DG
behaviour and has demonstrated that 4-5 year-old children show little effect of earning
their endowment. However, it appears that some children are beginning to modulate their
donations in line with a legitimacy norm and this emerging influence appears to be
modulated by a number of social factors, including possession of older siblings, SESand
time spent with peers. The next chapter will further examine the influences upon children's
altruistic behaviour, investigating whether the characteristics of the recipient affect DG
donations.
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Chapter 5: The influence of recipient deservingness in preschool children
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter added context to the DG by modulating the characteristics of the
endowment and asking children to earn their stickers. An alternative means of adding
context to the DG is to examine how the characteristics of the recipient rather than those
of the endowment itself influence donation behaviour. Adults are known to give more
when they are given information about who will receive the donation and are more
generous to more deserving recipients; the present study aimed to investigate whether 4-5
year-old children are able to incorporate positive and negative information about the
recipient into their donation decisions.
5.1.1 Reputation and reciprocity
The concept of social desirability is familiar to psychologists: people will attempt to present
a socially acceptable facade that may not reflect their real beliefs, actions or feelings by
either over-reporting desirable responses or down playing undesirable responses (Zerbe &
Paulhus, 1987). Socialdesirability influences behaviour in part becauseof the consequences
for reputation. When an individual's actions are directly or indirectly observed by another
person a reputation is formed which can, in turn, influence the nature and extent of future
reciprocity. Direct reciprocity occurs when the recipient of an action responds to the actor
in a tit-for-tat fashion (seeAxelrod & Hamilton, 1981), while indirect reciprocity is the result
of the actor being aware of the individual's previous actions with a third party and
responding in kind - they hear of the person's reputation and react accordingly (Alexander,
1987). Reputation is particularly important when the actor has not previously interacted
with the recipient as they do not have previous personal interactions to inform them of the
recipient's deservingness and trustworthiness. As such, indirect reciprocity is often
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advanced as an explanation for people's prosocial behaviour in one-shot economic games
such as the DG, in which direct reciprocity is not an option (e.g. Engelmann & Fischbacher,
2009).
5.1.2 DGand recipient characteristics in adults
When adults' donations in the DGare not anonymous, and therefore may have an impact
upon reputation, dictators are more generous (e.g. Piazza& Bering, 2008). Conversely, the
reputation of the recipient also influences the dictator, even when the dictator himself is
completely anonymous. Dictators donate more when they are informed of their recipient's
decision in a previous, unrelated DG than when they are given no information about the
recipient, while the amount donated is positively correlated with their partner's previous
donations despite there being no opportunity for future interaction: people appear to
reward generous behaviour. Moreover, even recipients who had previously been only
mildly generous or even selfish receive more than those whose prior behaviour was
unknown (Fehr & Schneider, 2010; Servatka, 2009, 2010). It appears that positive
information is not necessary to increase DG donations: simply giving the dictator
information about the recipient is sufficient to increase donations even if that information
demonstrates previous selfishness.
Information about the recipient hasconsistently been found to increaseadults' giving in the
DG.People give more to members of their ingroup than to strangers or outgroup members
and more still to kin, most likely because ingroup and family members are most likely to
have the opportunity to reciprocate in the future (Ben-Ner & Kramer, in press; Ben-Ner et
al., 2009). Findings according to recipient gender are mixed, with Ben-Ner, Kong et al.
(2004) finding that women send less to recipients of the same gender while men were not
influenced by recipient gender. Dufwenberg and Muren (2006), on the other hand, found
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that both men and women give more to women than to men. Poor people receive larger
DG donations than anonymous individuals (Brafias-Garza, 2006), as do charities (Eckel &
Grossman, 1996). These greater donations to more deserving or needy recipients are
modulated by the perceived worthiness of the recipient: recipients who are viewed as less
worthy or more responsible for their own misfortune receive smaller donations than more
worthy or blameless recipients (Fang, 2007; Fong& Luttmer, 2010; Fong& Oberholzer-Gee,
2011).
DG behaviour is not only influenced by potentially relevant information: irrelevant
information can also increase donations. Burnham (2003) asked dictators to view a
photograph of the recipient prior to dividing their endowment, finding that egalitarianism
increased compared to a no photo baseline. They suggest that the photograph increases
empathy with the recipient, leading to more equal splits of the pie. Even learning the family
name of the recipient prior to dividing the endowment is sufficient to increase their
salience in the dictator's donation decision and increase allocations (Charness& Gneezy,
2008), although learning the day and month of the recipient's birth does not appear to be
sufficient to significantly increase donations (Servatka,2009). Bohnet and Frey (1999) found
that while one-way identification of the recipient by the dictator did not increase donations
from baseline, donations did increase when seeing the recipient was combined with
learning their name, degree, hobbies and home town. Receiving an anonymous message
from the recipient also increases donations; indeed, even receiving an irrelevant message
from a previous recipient to a previous dictator increases donations (Mohlin &
Johannesson, 2008). In all of the studies above the dictator remains completely anonymous
and so there are no greater reputational repercussions for selfishness than there would be
when the recipient is also completely anonymous. Adults' DG behaviour is clearly highly
sensitive to the provision of information about the recipient, whether or not that
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information is relevant to their donation decision. This influence of anonymity reduction is
often assumed to be due to information about the recipient increasing the dictators
empathic response (e.g. Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Burnham, 2003). Indeed, these findings are
consistent with the identifiable victim effect (Schelling, 1968), in which people are more
likely to provide aid to an identified victim than to a statistical victim asempathy is aroused
when identifying information is provided (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; Small, Loewenstein,
& Siovic, 2007). Nonetheless, the influence of provision of information upon the elicitation
of empathy hasyet to be directly assessedin conjunction with the dictator game.
5.1.3 Information about the recipient in children
Children have also been demonstrated to be sensitive to the provision of information about
the recipient of prosocial behaviour. Braband and Lerner (1974) demonstrated that 9-10
year-olds provide more help to another child who is not responsible for their situation than
to someone who has caused their own problems, while Barnett (1975) found that boys
were more likely to share tokens that they had won in a bowling game with a child who has
not had the opportunity to win their own than with someone who has played and lost.
Children, like adults, also prefer to help members of their ingroup or people who are more
similar to them; 5-9 year-olds, for instance, are more likely to give money to help a disabled
child than a disabled adult (Willis et al., 1977). Goeree, McConnell, Mitchell, Tromp and
Yariv (2010) asked 10-12 year-old girls in a closed social network to playa DG and found
that the closer in the social network the recipient was to the dictator, the larger an
allocation they received: children gave more to their friends than to their non-friends.
Moore (2009) asked 4-6 year-olds to playa resource allocation game with friends, non-
friends and strangers. In sharing trials, where the child had to choose between two stickers
immediately for herself or one for herself and one for the other later (l.e., there was a cost
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to the child to share), children were more likely to share with a friend than a non-friend or
stranger; they did not discriminate between a non-friend and a stranger. Thus, even young
children are clearly able to incorporate information about the recipient into their provision
of prosocial behaviour. However, there is no evidence to date as to whether young children
incorporate information about the reputation of the recipient in their DGdecisions.
5.1.4 Present study
The present study sought to discover whether 4-5 year-old children are able to take
reputational information into account when making their DG decisions. Children were
informed of the previous behaviour of two children that the experimenter had previously
encountered, whether 'nice' or 'naughty', and offered the opportunity to donate stickers to
these children. This direct comparison between DGdonations to recipients with positive or
negative character traits has not previously been conducted with either adults or children.
However, adults find people with positive character traits to be deserving of positive
outcomes and people with negative character traits to be deserving of negative outcomes
(Lupfer & Gingrich, 1999). Furthermore, 6 year-olds have been demonstrated to understand
that people's actions influence others' judgements of them (Hill & Pillow, 2006), while
there is evidence that children as young as 3 years understand that there are direct and
indirect reciprocity norms and they expect others to abide by these norms in a sharing
game (Olson & Spelke, 2008). As such, 4-5 year-old children are expected to be able to
incorporate information about the recipient into their DGbehaviour and modulate their DG
donations according to the valence of the reputation of the recipient. It is therefore also
expected that children will implement an indirect reciprocity norm and donate more to
children who have previously exhibited positive behaviours than to those who have
behaved negatively.
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The present study also sought to establish whether 4-5 year old children were sensitive to
mere information possession. Given adults' extreme sensitivity to information possession in
the DG it seems likely that children will donate more to a recipient about whom they
possess positive information than a recipient about whom they possess no information.
However, there is little evidence to suggest how children will respond to negative
information. Children may give less than in anonymous conditions as the recipient is known
to be undeserving of reward, while the anonymous recipient may be deserving or
undeserving. Conversely, children may behave similarly to adults with possession of
negative information increasing donations compared to anonymous conditions (Servatka,
2010); this may be either because the child does not perceive the recipient to be
undeserving or because empathy is increased due to the reduction of anonymity. As such, a
measure of deservingness (which is cost-free to the child) will also be taken to distinguish
between these potential explanations.
Finally, the impact of gender and possession of older siblings upon potential reputation and
information possession effects will also be assessed. As boys donated less often than girls in
the Classic DG (see section 4.3.1.1) it seems likely that they will show a greater effect of
possession of information than girls; however, there is little evidence to suggest whether or
not boys and girls will be differentially influenced by the valence of the recipient's
reputation. Sibling status effects have only previously emerged under restricted conditions
(Le. with endowments of 4 but not 10 items) so an influence of sibling status is not
expected due to the use of endowments of 10 stickers" in the present study.
10 An endowment of 10 stickers was used in order to provide sufficient sensitivity to capture
differences according to possessionof information and deservingness.
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5.2 Methods
5.2.1 Participants
Seventy-five 4-5 year-old children (mean age 4:11; age range 4:0 to 5:5) participated in the
study. Children were recruited from schools in London and Belfast and were tested in a
quiet environment in their school setting by third year undergraduate project students. All
three students were trained before the onset of testing to deliver the study in the same
manner. At the time of consent parents completed a questionnaire detailing demographic
information such as their child's age, gender, the number and ages of the child's siblings
and the average time the child spends in childcare and extracurricular activities per week
(see Appendix 1 for the questionnaire). As in previous chapters, children were recruited on
the basis of sibling status to fall into the following groups: singletons (no siblings), firstborns
(only younger siblings) and lastborns (only older siblings). As in Chapter 4, the comparison
group was composed of the children who had received the 10 condition first in the classic
dictator game in Chapter 2 (Classic DG). See Table 5.1 for sample characteristics for each
group; see Table 5.2 for descriptive statistics in the Deservingness DG by sibling group ..
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics in the Deservingness DG and the Classic DG (standard deviations in
parentheses; ranges in italics)
Deservi ngness
Classic DG Group differences
DG
Total n 75 56
Gender/ female:male 40:35 28:28
Siblings
21:26:28 11:25:20(singletons:firstborns:lastborns)
58.66 59.41
Mean age/months (4.40) (6.00) U=1963.50, p=.53
48-65 49-72
29.46 30.02
Mean time spent with unrelated (23.48) (10.85) U=1469.50, p=.002
peers/hours per week
1.2.50-48.50 3.00-45.75
40.01 74.20
SES/percentile (23.48) (25.79) U=732.00, p<.OO1
22.1.9-71..1.0 1.2.09-99.53
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics in the deservingness DG across sibling groups (standard deviations in
parentheses; ranges in italics)
Singletons Firstborns Lastborns Group differences
Total n 21 26 28
Gender
(female:male) 13:8 13:13 14:14
Age/months
59.43 57.73 58.96
(3.54) (4.97) (4.43) H(2}=1.26, p=.53(mean)
51-64 48-65 50-65
Time spent with
H(2}=8.45, p=.02;
32.40 28.42 28.21 singletons> firstborns
unrelated peers (3.23) (7.24) (6.02) (U=164.50, p=.03),(mean
hours/week) 25.00-40.00 12.50-48.50 12.50-36.50 singletons> lastborns(U=369.50, p=.Ol)
43.25 37.50 39.92
SES (24.72) (22.85) (23.67) H(2}=0.28, p=.87(mean percentile)
22.19-71.10 22.19-71.10 22.19-71.10
5.2.2 Procedure
Children first took part in two iterations of the DG, in which they were given a description
of the recipient's behaviour before making their allocations. This was followed by a set of
maths tasks and two false belief measures of ToM.
5.2.2.1 DG
The experimenter began by describing an encounter with a child she had met the day
before. This fictional child was portrayed as real, of the same gender as the participant and
attending a school that the experimenter had visited the day before. Depending upon the
experimental condition, the fictional child had exhibited either responsible (Nice condition)
or disruptive (Naughty condition) behaviour (see Appendix 7 for the stories). Following the
description, as a measure of her understanding of the account, the participant was asked
whether she thought that the child in question was nice or naughty; this also served to
force the participant to make a conscious appraisal of the nice/naughty child's behaviour.
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The participant was then offered a selection of 30 stickers and asked to choose her
favourite. This sticker was put aside and she was asked to choose her favourite from the
remaining stickers; this process was repeated until 10 stickers had been chosen. The
stickers were arranged from most to least favourite on an array composed of a row of 10
slots and shown to the participant. The participant was then given the opportunity to give
some of her stickers to the child in the story, who had received none as the experimenter
had not had enough stickers with her for everyone. As in previous versions of the DG, the
child was instructed to place all of the stickers that she wished to keep in an envelope
bearing her name while the experimenter looked away; the remainder would be placed in
an envelope bearing the other child's name (Bill/Ted for boys and Beth/Jane for girls; the
condition with which the name was associated was counterbalanced). Both envelopes
contained a colouring picture so that no child received nothing, and also to reduce donation
through guilt-avoidance. It was emphasised that the procedure was anonymous, that the
child was not obliged to give any stickers away and that the decision was completely up to
her. Once the child had divided the stickers as she saw fit, the envelopes were sealed and
the envelope for the other child was posted into a box.
The experimenter then told the participant about a second child that she had encountered
in a different class the day before. This child exhibited the opposing behaviour to the first
child, i.e. was disruptive if the previous child had been responsible and vice versa. The order
in which the conditions were received was counterbalanced as far as possible acrossgender
and sibling status (seeAppendix 8). The participant was again asked to make an appraisal of
this child's behaviour, whether naughty or nice, before being offered a different selection
of 30 stickers from which to choose her favourite 10. As before, the participant was offered
the opportunity to give some of her stickers to the other child, who again had none.
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Once she had made her division and the envelope had been posted, the child was reminded
of her appraisals of the children from the stories and asked three further questions: who
she liked best, whether the Nice child should be allowed to go on an upcoming school trip
and whether the Naughty child should be allowed on the same school trip (the order of the
final two questions were counterbalanced across participants). Contrary to the DG, which
provides a measure of deservingness at a cost to the participant, the answers to these
questions provided a measure of the likeability and deservingness of the children in
question at no cost to the participant.
5.2.2.2 Maths tasks
As in previous chapters, once the iterations of the DGwere complete the child took part in
a set of tasks of mathematical understanding: the equal division task and the same/more
task. These tasks were identical to those presented in Chapter 2 (see section 2.2.2.2 for a
full description). As previously, scores were summed to give a composite maths score,
expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible score.
5.2.2.3 ToM tasks
Finally, once the maths tasks were complete, the child was given two measures of ToM
ability: the deceptive box task based on Gopnik and Astington's (1988) Smarties task, and a
pictorial adaptation of Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith's (1985) Sally/Anne task. These tasks
were identical to those presented in previous chapters (see section 2.2.2.3 for a full
description). As previously, scores were summed to give a composite ToM score, with a
maximum possible score of 2.
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5.3 Results
Cases where eight or more items are donated are often removed from the analyses [see
Frohlich et al., 2001). However, only one such case occurred in the present data; this case
was therefore retained. Data were examined for skewness and kurtosis. As data were not
normally distributed, non-parametric analyses were employed. An alpha level of .05 was
used for all statistical tests. In order to be conservative in the analyses, all tests were two-
tailed.
5.3.1 Deservingness effect
Data were first examined in terms of the overall donation profile ILe. the proportion of their
stickers donated by each child). This was then broken down into analyses of the decision to
donate (Le. donating nothing or donating one or more stickers) and positive donations (l.e.
the proportion of stickers donated by only those who chose to donate). See Table 5.3 for
mean donations; Figure 5.1 shows the distributions of donations. The modal offer was zero
in both treatments; when only positive donations were taken into account the modal offer
was four stickers for Nice, while the mode lay at four and five in the Naughty treatment.
Table 5.3: Mean proportion of endowment donated to Nice and to Naughty (standard deviations in
parentheses)
Deservingness DG: Deservingness DG:
Nice Naughty
29.60 21.73
Overall donation (21.84) (22.14)
Decision to donate:
proportion choosing to donate
73.33 42.67
40.36 37.91
Positive donations (14.53) (15.36)
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Figure 5.1: Donation distributions in the Nice and Naughty treatments
Data were first examined to ensure that the children were able to discriminate between the
behaviour of the nice child (hereafter Nice) and the naughty child (hereafter Naughty).
100% of children correctly identified Nice as nice and Naughty as naughty. When asked who
they liked best, a two-sided z-test showed that a significantly greater proportion of children
preferred Nice to Naughty (z=11.92, p<.OOl). In response to the question of whether each
child should be allowed to go on the school trip, a significantly greater proportion of
children thought that Nice should be allowed to go than thought Naughty should go
(z=11.59, p<.OOl). Indeed, only 2.67% of children answered that Naughty should be allowed
on the trip. As such, it appears that when there is no cost to the self the children were able
to appropriately modify their responses based upon the recipient's characteristics and
rated Nice as more deserving of reward than Naughty.
Data were subsequently examined in terms of the order in which the children received the
conditions, i.e. whether the child donated to Nice or Naughty first. Mann-Whitney analyses
revealed no difference in overall donations to Nice or Naughty (U=656.50, p=.73; U=677.00,
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p=.91, respectively) according to order. Similarly, chi-squares revealed no effect of order on
the proportion choosing to donate to Nice or Naughty (X2(1)=.06, p=1; X2(1)=.10, p=.82,
respectively), nor were there any differences in positive donations to Nice or Naughty
(U=319.00, p=.40; U=214.50, p=.74, respectively). Data were therefore collapsed across
order for subsequent analyses.
Analyses revealed a robust effect of deservingness upon children's donations in the DG.
Wilcoxon analyses showed that children donated significantly more overall to Nice than to
Naughty (z=-3.33, p=.001; see Figure 5.2). A McNemar test using binomial distribution
revealed a significant effect of deservingnesson the decision to donate (n=75, p=.01); 76%
of the children were consistent across conditions in their donation decision, either giving
nothing to both Nice and Naughty (22.67%) or making a donation to both (53.33%). Of
those who were inconsistent, 83.33% chose to donate to Nice but not Naughty, while only
16.67% donated to Naughty but not Nice (see Figure 5.3 for percentages of children
choosing to donate in each condition). Children also made larger positive donations to Nice
than to Naughty (Wilcoxon; z=-2.34, p=.02; see Figure 5.4).
When children made their sticker selections they were asked to choose their favourite each
time. The first five stickers chosen were therefore coded as their most preferred and the
final five their least preferred. The proportion of stickers donated that were most preferred
were then compared to the proportion of stickers donated that were least preferred for
each condition. Wilcoxon analyses revealed that children donated more of their least liked
stickers than their most liked stickers to both Nice (z=-3.69, p<.001) and Naughty (z=-4.39,
p<.001). When comparing across deservingness, children donated significantly more of
their most preferred stickers to Nice than Naughty and more of their least preferred
stickers to Naughty than Nice (z=-2.02, p=.04).
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Figure 5.2: Mean percentage donated overall in the Nice and Naughty treatments (error bars
represent standard error of the mean)
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Figure 5.3: Percentage of participants choosing to make a donation in the Nice and Naughty
treatments
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Figure 5.4: Mean positive donation in the Nice and Naughty treatments (error bars represent
standard error of the mean)
5.3.1.1 Gender
Data were analysed to assess the impact of gender upon donations in the Deservingness
DG. Mann-Whitney analyses revealed that while gender did not influence overall donations
to Nice (U=S71.00, p=.16), it had a significant influence on overall donations to Naughty
(U=S21.00, p=.OS), with boys donating more than girls (see Figure 5.S). Chi-squares showed
no effect of gender on decision to donate to Nice (X2(1)=O.03, p=l), although gender
influenced the decision to donate to Naughty (X2(1)=S.33, p=.04) with boys choosing to
donate more often than girls (see Figure 5.6). Gender had a significant effect on the positive
donations to Nice (U=260.50, p=.04), with boys donating more than girls; there was no
effect of gender on positive donations to Naughty (U=219.00, p=.89; see Figure 5.7).
In order to make a direct gender comparison of the extent to which children modulated
their donations according to deservingness, a difference score was calculated by
subtracting each child's donation to Naughty from their donation to Nice for overall
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donations, the decision to donate and positive donations. For positive donations, only
children who donated to both Nice and Naughty were included. A negative score therefore
represented a larger donation to Naughty than to Nice, a zero score represented no
difference in donations according to deservingness, while a positive score represented a
larger donation to Nice than to Naughty. No gender difference was observed in
deservingness modulation for overall donations (U=640.50, p=.52), the decision to donate
(X2(2}=O.36, p=.83) or positive donations (U=156.50, p=.28).
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Figure 5.5: Mean percentage donated overall in the Nice and Naughty treatments as a function of
gender (error bars represent standard error of the mean)
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Figure 5.6: Percentage of participants choosing to make a donation in the Nice and Naughty
treatments as a function of gender
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Figure 5.7: Mean positive donation in the Nice and Naughty treatments as a function of gender (error
bars represent standard error of the mean)
The impact of sticker preference according to gender was also assessed. When directly
comparing across boys and girls, there were no differences in the proportion of donations
that were most or least liked for either Nice (U=302.S0, p=.21) or Naughty (U=199.50,
p=.S3). When comparing the proportion of most and least preferred stickers donated for
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each gender individually, girls donated significantly more of their least preferred stickers to
both Nice (z=-3.37, p<.001) and Naughty (z=-3.08, p=.001). However, boys did not show a
significant effect of sticker preference when donating to Nice, giving only marginally more
of their least preferred stickers (z=-1.82, p=.07). Boys also donated significantly more of
their least preferred stickers to Naughty (z=·3.11, p=.001).
5.3.1.2 Sibling status
Given the lack of difference between singletons and firstborns in previous chapters, these
children were compared on all measures of donations to assess whether they could be
grouped together as children without older siblings. There were no differences for either
the Nice condition or the Naughty condition in overall donation profiles (U=230.50, p=.36;
U=225.50, p=.29, respectively) decision to donate (X2(1)=0.57, p=.51; X2(1)=1.63, p=.25,
respectively) or positive donations (U=140.50, p=.58; U=68.50, p=.87, respectively). These
groups were therefore combined and subsequent analyses were performed according to
whether or not children possessed older siblings.
There were no significant differences between sibling groups in donation behaviour in
either condition: there were no differences in overall donations to either Nice or Naughty
(U=623.50, p=.70; U=557.00, p=.25, respectively), the decision to donate to Nice or Naughty
(l(1)=O.69, p=.43; X2(1)=0.88, p=.47, respectively), or positive donations to Nice or Naughty
(U=319.00, p=.68; U=197.00, p=.49, respectively).
When modulation according to deservingness (difference scores) was compared to
according to possession of older siblings, the same null pattern emerged with no
differences in overall donations (U=570.00, p=.32), the decision to donate (X2(2)=1.95,
p=.38) or positive donations (U=169.0, p=.52).
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The impact of sticker preference was also assessed according to the possession of older
siblings. When directly comparing across possession of older siblings, there were no
differences in the proportion of donations that were most or least liked for either Nice
(U=314.50, p=.62) or Naughty (U=195.00, p=.46). When comparing the proportion of most
and least preferred stickers donated for each sibling group individually, children without
older siblings donated significantly more of their least preferred stickers to both Nice (z=-
3.29, p=.001) and Naughty (z=-3.72, p<.001). However, children with older siblings did not
show a significant effect of sticker preference when donating to Nice (z=-1.68, p=.09),
although they showed a trend towards giving more of their least preferred stickers;
children with older siblings also donated significantly more of their least preferred stickers
to Naughty (z=-2.32, p=.02).
5.3.1.3 Confounding variables
Table 5.5 shows descriptive statistics for maths and ToM ability by sibling status, For the
group as a whole the maths equal division and same/more tasks were found to be
significantly correlated (r.=.51, p<.001). For ToM, 68.00% of children were consistent in
their response on the deceptive box task and Sally/Anne task (see Table 5.4). Of those who
were inconsistent, children were equally likely to pass the Sally-Anne task (54.17%) as the
deceptive box task (45.83%; McNemar t p=.20).
Table 5.4: Consistency table showing the number oj children in the group as a whole passing and
jailing the two ToM tasks
Fail Sally- Pass Sally-
Anne Anne
Fail Deceptive box 32 13
Pass Deceptive
11 19box
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Table 5.5: Moths and ToM ability in the Deservingness DG across sibling groups (standard deviations
in parentheses; ranges in italics)
Singletons Firstborns Lastborns Group differences
Equal division 5.76 5.62 5.36
task (.77) (1.1O) (.99) H(2}=5.39, p=.07
(mean score/6) 3-6 2-6 3-6
VI
.:>£ 23.19 23.08 22.14VI
ro Same/more task...... (1.60) (2.18) (3.42) H(2)=3.00, p=.22VI
J::. (mean score/24)
...... 18-24 16-24 11-24ro
~
Composite 28.95 28.68 27.50
maths (2.18) (3.21) (3.89) H(2)=7.11, p=.03
(mean score/30) 21-30 19-30 15-30
Deceptive box
.48 .38 .36
task (.49) 1(2)=0.75, p=.73(pass rate) (.51) (.50)
VI
.:>£
VI Sally/Anne task .33 .38 .54ro
1(2)=2.79, p=.28......
~ (pass rate) (.48) (.50) (.51)
0
~ Composite ToM .81 .77 .89
score (.81) (.82) (.83) H(2)=2.27, p=.32
(mean score/2) 0-2 0-2 0-2
Correlations were conducted to examine whether any potential confounding variables
influenced donation behaviour (see Table 5.6). As there was a significant correlation
between the maths tasks and there was no significant difference between the frequency of
passing the two ToM tasks, composite scores were entered into the correlations rather
than individual scores. There was a significant relationship between SES and positive
donations to Nice (r5=.29, p=.03) and a marginal effect in the same direction towards
Naughty (r= .28, p=.07L with donations increasing as SESincreased. No other variables had a
significant influence upon donation behaviour (p>.05).
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Table 5.6: Relationships between potential predictor variables and donations to Nice, donations to
Naughty and difference scores
Overall donation profile Naughty
Difference score
Nice (Nice-Naughty)
Maths composite score rs=.12, p=.33 's=-.05, p=.68 rs=.l1, p=.37
Time with peers 's=-.07, p=.55 's=.04, p=.76 's=-.Ol, p=.94
SES 's=.06, p=.60 's=.04, p=.71 's=.03, p=.83
ToM composite score 's=.04, p=.76 's=-.04, p=.71 's=.08, p=.51
Decision to donate Nice Naughty
Difference score
(Nice-Naughty)
Maths composite score 'pb=.15, p=.20 'pb=.02, p=.85 's=.05, p=.68
Time with peers 'pb=.08, p=.48 'pb=.10, p=.41 's=.04, p=.76
SES 'Pb=-.l1, p=.33 'pb=-.03, p=.81 's=-.04, p=.75
ToM composite score 'Pb=.02, p=.87 'pb=-.02, p=.88 's=-.04, p=.71
Positive donations Naughty
Difference score
Nice (Nice-Naughty)
Maths composite score 's=.03, p=.84 r=-.09, p=.58 's=.09, p=.59
Time with peers 's=-.14, p=.30 r=-.06, p=.69 's=.04, p=.76
SES '5=.29, p=.03 r=.28, p=.07 's=.10, p=.56
ToM composite score 's=.04, p=.79 r=-.07, p=.66 's=-.04, p=.71
Given that the only correlation that reached significance in Table 5.6 was between positive
donations to Nice and SES,a simultaneous multiple regression was conducted in order to
establish whether SESmight be a confounding variable accounting for the gender effect
described earlier on the size of positive donations to Nice (see section 5.3.1.1; no other
regressions were conducted as no other significant relationships with potential predictor
variables were observed). As such, gender and SESwere entered as predictor variables,
with positive donations to Nice as the dependent variable. A significant model was not
produced (F2,52=2.04, tJR2=.07, p=.14) and neither variable emerged as a significant
predictor; coefficients are summarised in Table 5.7. The gender effect observed on the
positive donations to Nice may therefore be an artefact of an SESimbalance acrossthe girls
and boys. However, the absence of a significant correlation between SESand donations to
Naughty suggeststhat the gender effect observed in those conditions cannot be accounted
for by SES.
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Table 5.7: Summary of multiple regression analysis for variables predicting positive donations to Nice
(n=54)
B (SE) Significance 95% Cl for B
Constant 3.42
(O.39) <.001 2.64-4.20
Gender 0.55
(O.40) .18
-0.26-1.35
SES 0.01
-0.01-0.03
(O.Ol) .29
5.3.2 Possession of information
Data were compared to those from the Classic DG in order to examine how possession of
information about the recipient, whether positive or negative, influences donation
behaviour. Means and standard deviations for the Classic DG can be found in Table 4.2.
Figure 5.8 shows the distributions of donations in the Classic DG and the Deservingness DG.
Overall, possession of both positive and negative information increased donations as
children donated significantly less in the Classic DG than in both the Nice and Naughty
conditions (Mann-Whitney, U=1247.50, p<.OOl; U=1658.00, p=.03, respectively; see Figure
5.9). Chi-square analyses revealed that the decision to donate was also influenced by
possession of both positive and negative information (X2(1)=15.34, p<.OOl; X2(1)=4.18,
p=.OS, respectively; see Figure 5.10). Positive donations, however, were not influenced by
the possession of either positive or negative information (U=467.50, p=.l1; U=410.00,
p=.38, respectively).
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Figure 5.8: Donation distributions in the Nice, Naughty and Classic treatments
The influence of possession of information on the proportion of most or least preferred
stickers donated was also examined, with no difference in proportion donated according to
preference when possessing either positive or negative information (U=602.00, p=.98;
U=416.50, p=.43, respectively).
50
."
40
<II
-
~
c
0
""0 30
<II
~
-c I<IIuL- 20<II
a.
c:
~
<II
~ 10
0+----
Nice Naughty Classic
Figure 5.9: Mean percentage donated overall in the Nice, Naughty and Classic treatments (error bars
represent standard error of the mean)
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Figure 5.10: Percentage of participants choosing to make a donation in the Nice, Naughty and Classic
treatments
5.3.2.1 Gender
In order to assess whether gender influences the effect of information possession, analyses
were also conducted individually by gender examining the influence of possessing
information about the recipient (see Figures 5.11-13). Girls did not show a significant effect
of either positive information possession (overall: U=446.00, p=.lS; decision to donate:
l(1)=2.58, p=.13; positive donations: U=209.S0, p=.84), although there was a nonsignificant
trend towards girls donating more overall and choosing to donate more often to Nice than
in the Classic DG (see Figures S.11-12). Girls showed no effect of negative information
possession (overall: U=S28.50, p=.68; decision to donate: X2(1)=O.48, p=.62; positive
donations: U=118.50, p=.SS). Boys, however, showed a strong effect of positive information
possession, donating more overall (U=200.S0, p<.OOl), choosing to donate more often
(l(1)=lS.1S, p<.OOl) and making larger positive donations (U=43.00, p=.03) when
possessing positive information than when possessing no information in the Classic DG.
Boys were also influenced by possession of negative information, donating more overall
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(U=246.00, p<.OOl) and choosing to donate more often (X2(1)=13.42, p<.OOl) when
possessing negative information than when possessing no information in the Classic DG.
However, possession of negative information had no effect on positive donations (U=71.00,
p=.48).
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Figure 5.11: Mean percentage donated overall in the Nice, Naughty and Classic treatments as a
function of gender (error bars represent standard error of the mean)
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Figure 5.12: Percentage of participants choosing to make a donation in the Nice, Naughty and Classic
treatments as a function of gender
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Figure 5.13: Mean positive donation in the Nice, Naughty and Classic treatments as a function of
gender (error bars represent standard error of the mean)
In order to ascertain whether the difference in SES between the Classic DG and the
Deservingness DG is driving the significant effects observed above in boys, regressions were
conducted to establish whether these effects remained once the influence of SS was
controlled. In each case, 'Study' (i.e. Classic DG or Deservingness DG) and SESwere entered
as predictor variables. When overall donations to Nice were entered into a simultaneous
multiple regression as the dependent variable, a significant model was produced
(F2• 59=10.35, L1R2=.26, p<.OOl), with only Study emerging as a significant predictor: boys
made smaller overall donations in the Classic DG than to Nice in the Deservingness DG
(coefficients are summarised in Table 5.8).
Table 5.8: Summary of multiple regression analysis for variables predicting overall donations in boys
(Nice treatment; n=62)
B (SE) Significance 95% Cl for B
Constant 0.58
(0.99) .56 '1.40-2.57
Study 0.57
(Classic DG, Nice) (0.15) <.001 0.27-0.87
SES '0.004
(0.01) .74 '0.03-0.02
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When the decision to donate to Nice was entered into a logistic regression as the
dependent measure, Study significantly predicted donation decision with between 23% and
31% of the variance was accounted for by the model (X2(2)=16.46, p<.OOl); boys donated
less often in the Classic DG than to Nice in the Deservingness DG (coefficients are
summarised in Table 5.9).
Table 5.9: Summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting donation decision in boys
(Nice treatment; n=62j
8 (SE) Wald (df) Significance Exp b (95% Cl)
Constant 1.80 6.01 (1) .01 6.06
(0.74)
Study -1.78 7.91 (1) .01 1.69
(Classic DG, Nice) (0.63) (0.05-0.58)
SES -0.02 1.55 (1) .21 0.99
(0.01) (0.96-1.01)
When positive donations to Nice were entered into a simultaneous multiple regression as
the dependent variable, a significant model was not produced (F2•30=2.37, ~R2=.14,p=.l1),
with no variables emerging as significant predictors, although there was a trend towards
boys making smaller overall donations in the Classic DG than to Nice in the Deservingness
DG (coefficients are summarised in Table 5.10).
Table 5.10: Summary of multiple regression analysis for variables predicting positive donations in
boys (Nice treatment; n=33j
8 (Sf) Significance 95% Cl for 8
Constant 2.35
(0.88) .01 0.54-4.15
Study 0.29
(Classic DG, Nice) (0.15) .06 -0.01-0.59
SES 0.01
(0.01) .18 -0.01-0.04
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When overall donations to Naughty were entered into a simultaneous multiple regression
as the dependent variable, a significant model was produced (F2.59=6.58, LlR2=.18, p=.003),
with only Study emerging as a significant predictor: boys made smaller overall donations in
the ClassicDG than to Naughty in the DeservingnessDG (coefficients are summarised in
Table 5.11).
Table 5.11: Summary of multiple regression analysis for variables predicting overall donations in boys
(Naughty treatment; n=62)
B (SE) Significance 95%Cl for B
Constant 0.21
(0.94) .83 -1.68-2.09
Study 0.47
.002 0.19-0.75(ClassicDG,Naughty) (0.14)
SES 0.003
.77 -0.02-0.02(0.01)
When the decision to donate to Naughty was entered into a logistic regression as the
dependent measure, Study significantly predicted donation decision with between 19%and
26% of the variance accounted for by the model (X2(2)=13.24, p=.001); boys donated less
often in the Classic DG than to Naughty in the Deservingness DG (coefficients are
summarised in Table 5.12).
Table 5.12: Summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting donation decision in boys
(Naughty treatment; n=62)
B (SE) Wald (df) Significance Expb (95%Cl)
Constant 1.12 2.74(1) .10 3.07
(0.68)
Study -1.86 8.37 (1) .004 0.16
(ClassicDG,Naughty) (0.64) (0.04-0.55)
SES -0.004 0.13 (1) .71 1.00
(0.01) (0.97-1.02)
Thus, these findings confirm that even when SESis controlled, information possession
remains a significant influence on boys' overall donations and the decision to donate, while
the influence of SESdisappears.
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The influence of possession of information on the proportion of most or least preferred
stickers donated was also examined independently for gender. Compared to the ClassicDG,
girls did not show a significant difference in the proportion of most or least preferred
stickers donated when possessingeither positive or negative information (U=178.00, p=.38;
U=97.50, p=.17, respectively); this was also the case for boys (U=66.00, p=.27; U=74.00,
p=.55, respectively).
5.3.2.2 Sibling status
The possessionof information effect was also examined independently according to sibling
status (see Figures 5.14-5.16). Children without older siblings were found to give
significantly more overall when possessing positive information (U=427.00, p<.OOl) and
marginally more when possessing negative information (U=670.50, p=.08). Similarly, they
chose to donate significantly more often when in possession positive information
(X2(1)=15.65, p<.OOl) and marginally more often when in possession of negative
information (X2(1)=3.25,p=.08). Positive donations were not affected by either positive or
negative information (U=163.00, p=.19; U=142.50, p=.83, respectively). For children with
older siblings, there was no effect of possessionof positive information (overall donations:
U=207.50, p=.12; decision to donate X2(1)=1.56,p=.25; positive donations: U=72.50, p=.30)
or possession of negative information (overall donations: U=223.00, p=.22; decision to
donate: X2(1)=O.98,p=.38; positive donations: U=73.00, p=.42).
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Figure 5.14: Mean percentage donated overall in the Nice, Naughty and Classic treatments as a
function of sibling status (error bars represent standard error of the mean)
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Figure 5.15: Percentage of participants choosing to make a donation in the Nice, Naughty and Classic
treatments as a function of sibling status
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Figure 5.16: Mean positive donations in the Nice, Naughty and Classic treatments as a function of
sibling status (error bars represent standard error of the mean)
In order to ascertain whether the difference in SES between the Classic DG and the
Deservingness DG is driving the significant effects observed above in children without older
siblings, regressions were conducted to establish whether these effects remained once the
influence of SSwas controlled. In each case, 'Study' (i.e. Classic DG or Deservingness DG)
and SESwere entered as predictor variables. When overall donations to Nice were entered
into a simultaneous multiple regression as the dependent variable, a significant model was
produced (FV9=9.25, LlR2=.19, p<.OOl), with only Study emerging as a significant predictor:
children without older siblings made smaller overall donations in the Classic DG than to
Nice in the Deservingness DG (coefficients are summarised in Table 5.13).
Table 5.13: Summary of multiple regression analysis for variables predicting overall donations in
children without older siblings (Nice treatment; n=82)
B (SE) Significance 95% Cl for B
Constant 1.55
(0.83) .07 ·0.11-3.21
Study 0.38
(Classic DG, Nice) (0.13) .006 0.11-0.64
SES ·0.01
(0.01) .26 ·0.03-0.01
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When the decision to donate to Nice was entered into a logistic regression as the
dependent measure, Study significantly predicted donation decision between 20%and 27%
of the variance accounted for by the model (X2(2)=18.63, p<.OOl); boys donated less often
in the ClassicDG than to Nice in the DeservingnessDG, while there was a trend towards
children who donate having a higher SES(coefficients are summarised in Table 5.14).
Table 5.14: Summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting donation decision in
children without older siblings (Nice treatment; n=82)
8 (SE) Wald (df) Significance Expb (95%Cl)
Constant 1.96 11.99 (1) .001 7.13
(0.57)
Study -1.31 5.41 (1) .02 0.27
(ClassicDG,Nice) (0.56) (0.09-0.81)
SES -0.02 3.43 (1) .06 0.99
(0.01) (0.96-1.00)
Thus, these findings confirm that even when SESis controlled, information possession
remains a significant influence on the overall donations and the decision to donate of
children without older siblings. The influence of SESdisappeared in overall donations, while
a trend remained with the decision to donate, with higher SESchildren donating more
often.
The influence of possessionof information on the proportion of most or least preferred
stickers donated was also examined independently for sibling status. Compared to the
Classic DG, children without older siblings did not show a significant difference in the
proportion of most or least preferred stickers donated when possessingeither positive or
negative information (U=209.00, p=.87; U=123.50, p=.39, respectively); this was also the
casefor children with older siblings (U=89.00, p=.79; U=86.00,p=.86, respectively).
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5.3.3 Summary of results
All children could discriminate between Nice and Naughty and when there was no personal
cost the majority of children thought that Nice was more deserving of reward than
Naughty. This was reflected in DGdonations, with children demonstrating a robust effect of
deservingness. Children donated more overall, chose to donate more often, and made
larger positive donations to Nice than to Naughty. When examined by gender, there were
no differences in donations to Nice for overall donations and the decision to donate, but
boys made larger positive donations than girls. This effect did not remain significant once
SESwas controlled. Boysdonated more overall and chose to donate more often to Naughty
than did girls, but there were no differences in positive donations. However, gender did not
influence modulation of donations according to deservingness as assessedby a difference
score between donations to Nice and Naughty. Sibling status did not influence donation
behaviour to either Nice or Naughty or modulation of donations according to
deservingness. SESwas positively correlated with positive donations to Nice, although this
did not remain significant once the effect of gender was controlled. No other potential
predictor variables influenced donations to either Nice or Naughty or the modulation of
donations according to deservingness. Children consistently donated more of their least
preferred stickers to both Nice and Naughty, although this effect did not quite reach
significance for both boys and children with older siblingswhen donating to Nice.
When data were compared to the Classic DG to examine the influence of possessing
information about the recipient, both overall donations and the frequency of donations
were increased by possession of information, whether positive or negative. Positive
donations were not influenced by possession of positive or negative information.
Furthermore, girls and boys showed different effects of information possession. Girls'
donations were not significantly influenced by the possessionof either positive or negative
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information about the recipient, although there was a nonsignificant trend towards girls
donating more overall and choosing to donate more often when possessing positive
information. Boys' overall donations and frequency of donation were increased by the
possession of both positive and negative information, although only positive information
increased the size of boys' positive donations. The effects of information possessionupon
boys' overall donations to both Nice and Naughty and upon the decision to donate to both
Nice and Naughty remained when SESwas controlled, but the influence of positive
information possession upon positive donations did not remain once SESwas controlled.
Different effects of possession of information were also observed according to sibling
status. Children without older siblings gave more overall and chose to donate more often
when possessingboth positive and negative information, although the effects did not quite
reach significance for negative information (positive donations were not affected); this
effect of positive information on overall donations and the decision to donate remained
even when SESwas controlled. The donations of children with older siblings, however, did
not differ from those in the Classic DG when possessing either positive or negative
information. Possessionof information did not influence the proportion of most preferred
stickers donated for the group asa whole, or according to gender or sibling status.
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5.4 Discussion
The current study examined how 4-5 year-olds' DGdonations are influenced by information
about recipients' reputations. It has demonstrated that young children are able to factor in
the valence of reputation information when dividing their endowments, donating more to a
'nice' child than to a 'naughty' child. Children are also influenced by the possession of
information, donating more to both Nice and Naughty than in the ClassicDG.While boys
appeared to be more influenced by the possession of information (both positive and
negative) than girls, and children without older siblings were more influenced by the
possession of positive information than those with older siblings, other confounding
variables had little effect upon donations.
5.4.1 Reputation
Consistent with our prediction, children's donations were influenced by the reputation of
the recipient. A robust effect of deservingnesswas observed, with children donating more
to Nice than to Naughty acrossall measures. Positive and negative recipient attributes have
not previously been directly compared with the DG in either children or adults, but this
finding is consistent with the fact that adults donate more to more worthy recipients (Eckel
& Grossman, 1996) and less to lessworthy recipients (Fong, 2007; Fong & Luttmer, 2010;
Fong & Oberholzer-Gee, 2011). Children are not just aware of the norm of reciprocity
(Olson & Spelke, 2008): the present study has demonstrated that they are also able to use
reputational information to inform their own indirect reciprocity. While children favour
Nice with a larger proportion of their most preferred stickers than that given to Naughty,
they nonetheless seem to be strategic in their implementation of the reciprocity norm,
minimising the impact to themselves by consistently donating a greater proportion of their
least preferred stickers than most preferred stickers to both Nice and Naughty, irrespective
of gender or sibling status.
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When there was no personal cost the majority of children thought that Nice was more
deserving of reward than Naughty. When it is down to the child to provide the reward (and
this is costly to the child) a larger proportion of children would be expected to behave
selfishly to Nice, especially under conditions of anonymity. This was confirmed, with 3% of
children stating that Nice should not go on the school trip but 26% choosing not to donate.
It is interesting therefore that while 97% of children stated that Naughty should not be
allowed to go on a school trip, only 57%of children implemented this by not allocating any
stickers. There are two potential explanations for this pattern of results. The children may
have exhibited a social desirability bias in their assessmentof whether the recipient should
be allowed to go on the school trip, as they gave a verbal judgement to the experimenter.
Children may have felt that the experimenter expected them to reward Nice and punish
Naughty, but when they were no longer observed children felt freer to indulge in
selfishness to Nice and generosity to Naughty. Alternatively children may have an altruistic
self impression, in which they perceive themselves to be generous individuals (Dana et al.,
2007; Murnighan et al., 2001). Framing, Nasby and McManus (1998) found allocations of
tokens in a DG-like task to be positively related to a prosocial self-schema in 10-13 year-
olds. If this is also the case in young children, they may have found that contradicting their
self-image with selfish behaviour may have been more costly (in terms of guilt) than to give
up stickers to Naughty, especially if empathy has been activated by describing the recipient.
Possessionof older siblings did not influence donation behaviour to either Nice or Naughty,
nor did it affect deservingnessmodulation. This is not unexpected, given the null results of
sibling status in previous chapters utilising 10 stickers (see Chapters 2 and 4) and supports
the suggestion in Chapter 4 that the sibling effect is delicate and is readily influenced by the
context of the experiment. It appears that other social norms such as legitimacy in Chapter
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4 and reciprocity in the current study override the basic sharing norm that is internalised
through possessionof older siblings.
When the data were examined according to gender, a differential pattern of results
emerged. Boysdonated more overall and chose to donate more often to Naughty than did
girls. Figures5.6 and 5.7 show how girls were lessgenerous to Naughty: they appear to take
negative information into account more than boys when they are deciding to donate, but
there are no differences in positive donations once that decision has been made. When
donating to Nice, only positive donations are influenced by gender, with boys appearing
more generous than girls; however, when SESis controlled this difference disappears - it
appears positive donations do not differ according to gender. As such, it appears that
gender differences arise through boys' greater propensity to donate to Naughty: asa group
boys seem to discriminate according to valence to a lesser degree than do girls, although
within subject analysis with deservingness modulation scores reveal that this difference is
not significant.
Confounding variables had little influence upon donations in the DeservingnessDG. As in
previous chapters, maths ability had no effect upon DG donations irrespective of the
recipient, once again confirming that performance in the DG is independent of
mathematical ability. A relationship was also not found between ToM ability and behaviour
in the Deservingness DG, consistent with the ClassicDG group and previous studies with
young children (e.g. Lucaset al., 2008). ToM appears to be influential only under conditions
of complete anonymity. This is consistent with Froming et al.'s (1985) suggestion that
children with high ToM have a better understanding of anonymity, which is reduced by the
current study and the increase in empathy brought about by describing the recipient. Time
spent with peers was also unrelated to donation behaviour in the Deservingness DG. The
204
fact that neither time spent with peers nor sibling status influenced donations leads to two
possible conclusions: either peers and siblings have no influence upon the acquisition and
internalisation of the reciprocity norm at work in the present study, or they were previously
influential but internalisation is already complete at this young age so different levels of
experience with these groups is no longer reflected in DG behaviour. Due to their
importance in social development (Downey & Condron, 2004; Kitzmann et al., 2002; Sawyer
et al., 2002) replication of the study with younger children might be expected to reveal that
peers and siblings influence the acquisition of the reciprocity norm; should this not be the
case it may be that the norm is actively taught by parents rather than passively acquired
through observation and modelling.
The only confounding variable to show a relationship with behaviour in the Deservingness
DGwas SES:positive donations to Nice increased asSESincreased, with a trend in the same
direction for donations to Naughty. This effect is in the opposite direction to significant SES
effects observed in previous chapters (see sections 2.4.2, 3.4.3 and 4.4.2) and several
studies with adults (Carpenter et al., 2005; Kamedaet al., 2005; Piff, Kraus,Cote, Cheng,&
Keltner, 2010). Evans (2004) and Piff et al. (2010) argue that low SESpeople have less
experience of norms of reciprocity; this may lead to high SESchildren showing greater
reciprocation and thus donating more in the present study. However, this effect is clearly
weak as the regression showed that SESfailed to significantly predict positive donations to
Nice.
5.4.2 Possessionof information
Data from the DeservingnessDGwere compared to those from the ClassicDGto examine
the influence of possessionof information about the recipient upon donation behaviour.
Both overall donations and the frequency of donations were increased by possession of
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information, whether positive or negative. Positive donations, however, were not
influenced by possession of either positive or negative information. Consistent with
Servatka's (2010) finding that adults give more when they know about the recipient's
previous behaviour even when they know that another person was selfish, this finding that
both positive and negative information can increase DGdonations suggeststhat reputation
and reciprocity are not solely responsible for the influence of information about the
recipient. Children's responsesto the question of whether the recipients should be allowed
to go on the school trip demonstrated that they clearly perceived Nice to be deserving and
Naughty to be undeserving, suggesting that describing the recipient increases the salience
of the recipient in the donation decision and so activates an empathic response, leading to
increased donations in comparison to the anonymous conditions of the Classic DG. This
empathic response may be in the form of empathic concern, as in adults in Chapter 3.
However, this only assumes that possessing information about the recipient elicits an
empathic response in these young children. Strayer and Roberts (2004) assessed5-year-
olds' responsive empathy on the Empathy Continuum, in which the level of a child's shared
affect in response to a number of vignettes is assessed (Strayer, 1993). This, when
combined with parent and teacher reports of empathy, was positively correlated with
children's prosocial behaviour. As such, children who have greater empathic ability may be
more susceptible to the influence of provision of information in the DG and therefore
donate more. Nonetheless, in order to confirm this assumption of an empathic response it
would be necessary to question children about their responses to the recipient and
examine how these relate to DGbehaviour. Furthermore, it would be informative to take a
within subjects measure of the increase in donations caused by the possession of
information and correlate this with trait empathy. Should the influence of possession of
information be driven by an empathic response, a positive correlation between these
measures should be observed. Moreover, giving to a recipient with negative characteristics
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is likely to be less motivated by reciprocity than giving to a recipient with positive
characteristics. If this is the case a stronger relationship may emerge between empathy and
negative information possession than with positive information possession.
Table 5.1 shows a significant difference in SESbetween the Classic and Deservingness DGs,
which could potentially confound the possession of information analyses. However, the
only significant correlations between SESand donation behaviour in the Classic DG or the
Deservingness DG occur with positive donations (with a significant positive correlation with
Nice and a trend in the same direction with Naughty). The correlation between SES and
positive donations in the Classic DG is not significant but is of the same valence, suggesting
that the difference in SES between the two studies cannot be solely responsible for the
difference in donations between the two studies. Indeed, as SES is lower in the
Deservingness DG, one would expect children to donate less in this study if SESwere driving
results. This is not the case, as children make slightly larger positive donations, a difference
that becomes significant for donations to Nice once SESand gender are controlled. One can
be confident, therefore, that the observed differences between the two studies are not due
to SES,but rather to the increase in empathy elicited by describing the characteristics of the
recipient.
Once again, different effects of information possession upon donation behaviour emerged
when data were examined by gender. Girls showed little influence of simple possession of
information: they were more generous than boys in the Classic DG, and so showed a
smaller increase in donations in the Deservingness DG. As discussed above, this is not due
to a lack of discrimination between Nice and Naughty. Examination of Figures 5.11 and 5.12
reveals that girls' Classic DG donations lie between those to Nice and Naughty - while this
difference is not significant, girls seem to be 'punishing' Naughty by choosing to donate less
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often than girls who have no information. It appears that girls incorporate the valence of
the characteristics of the recipient into their donation decisions. Conversely, boys are
influenced by information possession,donating more overall and choosing to donate more
often when they possess both positive and negative information (an effect that remains
even when the influence of SESis controlled), supporting the idea that when donating they
do not discriminate between Nice and Naughty to the same extent as girls. This possession
of information effect appears to be driven by boys' low incidence of donation in the Classic
DG(see Figure 5.12).
Positive donations to Naughty did not significantly differ from those in the ClassicDG for
either boys or girls. While boys (but not girls) initially appeared to make significantly larger
positive donations to Nice than in the ClassicDG,this different pattern is most likely driven
by differences in SESas this effect did not remain significant once SESwas controlled. In
Chapter 2 it was suggested that the decision to donate reflects adherence to social norms
while positive donations reflect altruistic intentions. Should this be the case, it would
suggest that it is not altruism that is influenced by possessionof information, but the social
norm of reciprocity. This would suggest that, should an empathic response be involved,
empathy is activating an awarenessof social expectations rather than altruism.
While children, particularly boys, are influenced by the mere possession of information
about the recipient, they also implement indirect reciprocity by modulating their allocations
according to the deservingness of the recipient. Girls appear to be slightly more
sophisticated in this process as they made a small, nonsignificant, reduction in their
donations to Naughty as well as increasing those to Nice, while boys increase their
donations across the board. It is possible that this reflects differing developmental
trajectories, with boys slightly behind girls at this young age. If so, boys' behaviour would
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be expected to more closely resemble that of girls as they get older, especially given that
boys do not normally display greater generosity than girls (Benenson et al., 2007;
Gummerum et al., 2008; Gummerum et al., 2010; Harbaugh et al., 2003; Lucaset al., 2008)
nor do men normally display greater generosity than women (Bolton & Katok, 1995; Eckel&
Grossman, 1998; Kamaset al., 2008). Studies in adults rarely examine gender differences,
so it remains unclear whether adult women discriminate more across the characteristics of
the recipient and whether men are more sensitive to the possessionof information. Indeed,
the few studies that have examined gender effects in adults when recipient information is
manipulated have found differing effects. Ben-Ner and Kramer (in press) found no gender
effect on DGgiving, regardless of the social distance between donor and recipient. Ben-Ner,
Putterman et al. (2004), on the other hand, found that women reciprocated more than men
in the DGafter having observed the actions of a third (uninvolved) party. Further study of
gender differences in reciprocity in adults is required to determine whether the gender
differences observed in the present study represent a permanent difference or whether
boys are simply not as advanced as girls in implementing a reciprocity norm at this young
age.
The influence of possession of information also showed a different pattern according to
sibling status (see Figures 5.14-5.16). Children without older siblings showed an increase in
overall donations and the decision to donate when possessing positive and negative
information even when SESwas controlled (although the effect of negative information did
not quite reach significance), with no effect of positive or negative information possession
on the size of positive donations. Children with older siblings, however, did not show any
effect of the possessionof information. Similar to the difference between boys and girls
observed above, this appears to be due to children without older siblings having a slightly
lower incidence of sharing in the Classic DG. Children with older siblings, like girls, were
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slightly more generous to start with and so have not increased their donation behaviour to
such a great extent when given information about the recipient. This finding is consistent
with the suggestion above that the sibling effect is delicate and is overridden by the
reciprocity norm that is likely to be activated in the present study.
In the current study it was necessary to give the recipient a name, both for the purpose of
believability and in order to make a clear distinction between the two recipients when
questioning the child. Donor/recipient genders were therefore kept congruent in order to
minimise potential recipient gender effects. Children may have donated less to a recipient
of the opposite sex as children are often reluctant to interact with children of the opposite
sex at this young age (Maccoby, 1988), an effect that may extend to prosocial behaviour.
Indeed, Hay et al. (1999) found that the sharing behaviour of 3-year-olds was influenced by
the gender of the recipient, with girls being less likely to share toys with boys than with
girls. Boys, on the other hand, shared equally with girls and boys. Similarly, Ben-Ner, Kong
et al. (2004) found that adult women were influenced by recipient gender (men are not),
although they found that women donated less to other women. Dufwenberg and Muren
(2006), on the other hand, found that both women and men donated more to women. As is
often the case with gender effects, findings are unclear and dependent upon the measure
in question, but it would be interesting to explore the influence of recipient gender in
young children to ascertain how it influences DGbehaviour.
While children in the present study were not explicitly instructed to reciprocate, the
positive/negative character of the recipient was emphasised when the child made her
donation decision (as the aim was to assesswhether the child was capable of incorporating
this information rather than whether she did so spontaneously). Future work should
therefore examine whether character valence is a salient factor in children's altruistic
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decision-making when it has not been highlighted to the child. It is possible that less clear-
cut differences in donation behaviour would arise with spontaneous assessment and
incorporation of personal characteristics. Furthermore, this should not only be compared to
the Classic DG, where no information is provided, but also to donation behaviour when
neutral information is provided, further clarifying the contribution of character valence
independently of information possession.
Similar to studies with adults examining the influence of recipient characteristics upon DG
donations, decisions in the present study were based on one instance of good or bad
behaviour (although there were multiple examples within that one instance). In reality it is
unlikely (although not impossible) that a person would be faced with such limited
information and children are known to understand that one isolated incident does not
necessarily reflect a permanent personality feature (Heyman & Gelman, 1998). Children in
the present study may have taken this into account when making their donations to
Naughty and donated due to an assumption that Naughty does not always behave in such a
manner. It would be informative, therefore, to look at the influence of a reputation
developed over a longer period of time, as it is possible that lessaltruism to Naughty would
be found if Naughty were demonstrated to be consistently badly behaved. An alternative
approach would be to examine the influence of a reputation based on a behaviour such as
sharing toys with a classmate. Rather than demonstrating a general trait, this would be
more closely related to the DG and may produce stronger reciprocity and therefore less
altruism to a selfish child. Additionally, it would be interesting to see how children balance
contradicting valences of the same type of personality traits (e.g. sometimes naughty,
sometimes nice) or contradicting valences of different types of personality traits (e.g.
naughty but also honest). Would the effects of these opposing traits cancel one another
out? Are some traits valued more highly than others? Do some traits override others, so
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that a positive trait is ignored due to the presence of a negative trait? Or does simply
increasing the amount of information provided, regardless of valence, increase donations?
Further work with both children and adults can answer these questions.
A direct comparison between children's behaviour in the present study and comparable
behaviour of adults would also be valuable. While children are likely to be aware that one
instance of good or bad behaviour is not necessarily indicative of a permanent character
trait, as discussed above, they may nonetheless generalise to a greater extent than do
adults and therefore show a greater difference in donations between Nice and Naughty. On
the other hand, adults may be more punitive and show a greater deservingnesseffect than
children. Studies of altruistic punishment have shown that adults are prepared to sacrifice
their own outcome to punished norm violations, in examples of both direct (e.g. UG; see
Camerer, 2003) and indirect reciprocity (e.g. third party altruistic punishment; see Fehr &
Fischbacher, 2004), but whether adults or children do so in response to personality
characteristics is yet to be explored.
In sum, the present study is the first to add context to the dictator game with children by
examining the impact of recipients' characteristics upon DGdonations. It hasdemonstrated
that young children are sensitive to the mere provision of information about the recipient.
Furthermore, children appear to implement a norm of indirect reciprocity in their DG
donations and are able to modulate this reciprocity according to the nature of the
recipient's previous behaviour. As such, this study has provided evidence that young
children's altruistic behaviour, like that of adults, is both sophisticated and systematic.
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Chapter 6: General discussion
6.1 Summary of findings
This thesis sought to examine the influence of demographic, methodological and
descriptive factors upon a behavioural measure of altruism in preschool children: the
dictator game. Chapter 2 demonstrated that under conditions of scarcity, 4-5 year-old
children possessingolder siblings are more likely to donate in the DG than those without
older siblings. While SES, ToM and gender also independently influenced children's
behaviour, DG behaviour was not influenced by time spent with genetically unrelated
peers, mathematical ability and endowment size. Chapter 3 demonstrated that differences
in altruistic behaviour according to sibling status can arise in adults' DGperformance under
conditions of scarcity. This difference held even when individual differences in empathy
were controlled. This chapter built on the findings of Chapter 2, demonstrating that the
influence of sibling status appeared to change over time with the possession of older
siblings benefiting children while the possessionof siblings in general (Le. older or younger)
benefited adults. There was no effect of gender, nor did SES and time spent with others
influence adults' behaviour, possibly due to a lack of sensitivity in the questionnaire
measures used to assessthese factors. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the methodological
influence of earning the endowment had little effect on DG behaviour at a young age,
although some children (children with older siblings and girls) appeared to be beginning to
modulate their donations in line with a legitimacy norm. Other social factors (SES and time
spent with peers) also appeared to increase the implementation of the legitimacy norm.
Chapter 5 examined descriptive influences upon children's DG behaviour, finding that
young children are sensitive to the mere provision of information about the recipient,
particularly boys and children without older Siblings, mainly because these children were
less generous when no information was provided. Children also appeared to implement a
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norm of indirect reciprocity in their DGdonations and modulated this reciprocity to some
degree according to the valence of the recipient's previous behaviour. Other factors
appeared to have little influence in indirect reciprocity. The remainder of this chapter will
discuss how these findings relate to one another and how they inform our understanding of
altruism.
6.2 The influence of siblings upon altruistic behaviour in the DG
Under conditions of scarcity (i.e., using a reduced endowment of 4 stickers), a clear effect
of sibling status was demonstrated in preschool children in the DG,with possessionof older
siblings appearing to facilitate internalisation of a sharing norm. This influence shifted
slightly in adults, with the possessionof siblings in general providing an advantage. The fact
that some singletons made donations (albeit rarely) demonstrates that the sibling effect is a
facilitation of norm internalisation rather than the direct cause. Numerous other factors
that were not explored in this thesis may be responsible for acquisition of a sharing norm,
including parental influences and of course individual altruistic propensity. Time spent with
peers is unlikely to be responsible given the null findings in Chapters 2 and 3, although the
measure used in this thesis may have lacked sensitivity so confirmation of this finding is
necessary.
It appears that the influence of siblings is greatest under conditions of complete anonymity
and with a windfall endowment, as when other variables were introduced to the DG (Le.
earning the endowment and reducing anonymity of the recipient) the influence of sibling
status was greatly reduced. Indeed, Chapters 4 and 5 made use of an endowment of 10
stickers, which did not show a significant sibling effect in Chapter 2 (although there was a
trend in the same direction); as such, a significant sibling effect would not be expected. In
Chapter 4, there was little effect of earning the endowment for the group as a whole.
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However, children with older siblings made smaller positive donations in the earning
treatment than those without and there was a trend towards children with older siblings
showing an earning effect in their positive donations. These findings imply that at 4-5 years
of age, children with older siblings are beginning to learn a legitimacy norm but children
without older siblings are not. In Chapter 5, when children were asked to donate to a
recipient who had previously exhibited positive or negative behaviour, children without
older siblings raised their donations in line with children with older siblings. Together these
findings suggest that a deservingness norm is acquired and internalised sooner than a
legitimacy norm, which is just beginning to emerge at this young age when facilitated by
possessionof older siblings. However, a wider range of agesneeds to be studied to confirm
this, ideally through longitudinal study. Should these suggestions be upheld, the small
effect of possessionof older siblings upon the legitimacy norm should shift to possessionof
siblings in general in older children, or possibly would disappear entirely given that children
who spent more time with peers also donated less. Should the possession of siblings (in
general, or the possessionof older siblings) also influence internalisation of a deservingness
norm, examination of a younger age group should reveal sibling status-driven differences in
implementation of the deservingness norm as it emerges.
Exactly how siblings facilitate the internalisation of norms cannot be determined by this
thesis, but the data do allow speculation. As discussed in section 3.4.4, the combined data
from Chapters 2 and 3 are inconsistent with several mechanisms described in Table 3.1:
differences in parental investment, dominance hierarchy effects, nice partitioning and
deidentification (see Schachter et al., 1976; Sulloway, 2001, 2007). However, data were
consistent with several mechanisms: birth order stereotypes (see Herrera et al., 2003;
Mancillas, 2006), teaching and modelling (see Brody, 2004; Whiteman & Christiansen,
2008); these mechanisms are also consistent with the results from Chapter 2. While the
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stereotype mechanism could not be ruled out on the basis of these findings, this may be
because stereotypes reflect real-world differences rather than that they drive behaviour. It
seems likely that rather than one mechanism exclusively driving differences in altruistic
behaviour, these mechanisms interact. It is possible that the mechanism at play depends
upon an individual child's relationship with their sibling (Whiteman et al., 2007a, 2007b).
Alternatively, age may be a factor, with teaching and modelling becoming less necessaryas
the child grows up, while stereotypes may be increasingly influential as the child becomes
more aware of them. It is concluded, therefore, that on the basisof this data a combination
of teaching, modelling and stereotypes could drive the influence of siblings upon altruistic
behaviour. Examination of data from Chapters 4 and 5 allows it to be possible to further
discern between these possibilities, with different mechanisms potentially at play
depending upon the norm in question.
The lack of a difference between firstborns and singletons in Chapters 4 and 5 and the lack
of sibling effect in the implementation of a deservingness norm is inconsistent with the
stereotype mechanism, which predicts that singletons are more selfish. It may be that the
activation of legitimacy and deservingness norms is sufficient to override this mechanism;
however, this seems unlikely given that the stereotype exists due to real-world behaviour in
which multiple norms are likely to be at play. It seems reasonable, therefore, to discount
stereotypes as influences upon altruistic behaviour when deservingness and legitimacy
norms are activated.
It seems likely that teaching is a more rapid process than modelling, as teaching does not
require the child to extrapolate the correct behaviour but instead directly imparts it. As
such, teaching may enable a child to learn a norm in as little asone instance, while multiple
observations are possibly necessary for modelling. The lack of a sibling effect in the
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acquisition of a deservingness norm is consistent with it being directly taught to the child,
hence its earlier internalisation. The legitimacy norm, on the other hand, may be acquired
implicitly thorough modelling rather than being directly taught, leading children with older
siblings to begin to internalise it sooner than children without older siblings due to their
likelihood of increased exposure to the norm. This is not quite consistent with the
prediction in Table 3.1 as the norm is only just emerging, but should this be the case then it
should be acquired by firstborns before later being acquired by singletons. However,
spending more time with peers at school should also facilitate internalisation of the
legitimacy norm, so this difference may never appear in older children. It should be noted,
however, that children may simply be quicker to acquire norms that pertain to others (i.e.
recipient deservingness) rather than themselves (i.e. source of the endowment) as not
adhering to a norm that affects someone else haswider repercussions than not adhering to
a norm that influences only oneself.
It should be noted that Dunn (2006) suggests that it is crucial to take the quality of the
sibling relationship into account when examining sibling influences. Asmentioned in section
2.1.3, children experience a mixture of positive and negative emotions with regard to their
siblings, with some relationships being characterised by hostility, others by empathy and
yet others by ambivalence. Those who had experienced cooperation from their siblings
were more likely to be cooperative themselves (Dunn & Munn, 1986) and it would have
been interesting to explore whether this reciprocity extends to altruism beyond the sibling
relationship. It was beyond the scope of the current study to examine the nature of the
children's relationships with their siblings, as this would ideally involve observation of
sibling interactions. This would have greatly informed how possessing siblings increases
altruistic behaviour and future research should seek to explore how the quality of the
sibling relationship influences prosocial development.
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6.3 The influence of gender upon altruistic behaviour in the DG
There was little direct effect of gender throughout the chapters. In Chapter 2, girls did
donate a larger proportion of their least favourite stickers in the 4 condition than did boys,
suggesting that girls were more strategic. There was also a trend for girls to donate more
often than boys in the 10 condition (which emerged as significant in the Classic DG
analyses) that suggested girls made more token donations than boys due to a more
sophisticated understanding of the nuances of altruism. The lack of any effect of gender in
adults may suggest that this is a temporary state of affairs and boys catch up to girls with
age, but given that there was no way to assesswhether adults were strategic as all of the
coins in their endowment would have the same value to the participant, there is no direct
evidence to support this.
Evidence from Chapters 4 and 5 also indicates that girls have a slightly more advanced
understanding of the norms that drive behaviour in these DGmanipulations. No effect of
gender emerged in Chapter 4 when the endowment was earned, when it would arguably be
more beneficial to the child to exploit this understanding and be strategic in their donations
or make token donations. However, this may reflect the beginnings of earning-based
modulation in girls, who are dropping their donations in line with the slightly lessgenerous
boys. The pattern of results according to gender in Chapter 5 were at first glance surprising
- there were no gender difference in donations to Nice but boys donated more often to
Naughty than did girls. As previously discussed(seesections 1.3.1.1 and 5.4.2) when gender
effects are found, girls/women tend to be more generous than boys/men (e.g. Eckel &
Grossman, 1998; Kamas et al., 2008; Gummerum et al., 2010; Gummerum et al., 2008;
Harbaugh et al., 2003). While it is possible that this effect is spurious, an alternative
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explanation is that this finding is due to the young age at which assessment has taken place
- if boys are slightly behind girls in their internalisation of the deservingness norm, they
may not yet discriminate as well according to the valence of the recipient's behaviour and
so give more to Naughty than girls. This would suggest that gender differences would
disappear as boys learn to discriminate according to valence. Alternatively, boys may not
see Naughty's behaviour as worthy of punishment, although their cost-free assessment of
the recipients would suggest otherwise.
It is possible that the lack of an effect of gender is due to a lack of power. On the basis of
Gummerum et al (2010), who found a significant gender effect (with an effect size of effect
size of .54 and power of .64) we can estimate after a power analysis that 76 participants were
needed (38 for each gender) to find a reliable effect. In Chapter 3 a gender effect was not
found with 78 participants and given the complete lack of even a trend, power is unlikely to be
an issue here. In Chapter 4 a gender effect was also lacking, and 56 participants were tested in
this study. While this number is a little low, there was once again not even a trend that might
be pushed into significance with greater power. As such, it appears that the lack of a gender
effect in these chapters is not due to a lack of power.
It would have been interesting to have examined whether the influence of siblings was
influenced by gender. There was insufficient power in the present study to perform such a
fine-grained analysis, but it has been suggested that girls are socialised to be more prosocial
than boys (Cialdini et al., 1981; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Maccoby, 1988), and given that the
sibling effect is presumably driven by socialisation with siblings it is possible that girls would
show a stronger sibling effect than boys. Indeed, were this to be the case it may help to
explain the heterogeneity in findings according to gender in previous literature (see section
1.3.1.1): it is possible that imbalances in sibling status across gender groups may confound
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findings, in some casespushing a gender effect into significance and in others masking it. In
order to confirm this it would be necessaryfor DGstudies examining gender differences to
also collect sibling status information; this may lead to more stability in gender findings
across the literature.
6.4 Other influences on altruistic behaviour in the DG
The variable that, aside from sibling status and gender, most often influenced DGbehaviour
was SES.In Chapters 2-4 negative relationships were observed, with participants showing
lessaltruistic behaviour asSESincreased. It appears that possessinga lower SESmay drive a
more egalitarian viewpoint (Kamedaet al., 2005), leading to a greater likelihood of sharing
in the DG.While this influence did not appear to hold into adulthood, it is likely that the
measure taken in adults was not sufficiently sensitive to capture SESeffects. SESwas
calculated from participants' current post code (see section 2.2.1 for a description of this
calculation) as many students gave home post codes for which SESinformation could not
be obtained. As such, many adults' SESreflected the student area in which they were living
at the time, which may have been very different from their home address. As such, it is
likely that the measure of SESin adults was flawed. The direction of the SESeffect reversed
in Chapter 5, with children being more altruistic as SESincreased. However, this influence
was weak as it did not remain significant when the influences of other variables were
controlled.
ToM ability, as measured by first order false belief tasks, did not appear to influence
behaviour on the DG. It is possible that a measure of more sophisticated mentalising ability
may have revealed different results; however, the lack of a relationship between altruistic
behaviour and perspective-taking in adults suggests that the ability to imagine the other
person may not drive behaviour in the DG. This crucial factor may rather be empathy,
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especially given the relationship observed in Chapter 3 with empathic concern, and that
children's altruistic behaviour increased in Chapter 5 as a result of being given information
about the recipient.
It should be noted that in order to reliably confirm the lack of influence of ToM ability on
DG behaviour a study designed to assessthis would need to be conducted. This would
ideally involve a larger battery of ToM tasks as the Sally-Anne task was consistently found
to be passed more readily than the deceptive box task. This is because the inhibition
demands for the deceptive box task are higher, resulting in greater likelihood of failing the
task. A larger battery of ToM tasks would give a more sensitive picture of children's ToM
abilities and this combined with a manipulation of perspective-taking would provide an
more reliable assessmentof the relationship between ToM ability and altruistic behaviour
on the DG. Nonetheless, the current findings allow confidence that ToM ability is not
confounding the effects of the variables of interest.
No influence of mathematical ability was found in any of the present studies. This,
combined with a lack of influence of endowment size and the fact that children appear to
respond strategically rather than randomly, suggests that DG behaviour in 4-5 year old
children is not driven by a lack of understanding of the numerosities involved. It is possible
to attribute this to the steps taken to make the task as simple as possible for children,
including placing stickers on an array so that they could keep track of their divisions.
Replication of the study without the array would be necessary to confirm this; however,
given the complete lack of a maths effect and the consistency across the 4 and 10
conditions it seemsmore likely that the children already understand the divisions they have
made.
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Time spent with peers had little influence upon DG behaviour. This may reflect a lack of
sensitivity of the measure rather than a lack of influence; this is certainly likely in Chapter 3
as adults' responses on the questionnaire were vague and most probably inaccurate.
However, time spent with peers did influence behaviour in the Earning DG in Chapter 4,
with children who spent more time with peers appearing to implement a legitimacy norm
more and consequently giving less. As such, it seems that this measure was capable of
capturing differences according to a child's level of peer interaction, but at this age time
spent with peers did not influence behaviour in Chapter 2 or Chapter 5. It should be noted
that the one case in which peers were influential was when few children had internalised
the relevant norm; as such, it is possible that peers may have an impact at an earlier age
when the sharing and deservingness norms activated in these studies have yet to be
internalised by asmany children.
6.5 Use of preschool children
The variety of effects discussed above demonstrates how interesting it is to examine
behaviour in the preschool years, when children are just about to start or have just started
school and are expanding their social spheres. As demonstrated, norms have been acquired
to differing extents, highlighting differences in developmental trajectories according to
sibling status and gender that may not have been observed at older or younger ages. In
older children, more children would have internalised norms, resulting in more
homogeneous behaviour, while in younger children fewer children would have internalised
norms, also resulting in more homogeneous behaviour. This is not to say that examination
of different ages would not be informative; indeed as discussed in section 6.2 this would
help to reveal developmental trajectories and timelines of acquisition. Ideally this would be
done through longitudinal study, which would give a more reliable indicator of the
influences upon norm internalisation and altruistic behaviour.
222
Longitudinal study would also be useful for establishing the stability of the altruistic
behaviours observed in these 4-5 year-olds; however, it is possible to speculate on this
matter. Eisenberget al. (1999) suggested that some prosocial responses are stable, finding
that spontaneous but not compliant sharing behaviour at 4-5 years significantly predicted
self-reported prosocial behaviour in early adulthood. It is difficult to discern how DG
behaviour corresponds to this finding given that it appears to lie somewhere between
spontaneous and compliant sharing", as it is suggested to the child that she might give
some of her stickers away, rendering behaviour not entirely spontaneous, but it is left up to
the child to make the decision in private and so behaviour is therefore not entirely
compliant. However, given the similarity in DG behaviour between the children and adult
groups as a whole, it seemsplausible that this behaviour would demonstrate some stability.
Furthermore, Eisenberget al. suggest that "continuity of socialization influences that affect
prosocial behavior" (Eisenberg et al., 1999, p. 1368) is one influence on the stability of
prosocial behaviour in their longitudinal study and given the change in the sibling effect
from possession of older siblings in childhood to the possession of siblings in general in
adulthood observed in Chapter 3, it also seems possible that sibling status may be one of
these influences.
6.6 Dealing with DG data
It should be noted that there is some disagreement as to how DG data should be
approached, which in some views may have influenced the findings discussed here. Haley
and Fessler (2005) suggest that looking at the overall distribution can be misleading as
differences in mean offers are generally driven by differences in the numbers of people
11 Spontaneoussharingoccurswithout promptingwhile compliantsharingis in responseto a direct
request.
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making a donation. However, Frohlich et al. (2001) suggestthat dividing the data according
to whether or not the participant made a donation is problematic as this aproach groups
together large donations with small donations. They argue that donating one item out of 10
is a token donation and thus more similar to donating nothing than it is to donating half and
so potentially selfish people are treated the same asgenerous individuals. Thesearguments
emphasise the importance of taking different approaches to the data, as done here with
examination of overall donations (allowing comparison of these results to previous
findings), aswell as the decision to donate and positive donations, which give very different
results. Consistent with the suggestion of Saunders and Lynn (2010), these results suggest
that the decision to donate is influenced by social norms and confounding variables.
Saunders and Lynn (2010) suggested that the amount donated reflects prosociality, which
may well be the case, but the current finding in Chapter 4 that only positive donations are
influenced by earning the endowment has demonstrated that norms can also influence the
amount donated. These findings emphasise the importance of examining all aspects of
donation behaviour rather than simply examining overall donations.
It is important to note at this point that focussing on the acquisition and internalisation of
norms is not an argument that people do not differ in terms of a natural inclination for
altruism, but rather that learning a norm and applying it differs across individuals. While
factors such as sibling status and gender may influence some behaviour, it is also possible
that people who are naturally inclined towards altruism are more likely to internalise these
norms. It would be interesting to explore this idea further by taking a measure of altruistic
propensity and examining how this relates to the implementation of altruistic norms in
public and private, aswell as the implementation of non-altruistic norms.
6.7 Informing theories of prosociality and altruism
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There are explanations for altruism that the findings of this thesis cannot either accept or
refute. Warm glow and altruistic self-image are both likely to contribute to some extent,
although it is impossible to discern the degree of influence that they exert. However, the
present findings can inform several of theories of prosociality and altruism detailed in
sections 1.1.1 and 1.2.2. The present findings are in part consistent with Hoffman's (2000)
argument that prosocial development is closely coupled with empathic development, given
that children in Chapter 5 donated more when empathy was activated by providing
information about the recipient. However, Hoffman suggests that pure prosocial motives
increase as role-taking ability develops, yet this thesis found little evidence that this
influences altruism in either children or adults. Indeed, when a relationship between
donations and performance on false belief tasks was observed in Chapter 2 the effect was
in the opposite direction to that which would be expected on the basisof Hoffman's theory,
with greater ability related to smaller donations. However, it may be that there was
insufficient stimulus in the DG for role-taking to influence donations and an effect may be
observed in a more information-rich environment. Also inconsistent with Hoffman's theory
is the idea that empathising beyond the immediate situation occurs late in development. If
empathy does drive behaviour in the DGthen this must be occurring beyond the immediate
situation as the recipient is not present, or even known (except, to some extent, in Chapter
5). As such, children are either able to empathise beyond the situation earlier than
suggested by Hoffman, or else empathy is not the only factor influencing DGbehaviour.
The current findings also partly support Cialdini et al.'s (1981) three step model of altruistic
development. They argued that while altruism is not rewarding to begin with, children learn
its rewarding properties through socialisation. While the present finding that possessionof
older siblings falicitates norm internalisation is consistent with this suggestion, it is not clear
whether this is due to positive reinforcement, nor can this study ascertain the influence
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that adults may have upon this process. Cialdini et al. also propose that girls internalise the
rewarding nature of altruism earlier than boys, although given girls' generally more
sophisticated behaviour across the current studies, resulting in decreased as well as
increased altruistic behaviour, the suggestion of norm internalisation seemsmore plausible.
However, they suggest that children only begin to show 'true' altruism by behaving
altruistically when unobserved in the teenage years, when the current data suggest that
this can occur in the preschool years. It seemsthat preschool children are capable of much
more sophisticated altruistic behaviour than predicted by Cialdini et al.'s model. While
Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that preschool children are by no means as sophisticated as
adults in their altruistic behaviour when it is modulated by other social norms, the
internalisation process does appear to be quite rapid, particularly in children with older
siblings and girls.
Batson and Shaw's (1991) empathy-altruism hypothesis states that empathic emotional
responses to another's need leads to a greater likelihood of altruism, while acknowledging
that selfish routes to the same behaviour also exist. The findings in this thesis are
consistent with this hypothesis, as empathic concern (over and above personal distress)
appears to influence DG behaviour in adults, while children donate more when they are
given information about the recipient, which is likely to activate an empathic response.
While Cialdini et al. (1997) argue that oneness (Le. self-other overlap) with the recipient
drives altruistic behaviour rather than empathy, the current finding of altruistic behaviour
even in completely anonymous conditions, when oneness is likely to be minimal, suggests
that this is not always the case.
The current findings are not completely consistent with anyone model of prosociality or
altruism. However, with the exception of Cialdini et al.'s (1981) three step model of
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altruistic development, the influence of norms is little-considered. The argument is not that
there is an explicit altruism norm, but rather that people are not expected to behave in an
altruistic manner, which is one reason why altruism is so valued. Indeed, modesty is
esteemed in many cultures, implying that people benefit from keeping their altruistic
behaviour to themselves, which would not be the case if there were an altruism norm.
Nonetheless, the sibling effect in Chapters 2 and 3 suggests that siblings facilitate
internalisation of a sharing norm, which is activated in the anonymous DG but free to be
ignored. That it is not ignored is arguably due to altruism. It was also argued that this
sharing norm is overridden by other norms that can influence altruistic behaviour in the DG,
such as a legitimacy norm and a deservingnessnorm. Once again, the argument is not that
these norms drive altruism itself, but that they modulate its behavioural implementation. A
comprehensive theory of altruism, therefore, should incorporate the influence of norms
that both increase (e.g. deservingness)and decrease (e.g. legitimacy) altruistic behaviour.
6.8 Onwards from altruism: future directions
This thesis has only touched on the ways in which the DG can teach us about children's
altruistic behaviour and the influences upon it. Adding a taking option (Bardsley, 2008; List,
2007), for instance, would add an extra real-world dimension (Levitt & List, 2007), although
as discussed in section 1.3.2 this needs to be approached carefully in order that children do
not feel that taking is acceptable as this no more reflects the real world than does only
being able to give.
Expanding the DG to incorporate altruistic punishment (Le. converting it to an ultimatum
game by allowing the recipient to reject the offer) would help to demonstrate whether
children are committed to enforcing norms as well as personally abiding by them. There is
evidence to suggest that younger children punish less in a standard ultimatum game,
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possibly due to difficulty delaying gratification (e.g. Murnighan & Saxon, 1998). Proposals,
but not rejections, also appear to be related to ToM ability, with preschoolers who pass
false belief tasks making larger offers than those who did not, demonstrating the
importance of perspective-taking in making a strategic offers (Takagishi,Kameshima,Schug,
Koizumi, & Yamagishi, 2010). Use of an ultimatum game would also potentially help to
capture children's awareness of norms before they have been internalised. For instance,
should preschool children punish when the proposer is given a windfall endowment but
refrain from doing so when it has been earned by the proposer, it would suggest that they
are aware of the legitimacy norm but have not yet internalised it (hence the lack of a
general earning effect in Chapter 3).
An approach that has yet to be taken, presumably becauseof the enormous resources that
would be required, is conducting a cross-cultural study from a longitudinal developmental
perspective. This would help to reveal how norms are transmitted and internalised and at
what point in ontogeny children begin to behave in a manner that is characteristic of their
culture.
Finally, it would be particularly informative to address the issueof motives. This thesis has
from the outset examined altruistic behaviour at the expense of investigating the
underlying motives. While the argument that attempting to find a selfish basisof altruistic
behaviour undermines altruism still applies, this does not mean that the intention is to
argue that motives are not important. It would be interesting to combine the quantitative
approach of DG with the qualitative approach of interviewing the children about their
reasons for giving. Probing children's DGthinking would help to reveal whether they give
because they think it is expected of them, or whether behaviour is more automatic than
explicitly considered, to give just two examples.
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In sum, this thesis has demonstrated that preschool children are not uniformly selfish, but
are capable of similar levels of altruistic behaviour as adults. This behaviour is influenced by
numerous factors intrinsic to the child, such as their gender, sibling status and SES.It is also
modulated by both descriptive and methodological changes to the DG procedure, which
each activate different norms that children appear to have internalised to different extents.
As discussed above, the issueof motives has been intentionally sidestepped. However, this
thesis will finish with a personal view on this matter. The idea that pure altruism does not
exist as a selfish motive is always present seems rather bleak and potentially misleading.
For example, a mother is evolutionarily, genetically and hormonally driven to love her child,
but few would argue that this means that no mother truly loves her child. Similarly, just
because a person who runs into a burning building to save a trapped child could not live
with himself for not taking action, does it mean that this behaviour is no longer altruistic? If
altruism is defined out of existence, rather than proving altruism fallacious, perhaps the
definition of altruism itself should be re-examined.
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.. The University of
Jt_ Nottingharr
Cognitive Development and
Learning Group
Questionnaire
Title of project: The development of altruism
Investigator: Ellie Limback
(Supervisor: Dr. Dana Samson)
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham
We would appreciate it if you would complete the following questionnaire about
your child. This information will not affect your child's participation in the study,
but it will be useful for us to be able to take it into consideration when we look at
the study results. If you do not feel comfortable answering any of the questions
then feel free to leave them blank.
1. Please provide details of how many family members you have living at home
and their relationship to your child. Please also provide the ages and genders of
any of your child's siblings:
2. How many hours per week does your child spend at school?
3. Does your child take part in any extra-curricular activities or go to a nursery,
playgroup or childminder where they interact with other children?
YES/NO
4. If you answered 'yes' to question 3, please provide details, including how
many hours they spend there a week:
Signature of parent/guardian: Date: _
Name (block capitals): _
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Experimental script
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Sit the child at the table, experimenter sits opposite.
We're going to do some things together, is that alright? The first
thing that we're going to do is with stickers.
Uncover a selection of stickers in front of the child in a random arrangement (ensure
each faces the child).
Look carefully at these stickers and tell me which one out of all of the
stickers you would like to keep the most.
Allow the child to make their selection - make a note of the sticker and remove it
from the group, placing it on the appropriate array.
Now which of all the stickers that are left would you like to keep the
most?
Repeat as above until the child has selected four or ten stickers, depending on the
trial.
Well done, that's lovelyl We've finished choosing stickers for now, so
I'm going to put the rest away.
Remove the leftover stickers and place out of sight; place the array in front of the
child.
Look, these are the stickers that you chose, and guess what? You
really can keep theml They're all yours to take home with you if you
want to. Before you take them away, though, I want to ask you
something. I don't have enough stickers to give to all of the children
that I play with, so if you want to you can give some of your stickers
to someone else. The stickers are all yours so it's up to you whether
you give any away - you don't have to give any away at all if you
don't want to. If you do want to give some of your stickers to
someone else then they'll be gone forever - you won't be able to
have them back. If you decide to give some of your stickers away
then you can put them into one of these envelopes.
Show the child the two envelopes.
The stickers you decide to take home will go in this envelope. I'll
write your name on your envelope so you can remember which one
is yours.
Write the child's name on one of the envelopes.
Look, I'll put a picture to colour into each envelope so that everyone
gets something in their envelope. Put the stickers you want to keep
in your envelope first. Then put the card (gesture to the card) with
the stickers on it that you want to give away into the other
envelope. If you don't want to give any stickers away at all then just
put the empty card (gesture) into the envelope. It'll be a secret
whether you give any stickers away so I will close my eyes and put
my hands over them like this so I can't seewhat you do.
Demonstrate eyes shut with hands over them.
Remember, you don't have to put any stickers in this envelope if you
don't want to because they're all yours, you can put all of them into
your envelope. If you do give some stickers away then you won't be
able to have them back. Do you understand?
Repeat the instructions if the child does not understand.
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Okay, I'm going to shut my eyes and put my hands over them now.
You put all the stickers that you want to keep in this envelope
(indicate) and put all the stickers that you want to give away on their
card in this envelope (indicate) and you can tell me when you have
finished. Okay?
Close eyes and cover with hands. When the child indicates that they have finished:
Well done. Shall we close the envelopes?
If necessary, help the child to seal the envelopes.
Now we can put your envelope over here out of the way and you can
post this envelope into this box so I can give it to someone else on
another day.
Put the child's envelope on one side and allow the child to post the other envelope
into the box, which contains several similar envelopes.
Now we're going to do the same thing again, but this time we're
going to use some different stickers.
Place the alternative selection and alternative array in front of the child.
Look carefully at these stickers and tell me which one out of all of the
stickers you would like to keep the most.
Allow the child to make their selection - make a note of the sticker and remove it
from the group, placing it on the appropriate array.
Now which of all the stickers that are left would you like to keep the
most?
Repeat as above until the child has selected four or ten stickers, depending on the
trial.
Well done, that's lovely I We've finished choosing stickers now, so I'm
going to put the rest away.
Remove the leftover stickers and place out of sight; place the array in front of the
child.
These stickers are yours to keep, just like before, but if you want to
you can give some of these stickers to another child that doesn't
have any. Remember, the stickers are all yours so it's up to you
whether you give any away - you don't have to give any away at all
if you don't want to but if you do give some of your stickers to
someone else then they'll be gone forever - you won't be able to
have them back. If you do want to give some of your stickers to
someone else then you can put them into one of these envelopes.
Show the child the two envelopes.
Remember, the stickers you decide to keep will go in this envelope,
so I'll write your name on your envelope so you can remember
which one is yours.
Write the child's name on one of the envelopes.
I'll put a picture to colour into each envelope again so that everyone
gets something in their envelope. Put the stickers you want to keep
in your envelope first. Then put the card (gesture) with the stickers
on it that you want to give away into the other envelope like this. If
you don't want to give any stickers away at all then just put the
empty card (gesture) into the envelope. It'll be a secret whether you
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give any stickers away so I will close my eyes and put my hands over
them again so I can't seewhat you do. Remember, you don't have to
put any stickers in if you don't want to because they're all yours, but
if you do give some away you won't be able to have them back. Do
you understand?
Repeat the instructions if the child does not understand.
Okay, I'm going to shut my eyes and put my hands over them now.
You put all the stickers that you want to keep in this envelope
(indicate) and all the stickers that you want to give away on their
card in this envelope (indicate) and you can tell me when you have
finished. Okay?
Close eyes and cover with hands. When the child indicates that they have finished:
Well done. Shall we close the envelopes?
If necessary, help the child to seal the envelopes.
Now we can put your envelope over here out of the way and you can
post this envelope into the box so I can give it to someone else on
another day.
Put the child's envelope on one side and allow the child to post the other envelope
into the box.
Now we're going to playa game with some blocks like these.
Show the child the blocks and place two mats on the table side by side.
What colour is this (indicate)? What colour is this (indicate)?
Reinforce which colour is which if the child does not know.
I'm going to give you some blocks and I'd like you to put some on the
yellow mat and some on the blue mat so that both mats have the
same amount. let me show you.
Put two blocks together between the two mats.
look, I've got some blocks here, watch me as I put the blocks on the
yellow and blue mat.
Put one block on the yellow mat and one block on the blue mat.
look, there is one block on the blue mat and one block on the yellow
mat. So both mats have now the same amount. Do you see that
there is the sameamount on both mats? Now it's your turn.
Put set of 4 blocks between the two mats.
Canyou put some of these blocks on the yellow mat and some on the
blue mat and make sure that both mats have the same amount?
Wait until child seems to have finished.
Haveyou finished? Well done.
Repeat twice more, using different blocks each time. Conduct three further trials
with 10 blocks.
That game's all finished now, shall we play another game? For this
game we need my special cards. look - each card has spots on it.
Place two cards in front of the child as per the response sheet.
Do these both have the same number of spots?
If the answer is 'yes', move onto the next trial. If the answer is 'no', ask:
Which one hasmore spots?
Continue as per the response sheet until 01112 trials have been conducted.
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Well done, shall we play one more game before we finish? For this
game I'm going to show you some things and ask you some
questions about them, okay?
Show the child the box with the banana in it.
Look at this box. What do you think is inside?
Allow the child to respond.
Shall we have a look at what's inside it?
Open the box and remove the banana. Give it to the child ta hold.
What's this?
Allow the child to respond. If they do not respond 'banana', say:
It's a bananaI What is it?
Repeat as above until the child gives the correct response. Return the banana to the
box and close it again.
Your mummy/daddy hasn't seen inside this box. If mummy/daddy
sees the box all closed up like this, what will [s]he think is inside it?
Will [s]he think there is a banana inside it or will [s]he think there are
chocolate biscuits inside it?
Allow the child to respond.
When you first saw the box, before we opened it, what did you think
was inside it? Did you think there was a banana inside it or did you
think there were chocolate biscuits inside it?
Allow the child to respond.
Does it look like there is a banana inside the box or does it look like
there are chocolate biscuits inside?
Allow the child to respond.
What's really inside this box? Is there really a banana inside it, or are
there really chocolate biscuits inside?
Allow the child to respond.
Okay, now let's look at this story.
Read Sally-Anne story, then ask the following questions:
Where will Sally look for the ball first?
Allow the child to respond.
Where is the ball really?
Allow the child to respond.
Where was the ball in the beginning?
Allow the child to respond.
Well done, we've finished everything I Thank you for all your helpl
Would you like to take your envelopes back to your classroom now?
Allow the child to return to their classroom.
End of session.
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Adults' instruction sheet
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H L
D
.... The university of
Jt. Nottingharr
Human Development and learning
Group
Title of project: Social behaviour and emotions
Investigator: Ellie Limback
(Supervisors: Dr. Dana Samson and Dr. Nikki Pitchford)
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham
Participant instructions - please read carefully
The study
This study examines social behaviour and emotions. You will be asked to complete a
set of short questionnaires. You will also be given several coins which are yours to
take away with you; however, if you wish you may anonymously give some of your
coins to another person.
The sections below explain the different steps involved in the study.
Brown envelopes
The experimenter will place some £1 coins on the table which are all for you to
keep. However, if you wish, you can give some coins to another person. Should you
wish to do so, simply put the coins you wish to give away into the numbered brown
envelope. The content of that envelope will be given to a random person on
campus at a later date. The brown envelope marked "Take this envelope with you"
is your envelope where you can put any coins you decide to keep. You will notice
that there is a complimentary Sudoku puzzle in each envelope so that everyone has
something in their envelope.
It is entirely up to you how many (if any) coins you place in the numbered envelope.
When you have made your decision, seal both envelopes and place the numbered
envelope into the locked box. This process is completely anonymous - you will not
be told anything about the other person and they will know nothing about you.
White envelope and questionnaires
There are three short questionnaires placed face down. Please turn the
questionnaires over only once you have placed your brown numbered envelope in
the locked box. Please complete the questionnaires, then seal them into the
numbered white envelope and put it into the locked box.
263
Anonymity
To ensure anonymity, the box will only be opened when there are at least ten
brown and ten white envelopes inside. All brown envelopes will be opened and
their contents recorded before being sealed into new, unmarked envelopes. This
will be done by another experimenter whom you will not meet. The questionnaires
will remain confidential and will be kept in a locked filing cabinet. There will be no
means of associating the contents of either of your envelopes with you. The
numbers on your envelopes are simply for the purposes of matching the
questionnaires to the brown numbered envelopes. These numbers enable this
match to be made without identifying you in any way - this number will never be
associated with you. The process is completely anonymous.
Checklist
Please tick off each item on the checklist as you complete it. The experimenter will
check this at the end of the study to ensure that everything has been completed.
What to do next
The experimenter will give you your coins, leave the room and wait at the end of
the corridor. Please fetch the experimenter when you have finished and she will
provide you with your raffle ticket. If you have any questions, please ask the
experimenter.
Thank you for your participation.
Ellie Limback
Telephone: 0115 8468188
Email: IwxeI3@psychology.nottingham.ac.uk
Dr. Dana Samson: dana.samson@nottingham.ac.uk
Dr. Nikki Pitchford: nicola.pitchford@nottingham.ac.uk
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Adults' questionnaire
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Please respond to the questions below. All information will be strictly confidential
and completely anonymous - there will be no means of associating your responses
with you personally. Please try to answer all questions, but if you are uncomfortable
answering any questions then please leave them blank. When you have completed
the questionnaire, please fold it into the envelope provided, seal and post it into the
locked postbox.
Date of birth (dd/mm/yyyy): _
Gender (please circle as appropriate): Male Female
Course: _
Yearofcourse: _
Home post code (during holidays): _
Post code of your longest place of residence between ages 2 and 18: _
Do you have any brothers or sisters? Yes No
If yes, please give details of their dates of birth and genders below:
Date of Gender Are they a full, Did you live Approximately how many
birth half or step with them as a years did you live with them
sibling? child? for?
266
Did you spend time in childcare as a child? Yes
(e.g. nursery, childminder, playgroup, after school club)
No
If yes, please give details (as best you can remember) of your age at the time and
the approximate number of hours per week:
267
Appendix 5 -Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980)
268
Ul>-
~ex:
>
._ W
I->.....J
.0 U .....J W W W W W W W W W W UJ W
::J :fj(l)W
0 woES:
>
Ul (l)
(l)..c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.o+->
._ (l)
1-- 0U U
Ul I-(l) ·u
"0 U U U U U U U U U U U U
+->
1-'
(l)
U
~(l) Vl
~ C to to to to to to to co to to to coro
~ I-
0 ::J ::J to
..c o 0
(l) » (l)
..... C~ ~ -c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ <C ~ ~ ~ <Cro Eu o C I-
._ ro
~o (l)
"O"O..c
.!:: ~ I- z.o.....J'c .....J cV
,'u Ulu~
~ >
E (l) C
~:fjl-(l)"O 10 C B
.....
U o"O~ (l)(l)
::J e. e.
..c > 0 ::J UlU ro
>
I-
ro..c +->
(l)
(l) Ul ..c Cl.
::J ro ClI- 0 ::J I-0>>- ro (l)
u.. -
C~ (l) u s:
• (l) (l) E > E
+->
Ul ..c C
0
Qj (l) E
§s:o +-> Ul ..... ..c 0
._ ..c (l) ..... I-
..... C E e. C .... (l)roW Ul (l) Ul 0 ~ E10 (l) E 1:::J l- e. :0 :p 0
.~ 0 l- e. s 0 ro 10 0
I-
Ul ,(l) ro 0 u C ~ ::J .E
.... o~ ..c
(l) I- 0 ... Ul
';;; Cl. +-> 0 'iii Clo Ul +-> (l) (l) 'iii +-> (l)
>-Uc 01 Cl C
l- Q)
..c E .... '0 (l) e..... ~ Cl 0 e: e: (l) > 10 ..c 1..0
.~ Ifl'0 '> e: ... NE e: +-> (l) "0 :p 0 .j.J10 C m ~ u :p ~ ro
ttl 'z +.J ..c '0 ..c 0 10 (l) 0 0 ..c>~- ttl ... .j.J ~
ttl · ·0 ..c e.
(l) Qj t-' (l) 0 E ..c(l) I- ~ I- (l)
e:(l)z +.J ...
~
m > C m e. (l) Cl E
._ ClO Ul ttl 0 0 E e:Cl e: >- >- e: '0 .... ~ 0UllOa.. 0 C
Cl 0. lJ) C ::J ::J
(l) (l)
...... (l) Ul
~ Cl ..c ttl III "0 > '0. ,!!.!C(l)w ..c
.E
... C m '0 ~ C ttl
~£a:
.j.J l-
e: (l) C m
+.J (l) (l) I ttl .E ~ E (l)(l) .... w ::J Ul ..c Ul .j.J "- ';;;
.... oa: 0 Ul .j.J ..c I- m ,
(l) Qj 0
.!! 0 ~ (l) I > .0 > 0
"0 Cl.0 .0 :: +.J 10 (l) (l) .0 Ettl U ._ ... .... :0e:ou.. (l) (l) (l) ttl e. e: ...... I-ttl+->w a. a. I- '0 (l) '0
(l) I-
(l)tO > ..c m e: I- ....' 'E ~ 0Ul ..... 0 ..... 0 E
:c..c>- ·c (l) (l) ..c
co 0 0 (l) ~
E u
(l)
.0 0+.J.....J ttl Cl. Cl. (l) (l)
~
(l) (l)
Cl+.J .....J 0 I- (l) > .;;; Cl ..c Ul 0
::Jttl::::> ::J I- J:: (l) .e 'iii 01 10 ... '0 .0
,g(l)u.. Cl .E 0.r:. ..... e: E m .j.J C "0(l) Vl e:
+.Jftjw I- Ul Cl ... .... (l) .!!.! C (l) 00 0 10I-ua: (l) Cl C ..c 10 '0 > E ·c 0
::J Ul~ C I- Ul (l)
.... Cl
O(l)U E ..c .E Cl l- .e m "0 m >0 Qj .j.J e: 0. u "- m 10X >..c Cl. +.J 0 .... E
+.J+.J~ Ul ~
(l)
~
m e cW (l) (l) m (l) c
0 ::JeW ..c Ul
~
~
(l)
~
(l) "0
"0001- +.J '0 0 Qj '0 ..c eZ .0 ...... '3 (l) 0 I/) ...... 'iii 10 ttl (l)
.... ml-I E +.J (l) ~ C ..... ~ +.J >
~
~~u :!: ~
..c (l) I/) Cl Ul Ul 0(l) (l) ..... .... >-
I-
Ul+.J~ N U ::J (l) ..c
C I/) (l) >
....
m~w 'iii c u >
..c
~ ~
'0 'Qj (l) '0 e
>
+.J a.0
~
Qj '3 c 0 .0 c:.... tl~o 10 U 0 (l) .0 Qj ::J >-tJ +.J ~ > (l)C:m~ c: "0 :p ~ Qja: '0 10 B e ..c 0
~
(l) 'c W 10 (l) ~
~
(l) (l) 0 +.J E
E Cl. a:
.... ::J QjW '0
"0 C > .j.J
(l) > (l)
~ ~ex:
~e~ "0 c 0 0 'iii
...... (l)
E ~e: c: .0 ..... .j.J
.....J m Cl. (l) 10 (l) Ii:::: '0 > 0 ... 0
~
...
~
10 I/) Ul
~ t) ~~ ...... c >- III (l) (l)E (l) Ul ~Z (l) > (l) III +.J C 0 (l) E E 010 Cl(l)- 10 10 E (l) (l) (l) 10 (l) c
III ':.e(l)
(l)
..c E Cl ~ ::J .Q III ~ :p 'E
~+.J'lO
I- :p Ul (l)
ex: "0 (l)
~
> CLI 0 ...... E Ec ::J 0W o Cl·_ >
~
E E ... c:
a.. -cl- Io E 10 E b (l) 0 0 ua: O'_ e. '0 0 ~ CLI ..c I/) Ul (l)
W
.... UlO 0 Ul 0 C 10 3: ...... .... too I- ...... Ul
I- (l)oo.
-
...... ...... .... ...... ......
Z .e ..c 0.
--i \li ex) 0
~ N
...... I-um ~ N CV) I.J') r-.. 0\ .-4 ~ ~
VI>-
~OC
,_ W
I->....J
U ....J
~O)W
woE~
u
0)
~E
«00)
z.o....J
'c ....J
~u«
o~~
0'0«
w
o
u
«
E
ro
u
c
ro
E
~
o
~
'0
C
OJ
~
.....
1:
::J
J::.
~
OJ
Cl
OJ
C
o
OJ
E
o
VI
OJ
0)
VI
.....
c
0)
J::.
~
w
o
u
«
ro
0)
'0
~
ro
~
Cl
ro
OJ
E
of
::J
t;;
'0
~jij
::J
VI
::J
~
o
c:
o
'0
III
OJ
C
::J
1:::
.E
III
OJ
a.
o
OJ
a.
"-OJ
:5
o
V
.-4
w
u
cO
«
VI
~
c
Q)
E
::J
e'
ro
,VI
Q)
Cl.
o
0)
Cl.
l-
Q)
J::.
~
o
o
.....
Cl
C
C
OJ
.....
VI
OJ
E
:;:;
J::.
U
::J
E
OJ
~
VI
ro
~
~
c
o
'0
,
Cl
C
J::.
~
OJ
E
o
VI
~
::J
o
.0
ro
~
J::.
Cl
'c
,E
.....
~
::J
VI
,E
.....
..._
.....
w
o
u
«
~
OJ
t
E
ro
J::.
u
OJ
J::.
~
..._
o
OJ
c
o
~
OJ
~
....
J::.
Cl
::J
o
J::.
...
1/1
ro
...
.!
OJ
>
ro
J::.
.....
I-
o
>-
ro
a.
ro
Cl
c:
'Q;
QJ
III
I-
~
ID
.-4
w
o
u
«
OJ
E
VI
~
ro
u
VI
c
o
:;:;
ro
::J
~
'iii
ro
c
o
:;:;
o
E
OJ
0)
VI
C
OJ
.....
ro
c
Cl
c
'Q;
cO
w
o
u
«
E
QJ
J::.
.....
l-
.E
>-
.....
'0.
J::.
u
::J
E
~
0)
>
Qj
~
~
c
o
'0
Cl)
OJ
E
:;:;
0)
E
o
Cl)
,
>-
i:;e
C
::J
'0
~
ro
~
.....
Cl
c
'Q;
.0
OJ
cg
E
o
Cl)
~
Cl)
....
c:
QJ
J::.
~
w
o
u
«
VI
0)
'u
c
0)
e'
0)
E
0)
J::.
.....
'~
Cl
c
ro
0)
'0
C
OJ
>
B
~
OJ
>-
~
~
Cl.
>-
ro
::J
VI
::J
E
ro
w
o
u
«
c
OJ
a.
a.
ro
J::.
OJ
OJ
VI
.....
.....
ro
J::.
.....
Cl)
Cl
c:
J::.
.....
>-
.0
'0
OJ
J::.
U
::J
13
~
::J
C'
C
~
o
E
ro
.....
o
N
w
o
u
cO
«
J::.
~
o
.0
E
Q)
J::.
~
~
ro
~
o
o
o
~
~
~
'0
C
ro
c
o
:;:;
VI
0)
::J
0'
~
Q)
>
OJ
o
~
VI
OJ
'0
VI
o
E
OJ
I-
ro
~
OJ
J::.
.....
.....
ro
J::.
.....
OJ
>
OJ
W
.0
.....
w
o
u
«
c
o
~
0)
Cl.
'0
OJ
1:::
ro
OJ
J::.
I
~
o
Cl)
f
Cl.
ro
Cl)
ro
..._
Qj
Cl)
>-
E
OJ
.0
'C
U
Cl)
OJ
'0
'0
::J
o
~
....
N
N
w
o
u
«
~
OJ
.....
u
~
ro
J::.
u
Cl
C
'0
ro
OJ
ro
......
o
0)
u
ro
0.
0)
J::.
~
C
.....
Qj
VI
>-
E
.....
::J
Cl.
~
'iii
ro
OJ
~
OJ
>
C
ItI
U
.....
OJ
':;:
o
E
'0
o
o
Cl
ro
J::.
u
.....
ro
~
.....
c
0)
J::.
~
M
N
w
o
u
cO
«
Cl)
OJ
'u
c
OJ
~
OJ
E
OJ
Cl
C
'C
::J
"0
e
.....
c:
o
u
OJ
III
o
13
"0
c
~
....
w
o
u
«
OJ
J::.
~
::
VI
OJ
o
J::.
VI
VI
J::.
C
......
OJ
VI
>-
E
.....
::J
Cl.
o
.....
.....
OJ
C
o
OJ
E
o
VI
.....
ro
.....
OJ
VI
Cl.
::J
E
ro
w
o
u
-c
II
c
OJ
>
OJ
OJ
J::.
...
!!:::
Qj
.!
'0
::J
o
~
....
~
o
J::.
OJ
,!:
Cl
ItI
E
....
cO
w w
o o
u u
« «
Cl)
OJ
U
Q)
Cl.
o
~
o
Cl ....!!:::
.....
>-
u
c
OJ
e'
OJ
E
0)
c
ro
c
Cl.
W
J::.
VI
'0
0)
OJ
C
>-
'0
ro
.0
o
J::.
~
....
~
o
J::.
OJ
C
Cl
ro
E
o
...
~
...
....
>.
-g
.0
OJ
Eg
Cl
c::
'N
'0
:p
'I:
u
~
.E
~
CO
N
Appendix 6 - Alpha coefficients for the IRI (Davis 1980)
271
Fantasy Perspective Empathic Personal
taking concern distress
Males .78 .75 .72 .78
Females .75 .78 .70 .78
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Appendix 7
Script for previous encounter with recipient
273
Story A
I was at another school yesterday and I went to a cooking lesson where they were
baking a cake. When they all came in to the classroom the teacher asked them to
sit quietly in their places. Ted/Beth" came in sat in his/her place like the teacher
had asked them to and because Ted/Beth listened to the teacher she was very
happy with him/her. She then asked him/her to get the sugar which he/she took
from the cupboard and put it nicely on the table. When they had finished making
the cake and it had come out from the oven, the teacher gave Ted/Beth a knife and
he/she cut it in to nice neat pieces so that everyone received a piece of cake to eat.
At the end of the lesson the teacher was pleased with Ted/Beth and said well done.
Story B
Oh I'll tell you another story about the school I went to yesterday; I also went in to
another cooking lesson where they were baking a cake. When they all came in to
the classroom the teacher asked them to sit quietly in their places. Bill/Jane· came
and ran around the tables shouting and because Bill/Jane did not listen to the
teacher she was very cross with him/her. She then asked him/her to get the eggs
which he/she threw on the floor and broke. When they had finished making the
cake and it had come out from the oven, the teacher gave Bill/Jane a knife and
he/she squashed it so that nobody could eat the cake anymore. At the end of the
lesson the teacher was cross with Bill/Jane and told him/her off.
• If the participant has the same name as the character, an alternative name will be
used (Dan/Kate or luke/Claire)
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Appendix 8
Counterbalancing Chapter 5
275
Singletons Firstborns Lastborns
Total
Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys
Nice
6 4 6 6 6 4 32
first
Naughty
7 4 7 7 8 10 43
first
Total 13 8 13 13 12 14 75
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